Jin-soon Doh
Source: Korea Overseas Information Service
Immediately following the Liberation, South Korea was whirled into a political maelstrom with the uncomfortable co-existence of the Americans, rightists, and leftists, all of whom advanced various ideas on nation-building.
The left wing proposed the People's Republic of Korea (hereafter PRK) in 1945 and the establishment of a unified government under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Committee (hereafter UUJC) in 1946-47; the right wing, supported the Korean Provisional Government (hereafter KPG}, self-governance and a separate southern government. The United States, on the other hand, while seeking to establish a unified government under the UUJC, basically proceeded to establish an independent government in the South.
The political turmoil of Korea in the years 1945-48 culminated in the establishment of separate governments in the North and South, consequently prompting nationalist movements to turn to unification as a new cause. Although there exists a host of arguments concerning the division of Korea, the political nature which underlies the division may generally be summarized into two aspects: systemic and national confrontation.
|
Nature |
Content |
External Condition |
Internal Condition |
|
Systemic Confrontation |
Socialism and Capitalism |
U.S. and USSR |
South/North and Right/Left Confrontation |
|
National Confrontation |
Superpower and Weak Nation |
U.S./U.S.S.R./Japan and North/South Koreas |
Pro-American/Pro-Soviet/Pro-Japanese and Right/Left |
This paper, while keeping in mind the complicated post-Liberation political situation, will attempt to compare and contrast the ideas of nation-building advocated by Kim Koo, who represented the KPG, and by Kim Kyu-sik who represented the moderate right; then examine the process through which the two leaders came to an agreement in founding a unified government.
In this paper, I have avoided the method usually employed in researches on nation-building, i.e., examining political credos and policies which explicitly show the contents of national construction. This is because it is necessary first of all to analyze the political contents of nation-building and their systemic and national characteristics in relation to the political dynamics and activities of the times, for political credos and policies of this period contain a degree of banality and falsity as they usually are found in mass politics.
Also, since the right-wing politics of the turbulent post-Liberation era proceeded with the leader at its center, this paper will make ample use of the leaders' personal backgrounds and peculiar traits found in their independence movements. Finally, because much factual research on the leaders has been done through biographies and I have assessed in detail otherwise little-documented aspects, this paper will concentrate more on interpreting the major issues involved rather than analyzing or listing concrete facts.
The grounding of the personal background and the moratoria of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik influenced their full-scale political activities and independence movements in no small ways.
Kim Koo, born in the year of the Pyongja [18761 Treaty of Kanghwa-do was signed, went through "stormy wanderings" and "checkered fate" well before taking refuge in China in 1919 and launching an in-depth career of independence movement. As a child (12 years of age in 1887), he learned the Chinese classics at a sodang [traditional village-level primary school]. At 17, he applied for the Confucian civil service examination and failed; later on, he studied feng-shui [geomancy [and physiognomy.
At 18, he joined the Tonghak [Eastern Learning] order and was appointed the chapchu [district leader] of P'albong the following year; at 19, as a commander of the Tonghak army in the Kabo [18941 Peasants War, he led the troops in a bid to bring down Haeju-Sung [fort] in Hwanghae-do [province] but failed.
At 20, entrusting himself to the care of An T'ae-hun, An Chung-gun's father. He studied the Hwasa branch of the "Wijong-ch 'oksa" [Guarding the Orthodoxy and Refuting the Heterodoxy] school of Confucianism under the great scholar Ko Nung-son, then crossed the Yalu to join Kim Yi-On's Righteous Army Corps. At 21, he killed a Japanese general named Tsuchida at Ch'iha-p'o [port], Anak-kun in order to "avenge the murder of the Queen," for which he was imprisoned and sentenced to death. Two years later, after escaping from prison, he was ordained a Buddhist monk (Buddhist name, "Wonjong") at Magok-sa [temple] in Kongju and devoted himself to priesthood at Yongch'on-am [monastery] in P'yongyang.
At 24, he returned to secular life and wandered for some time. At 27, he betrothed Yook but broke off the match, converted to Christianity, once again betrothed An Ch'ang-ho's sister An Shin-ho but again broke off the match; at 29, he married Ch'oe Chun-rye. Such were the vicissitudes of Kim Koo's life. which continued into his 30's.
After 1905 (30 years old) he participated mainly in educational movements along the line of the Patriotic Enlightenment movement and in the New People's Association, a secret society, but was again imprisoned in connection with the An Myong-gun Incident and sentenced to 17 years. After being released on parole in the fall of 1914, he lived as a keeper of the Tongsan-p'yong farm.
The following personal traits may thus be perceived from Kim's developmental years, moratorium, and early experiences in the independence movement. Like most people of his era, he was deprived of the opportunities for a regular and systematic education, consequently going through an ideological digression, as has been shown from his fleeting encounters with Confucianism, Tonghak, Buddhism, and Christianity.
For this reason, Kim was comparatively lacking in a sense of self in relation to ideology; one may say that he, while free of didactic obsession with ideology, was deficient in an ideological-theoretical vision. Also, while Kim possessed a true plebeian simplicity rarely to be found in the political leaders of his times, he was an activist with a traditional leaning who advocated the loyalty typical of Confucianism or the Righteous Army instead of modern values and Western lifestyle.
For Kim, full-scale independence movement began after his exile to China in 1919, and it is closely related to the KPG as is well known. In order to discuss his independence movement, however, it is necessary to pay attention to the hitherto ignored inherent nature of the political lines of the KPG organization.
A "government," unlike a "political party," has as one of its prerequisites "single representativeness," and a "provisional government" likewise must be the sole representative of a people. But since a provisional government is established outside its homeland and may encounter some difficulty in verifying its unique representativeness, it is rounded in times of war (world wars or otherwise) in expectation of a quick independence and requires the official recognition of foreign governments.
Therefore, when a provisional government has problems ensuring its representativeness due to the prolongation of its existence or to the failure to win the official recognition of foreign governments, it may come to a deadlock.
The KPG started out in 1919 in optimistic circumstances, but many problems began to arise when immediate independence was frustrated and it had to go on out of necessity. The KPG attempted to solve the question of its national representativeness by proclaiming itself the representative of all independence movement organizations, but instead, some even demanded for its outright dissolution for the cause of a unified front and advocated the "Yidang-ch 'iguk" (Rule the Nation Through A Party) single-party movement.
Kim's independence movement after exile into China may in effect be summarized as the "firm maintenance and recognition of the KPG." When the KPG was rendered powerless in the 1923 National Representative Convention, he as the Minister of Internal Affairs dissolved the Convention. When the KPG fell into a limbo in 1926 because of difficulty in organizing the Cabinet, caused by a shortage of suitable men, he as the Premier put the system into order, and in the late 1920's, when the KPG became all but a name with the departure of independence movement leaders, he alone stayed put and maintained the KPG.
In addition to preserving the KPG, Kim was engaged in a number of significant activities as well. Representative of them are: special activities such as organizing "Patriotic Martyr" Yi Pong-ch'ang's attempt to assassinate the Japanese emperor and "Patriotic Martyr" Yun Pong-gil's heroic terrorism at Hong-k'ou Park through the Korean Patriotic Corps; organizing and fortifying sub-KPG organs such as the Korean Independence Party and the Korean Nationalist Party; and establishing and training military organizations, e.g. the Liberation Army.
In most cases, such activities on Kim Koo's part are put at the opposite end of the spectrum against Syngman Rhee's. Although Kim's activities must be differentiated from those of Rhee who worked under unilateral support of the American government, it is more important to pay attention to the fact that they were not unrelated to the recognition by nations such as China and other Korean independence movement groups of the KPG's representativeness.
As has been mentioned, the recognition of the KPG was in fact the prime goal of its political lines. Kim Koo through the aforesaid activities endeavored to win the KPG's recognition, and after the outbreak of the war, struggled for the KPG to be recognized diplomatically. Representative of such efforts are the negotiations with the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government following the Manchurian Incident, and those with the Chinese and American governments after the start of the Pacific War. It was here that the seeds of the post-Liberation "KPG legitimacy" theory were sown.
Kim Kyu-sik, 5 years Kim Koo's junior, was born in Tongnae, Kyongsang-namdo [South Kyongsang Province]. He was adopted by the American missionary Dr. Horace N. Underwood at 6 (1887), and became an orphan at 9 (1890) with the death of his father. At 16 (1897), he went to the U.S. to study at Roanoke College in Virginia. At 23 (1904), Kim, having finished his studies, returned to Korea and worked as Dr. Underwood's secretary.
He went on to work as a teacher at the YMCA School and as a dean at Kyongsin School, and as an elder at Saemunan Presbyterian Church. Kim sought refuge in China when he was 33 (1913), and after a period as a businessman, launched a career of independence movement leader around 37 {1919), in the year the Paris Peace Treaty (hereafter PPT) was signed.
Such experiences during Kim Kyu-sik's developmental years and moratorium form a striking contrast to those of Kim Koo, and this applies also to his independence movement. First, while the latter was reared and instructed with love and discipline by his mother well into his 50's, the former was early orphaned and adopted into the Underwood household. Kim Kyu-sik was thus removed from the traditional social network--e.g. family, clan, faction--and this may explain his later stance of maintaining a certain distance from all political cliques and of trying to bring on about a united front.
Second, he was reared in an American household and educated in the U.S., even receiving an honorary doctorate. Hence he, unlike Kim Koo, was fluent in English and served as a diplomatic expert in independence movement. Kim Kyu-sik started to join the movement while preparing to take part in the PPT of 1919, and after experiencing disappointment at the ensuing Versailles system, participated in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (hereafter FCTFE), held in the Soviet Union in 1923, along with YO Un-hyong and was elected a representative.
Thus Kim was knowledgeable not only of the U.S. but also of the USSR, and at one time maintained a favorable opinion of the latter. When the Soviet Union expelled him and other Korean nationalists in accordance with a secret pact signed with Japan in 1925, however, his goodwill toward the Soviets crumbled. Consequently, Kim's attitude toward foreign powers was according to the principle of being fair and just, being critical and flexible.
Third, although Kim returned to Korea as the Vice President of the KPG, his stance toward it was very passive or even critical. He took part in the KPG thrice, but at each session advocated its expansion or dissolution:
"In 1919, along with the foundation of the KPG, Kim was elected its Minister of Education and of Foreign Affairs. But when the KPG was later torn between "Creation" and "Reform" factions, he resigned from both posts and was elected, as the leader of the anti-KPG "Creation" faction, the "head of the Korean government." This forms a clear contrast with the fact that Kim Koo, as the Minister of Internal Affairs, defined the activities of the "Creation" faction as "subversive" and ordered its "immediate dissolution."
"With the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in 1932, Kim was again elected a KPG minister and served in that capacity until October 1935. He, however, as a "minister" hardly participated in the KPG and concentrated his efforts instead in the Korean Anti-Japanese Front Unification League (hereafter KAJFUL) and the Korean National Revolution Party (hereafter KNRP).
"With the participation of the KNRP in the KPG(1941 ), Kim was elected a minister (Propaganda Chief) in 1942 and the Vice President in 1944. He, however, was still passive toward the KPG, at odds with the Kim Koo faction, and after the Liberation cried out for the dissolution of the KPG. Fourth, Kim advocated a supra-KPG coalition and unification and was very open toward the socialists. During periods of political standstill, he participated in such activities as the FCTFE with Yo Un-hyong and Kim Won-bong's KNRP. But Kim was basically a politician of a Christian and rightist leaning.
Fifth, Kim was gifted not only in languages but also in literature and scholarly pursuit in general. With such grounding, he taught during periods of political standstill at Futan University in Shanghai, Peiyang University in Peiping, and Szechuan University in Chengtu. He was a politician with a scholarly and academic bent and 20 years of teaching experience; but this, on the other hand, signified that he lacked political organizational skills and the spirit of unceasing pursuit and dominance.
Kim Koo and the Theory of the Legitimacy of the Korean Provisional Government
Kim Koo's idea on nation-building may be termed the "KPG legitimacy" theory and this, as summarized in "The Imminent Tasks of the KPG" presented on September 3, 1945, consists of three stages:
For the first stage of the theory of the legitimacy of the KPG, Kim at the KPG Assembly held through August 18-22, 1945, vehemently opposed the dissolution of the KPG Assembly and the resignation en masse of its members against the KNRP, New Korean Nationalist Party, and Liberation League; then requested the all China American Commander-in-chief A. Wedemeyer to accept four clauses including the right to internal peace-keeping and to allow the KPG to return to Korea as the government; and after his return, at the end of 1945, declared the requisition of the government through the so-called "Anti-Trusteeship Coup."
Even after the failure of stage one of the "KPG legitimacy" theory, Kim, under the premise that the KPG was a "de facto government," proceeded with stage two by establishing the Emergency National Society (hereafter ENS) in the beginning of 1946 and the National Council in the beginning of 1947.
In order to assess the political nature of the "KPG legitimacy" theory, it is necessary to examine the relationship between this theory and other political cliques in South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and the Soviet Union. First, since the "KPG legitimacy" theory was a national construction theory espoused by the KPG, it naturally was exclusive and domineering toward the left and other political groups. This is confirmed by the KPG's stance shown in the course of collaboration with the PRK and of four-party and five-party conferences.
Next to be looked into is the Northpolitik of the "KPG legitimacy" theory. In the first half of 1946, when anti-trusteeship movements held much authority, antitrusteeship activists within the KPG such as Paeguisa infiltrated into the North and attempted assassination and terrorism on Kim II-sung, Kim Ch'aek, Ch'oe Yong-kon, and Kang Yang-uk; in the South led anti-trusteeship movements; and declared the political takeover of the KPG. What may be assessed from the anti-North policy of the KPG is the fact that KPG members, by contrasting the equation "North - pro-Soviet/pro-trusteeship - socialist" with "South - pro-American/anti-trusteeship - liberalist," viewed North-South relations in terms of the American-Soviet or right-left confrontational system.
Although the KPG's anti-North policy was nominally a part of the movement to expand itself, i.e., to gain national support for the KPG, it may be said to be a supplementary activity to the recognition of its legitimacy in the South, rather than one for a real overturning of the Soviet Army and North Korea.
Thus if North-South confrontation was to be perceived in the context of right-left confrontational system, as long as the question of initiative was solved, the "KPG legitimacy" theory was open to co-existence with the "separate Southern government" theory.
That Kim, while maintaining a critical stance, participated in the interim South Korean Representative Democratic Assembly (hereafter SKRDA), led by the United States Army Military Government in Korea (hereafter USAMGIK); that he cooperated to a degree with Syngman Rhee's American diplomacy for the establishment of an independent government in the South only; that he supported the foundation of a South Korean government on November 30, 1947. These are all concrete indications of the collaboration between the "KPG legitimacy" and the "separate Southern government" theories.
The "KPG legitimacy" theory, however, also differed from the "separate Southern government" theory in relation not to systematic problems but to national ones, namely the relationship between the U.S. and pro-Japanese collaborators. The American policy in Northeast Asia was the "constraint of the Soviet Union through alliance with Japan" and it materialized in South Korea as cooperation between the USAMGIK and pro-Japanese collaborators.
Consequently, in the "KPG legitimacy" theory, the national question, which hitherto had occupied a secondary place to that of political system, gradually began to surface. The U.S. only used the KPG members transitionally to counter leftist attacks and to unify South Korean political cliques; not only did it refuse to recognize the KPG as a government but steadily executed the dissolution of the Provisional Government.
The policy of the State Department and the U.S. Army in Korea is exemplified by, Lt. General J. R. Hodge's warnings against the "Anti-Trusteeship Coup," Goodfellow's schemes against the ENS and its conversion into the SKRDA, and the USAMGIK's "debilitation" tactics and its contraction of the KPG and decentralization of its members.
Through such processes, pro-Japanese collaborators, the National Committee for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence (hereafter NCRRKI), and Korean Democratic Party (hereafter KDP), instead of upholding the KPG and acting as its "tail," through USAMGIK organs such as the police and thus representative organs such as the SKRDA, became a "body" capable even of shaking up the KPG. And this provided the KPG with a turning point as well as dealing it crushing blows.
Thus the "KPG legitimacy" theory, while taking on a hue similar to that of separatism in relation to the right-left systemic confrontation, on the other hand, differed from the U.S. and pro-Japanese elements on national problems. Right after the Liberation, the Kim-KPG faction, by overconcentrating on the left and the North, was unable to put much effort into the weak link of the national problem, i. e., the settlement of colonial remnants both human and material including pro-Japanese collaborators, and as a result the national problem was lost to or dissolved by systemic confrontation.
But, as time went by, the Kim-KPG faction came to pay closer attention to the national aspect inherent in the national division. Kim's violent attacks on the KDP and the police and his criticism of the election in early 1948 were a fruit of such newly found awareness.
Kim Kyu-sik, as with his participation in independence movement during the colonial era, advocated the dissolution of the KPG immediately after the Liberation, in order to establish a national government through an expanded political unification. Therefore he, returning to Korea as the Vice President of the KPG, had in mind a different national construction theory from that of Kim Koo.
Kim Kyusik's political unification, irrelevant of the KPG, was superficially in line with the unification of South Korean politics promoted by the Americans. In this context, Kim participated in the SKRDA arranged by Goodfellow in early 1946 and in the Right-Left Coalition (hereafter RLC) arranged by L. Bertsch later that year, and was made the head of the South Korean Interim Legislative Council (hereafter SKILC) with Hodge's support.
The activity Kim most fervently devoted himself to among these was the RLC. But historical instances of right-left coalitions are truly varied, e.g. the Nationalist Communist Cooperation in China and the National Front in Vietnam and Chile outside Korea; and New Trunk Society of the 1920's, the National Single Party movement of the 1930's, and the RLC led by the KPG in the 1940's inside Korea.
Therefore, right-left coalitions or unified fronts differ greatly in content and in the paths they take despite similar names, and any research on them require clean-cut judgment under concrete criteria.
Generally, the criteria needed for the definition and assessment of right-left coalitions or unified fronts include the objectives and tasks of the parties involved, a common object of revolution and the scope of power, and the problem of initiative in the power structure. Here, in order to assess the nature of the RLC attempted during 1946-47, I will take an overview of the intentions of the involved parties and the power structure at each stage.
At the time of the RLC, four parties--right, moderate right, moderate left, and left wings--took part as a result of strong American wishes, but mainstream right and left wings soon broke away from the Right-Left Coalition Committee (hereafter RLCC). Thus, it may be said that the parties which continually participated with active attitude toward the Coalition were:
The U.S., which had led the RLC from start to end, first set up "The Construction of an Advisory Legislative Council in South Korea through Election" and as a channel planned "Political Unification through the RLC." The American reasons for recruiting rightists into the RLCC, not actively forestalling their recession later from it, and postponing the moderatists' demand for the oust of pro-Japanese collaborators and for police reforms all lay in the fact that they put more stress on the legislative council elections rather than on the RLC itself. Also, the reason why Americans were passive about leftist participation and eventual secession was that the latter were "needed only partly" in the scheme of the RLC and the legislative council.
The U.S., as it turned out, could make up for partial failure to retain rightists in the RLC through the SKILC elections, and the RLC would help to dismember the left; they, in fact, had .the upper hand. Thus, for the RLC, one may say that the key to its success was the exclusion of pro-Japanese elements and the disconnection of the link between the RLC and the SKILC.
With Kim as its head, the moderate right, while leading the RLCC, even supported the formation of a legislature on condition that pro-Japanese elements be excluded. The result of an election without reform, however, was the absolute victory of the NCRRKI and the KDP. Thus a right-left coalition which checked the left had actually ended in the seizure of power by pro-Japanese collaborators.
Kim advocated that the results of the vote be annulled, but unlike other members of the moderate right such as Yo Un-hyong took part in the legislature through the officially elected. Although the likes of Kim had failed first to eliminate pro-Japanese collaborators, they thought things could be amended gradually and thus participated in the legislature.
But the majority in the SKILC, including the officially elected ones, still was NCRRKI and KDP members, and their confrontation with the moderate right culminated in the struggle over the Popular Vote Law and the Anti-National Traitor Disposition Law. Such antipathy concluded with the victory of the NCRRKI and KDP forces, due to their majority seat in the legislature and American support.
Consequently, while the moderate right was cooperative to American policies toward Korea even to the degree of Kim Kyu-sik and An Chae-hong being popularly dubbed the "USAMGIK's cronies," the U.S. cooperated with it only very superficially while aiding pro-Japanese collaborators in a fundamental way. Next, in order to assess the nationwide significance of the Coalition, we shall turn to Kim's awareness of the North-South problem of the day.
The North-South problem as viewed by Kim, who participated in the legislature, may be summarized by the so-called "Dr. Kim's Plan," which opted for a North-South conference. The crux of Kim's idea was the establishment of a unified government through a national election on a population ratio, via conferences of the SKILC and the Northern People's Committee. This scheme was unique in that:
In spite of such differences, however, Kim's masterplan, by setting the 1:2 North-South Korean population ratio as a basic standard, was essentially a plan for a unified government led by the South and the right, and thus was open to collaboration with the American plan.
The U.S. in fact proposed a similar alternative when the second UUJC fell through with the problem of whom to direct the negotiations to, and Lovett's letter, which, contracted after the rupture of the UUJC and proposing a four-power conference, basically was of the. same tone. Therefore, Kim's plan overall was for the foundation of a unified government with the participation of the left and the North on condition that the right and the South hold the initiative.
Thus we realize that there never existed a formidable wall between Kim Kyu-sik's theory of right-left and North-South coalitions and the "separate Southern government" theory. Kim's address of May 12, 1946 proposal--"Let us establish a government if only on Cheju-do[island]" ----or his attempt, after the establishment of a Southern government had been decided upon concretely, to take part in the elections with police reforms as a condition all point to this.
Kim valued a supra-KPG political unification and negotiations with the North instead of antagonism. But his theory on right-left coalition inevitably stressed the aspect of systemic confrontation above all and delegated to secondary place other problems, e.g. Korean-American relations and what to do with pro-Japanese collaborators.
So although Kim's coalitions seemed to transcend the KPG, its initiative still belonged to the U.S. and pro-Japanese elements. He was deeply troubled when he finally realized this and lamented that he "no longer [had] anything to expect of the U.S." and that he "[had] been used by the Americans." In the end, he, after resigning the chain of the SKILC, at the North-South Joint Conference(hereafter NSJC) held in April 1948, claimed, "though I may have danced to the American tunes due to Right-Left Coalition," thence "I must dance to our tunes."
Consequently, the Coalition movement of 1946-47 led by Kim Kyu-sik, as the right-left problem surfaced as the major issue, lost hold of concrete national criteria of the Coalition such as the problem of pro-Japanese collaborators, and even Kim, who had been the most active proponent, came to judge it as a "failure" or as "having gone in the opposite direction."
In February 1948, despite American opposition, Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik in conjunction with the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea suggested through mail a "North-South Leaders Conference (hereafter NSLC).'' Considering the weight of the two leaders' national construction theories, the significance of this proposal is manifold.
First, in Kim Koo's case, this signified a clear transition from the 1946 anti-North policy to North-South talks. The reason for such change lay in the collapse of the "KPG legitimacy" theory, caused by the American dissolution of the KPG, the re-ascendancy to power of pro-Japanese collaborators, and the opposition stemming from problems such as the unsatisfactory settlement of colonial remnants.
Thus Kim, while experiencing the frustration of the KPG, came to pay attention to the national problem and to have a wider view of the right / left and the North/South. Now a new confrontational relationship developed between the Kim-KPG and Syngman Rhee-KDP factions, both right wing, on the national and other problems.
As we have examined, Kim Kyu-sik in 1946 once advocated right-left and North-South coalition, and his proposal and proceeding of the NSJC in 1948 would seem very natural. But a closer scrutiny reveals that the premeditated structure of the NSJC in 1946 and its actual proceedings in 1948 differed in no small ways.
The U.S. expressed a steady interest in the 1946 proposal for a conference and offered only passive resistance, but actively opposed the 1948 conference,. Kim, though he had suggested the conference at first, gradually became more passive due to American opposition.
That is, though he was progressive in the sense that he held the most favorable opinion of the left among right-wing politicians, he also valued cooperation with the U.S. and had a passive political streak typical of scholars. Therefore, Kim's participation in the NSJC was largely the result of the active exhortation of National Independence League members such as Hong Myong-hi, via "demands from the bottom."
Paradoxically, Kim Koo, often termed an ultrarightist, became a champion of the 1948 NSJC. Reasons for this may be found in the fact that his ultrarightism was much more emotional than ideological and that he was more of an activist than a theorist was. But a more fundamental cause lay in the American stance, which was of the greatest importance in the NSJC, and in the fact that Kim's demands for the recognition of the KPG and the American plan of establishing a separate government in the South were at odds with each other.
North Korea, in a reply received in March 1948, proposed the reduction of the NSLC suggested by Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik to a Preliminary Talk, and the main conference to a North-South Political Parties and Social Organization Representatives Conference (hereafter NSPPSORC). That is, the North, while assenting to include North-South talks of both levels, wished to set the NSPPSORC as the main one. This was the basic reason which made Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik wonder whether or not they were "only to attend a fully prepared feast."
But such differences in the form and content of the NSJC were adjusted to a great degree in the actual proceedings. That is, the NSPPSORC (held on April 19 and 21-23) and the NSLC (April 26-30) came to take on an equal importance; in the informal meetings, more emphasis was put on the latter. Despite the fact that the four-Kim meeting or the NSLC took on the shape of a "North-South Leaders Conference" as proposed by Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, however, the actual content of the agreement, as the Joint Statement confirms, no longer had the characteristic of a South-and--right-led meeting which the two men had intended.
Consequently, the conflict of form and content was resolved in the NSJC, thereby allowing for mutual recognition and for a joint agreement at the same time. Kim Koo is related to the 1946 anti-North policy and Kim Kyu-sik is said to have gone to the North in 1948 "with a view to opposing the North." Also, the northern government at one time had designated the two Kims as antagonists to be thwarted. Thus their coalition with the North seemed at the time an "impossible ice-and-ash affair," and according to one report, "other leaders were shocked."
The reason for the resolution of the "ice-and-ash affair" confrontation and the "grand coalition" must be sought in the relegation and attitude changes on both parties. The North postponed the establishment of the left-led PRK and the recognition of its own version of unified constitution.
A more important change, however, took place on the part of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik. By resolving misunderstandings about democratic reforms in the North at the same time that the North relegated at the four-party conference, they paved the way for a mutual agreement. The reform and settlement of colonial remnants such as pro-Japanese collaborators which took place in the North were just as the two Kims had proposed in the South.
I have in this paper examined the national construction theories of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik and their transitions in relation to the political nature of the national division. Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik, when considering their personal traits, are extreme opposites in almost every aspect.
But they shared the fundamental political awareness that the post-Liberation situation was linked to the right-left problem, and further confirmed that the national division was the result not only of systemic confrontation but more of the national problem. Such shared awareness enabled them to reach a concurring point, which was none other than the establishment of a unified government. As they themselves had termed the most urgent national task as "unification and independence," to them "national unification" signified and amounted to a "second independence movement."
In most cases, the activities of political leaders have been judged in respect to their activities during the periods of the Anti-Trusteeship movements and the RLC with greater emphasis on the particular period of independence movement and systemic contradictions. But a problem arises in this case, i.e., the activities and evaluations of these two leaders must be contradictory. Thus, it will be consistent only to criticize Kim Kyu-sik's activities if the KPG is to be praised; conversely, to undermine Kim Koo's Anti-Trusteeship movement and the "KPG legitimacy" theory if the post-Liberation RLC and the support of the UUJC are to be esteemed.
But many views esteem equally the activities of these opposing leaders, the reason for which is that the level of researches done on modern Korean history does not amount to much beyond the level of biography and that researches themselves are unable to over some the right-left and North-South systemic confrontations. At this point, it is necessary once more to summarize what the political activities and national construction theories of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sik imply.
The two leaders' post-Liberation national construction theories, i.e., the "KPG legitimacy" theory and the RLC, both set as the foremost standard the systemic aspect, thereby bypassing the national problem which, unresolved, brought about the downfall of the national construction theories. Through this the two leaders rediscovered the significance of the post-Liberation national problem, and advocated "unification and independence" as its task.
The establishment of a unified government therefore is the overall culmination of their long-time political careers and acted as the basis for overcoming the limits of their personal and political differences. In spite of this, however, often are to be found reverse situations in which the very elements that barred the two leaders' vision are highly touted and their cooperation and subjugation of individual differences belittled instead.
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