REQUESTED BY: Mr. Haviland, CIC Washington, X TIME: 0900 hrs 13 February 1952
NOTE: Information contained herein is based on experiences of Lt. Col. Burke, etc., during the period January-July, 1951.
I have barely scratched the surface in this field and am not an expert by any means. When assigned the responsibility for all guerrilla operations behind enemy lines in the western sector of Korea, I had no previous experience whatsoever in that field. We were the type organization, which learned by doing, profiting by mistakes and being careful through absolute necessity to avoid their recurrence. I hope you may be able to derive some benefit from out problems of operation and organizational structure as relate them, should you ever be engaged in operations of a similar nature.
The doctrines, which I shall discuss, are basic. No attempt will be made to deal with the strategic aims of guerrilla operations. If common, basic operational functions are fully understood and continually practiced at field level, the pieces will begin to fall into place to form the strategic pattern and mission which is the responsibility of such forces in a theater of operations.
Commanders responsible for employing indigenous personnel in unconventional warfare units should be specialists in that field. Such warfare encompasses the professional sphere from human psychology to Morse code. In very few other fields is the success of integrated effort so absolutely dependent upon the ability of the leader. The commander of a regular Army unit enjoys the advice of experts in various fields, which comprise his special staff.
He had a horn-o-plenty in logistical support and may call upon friendly combat units for tactical support. More importantly, he employs personnel whose minds are geared to his manner of reasoning, and who possess a basic knowledge of military units and their manner of operation. Conversely, the guerrilla commander must rely almost entirely upon his own training and experience for training, employment and logistical support of his forces.
To successfully command a guerrilla force with its many diverse elements, a commander must possess a certain amount of psychological and diplomatic skill. In addition to normal leadership qualities, a guerrilla leader must have the ability to improvise, a firm understanding of basic weapons and demolitions, the ability to correlate guerrilla activities with overall theater objectives and the ability to organize, just to name a few.
His unit is isolated and must live mainly by its wits. One wrong decision could easily destroy the entire operation. Very few times is it possible for a guerrilla unit to obtain tactical support when fighting behind the lines against innumerable odds. Agents dispatched on intelligence missions, of reconnoitering a unit or area of operations, must be thoroughly trained and briefed on the essential elements of intelligence. If agents made such mistakes as reporting a mortar as an artillery piece, or self-propelled artillery as a tank, and your operations are based on false information, then disaster may be the result.
The (American) commander responsible for such an operation must also recognize the importance of obtaining a qualified local native as overall leader, to whom he is merely an advisor. Replacing locally developed leaders with leaders from external sources may create personal or political rivalries, which can not be controlled or overcome. The American organizer-advisor must command respect of (both sides) and (the ability to) unify the efforts of opposing factions.
A guerrilla commander need not be native born, although some think that is a necessary prerequisite. However, historical examples will illustrate the success of non-native guerrilla commanders where native leadership is inferior or impractical. Colonel Lawrence in Arabia accomplished more than any native commander could have achieved. The distrust and friction that existed between native tribes were overcome by skillful leadership and diplomacy of a man who won the trust and confidence of the local natives. Sometimes a commander may better accomplish the task when he is not a native to the country.
Motivation of personnel comprising such a unit is of course essential, but motivation without understanding is as dangerous as a youngster with a high-powered automobile. Continually review you ability to exploit motivation, however faint it appears, and use that motivation wisely to impart upon these people the knowledge and understanding necessary to accomplish their mission. The American commander of such an operation who does not recognize the necessity for complete understanding and training, not only for himself, but with those he must employ, is risking an uncountable number of lives, including his own, as well as his entire operation. If a guerrilla unit is ill-led and ill-trained, it ceases to exist.
In summary then, we conclude that the commander’s ability must extend beyond military and technical fields, and embrace many activities and functions which are somewhat foreign to normal military operations.
Success of such an operation may also depend upon the operational and logistical support received from higher headquarters. Guerrilla forces normally live off the land. External supply should be executed wisely and with caution to prevent exposing the civilian population to more hardship because of enemy reaction to the guerrillas. Such hardship will decrease the civilian population’s loyalty and willing support.
The amount of external support may vary from irregular small supply shipments, to total logistical support. There may be times whey you requisition items of equipment and various supplies, which appear to be remote, and far removed from you operation, and about which your headquarters may gasp in amazement and amusement.
It is most difficult to pass upon the necessity for such equipment and supplies from a far removed desk, and it is impossible to conform exactly to the types and quantities specified in a TA or TD, should you be operation under one. In this type of operation loyalty and confidence must be actively practiced as a two-way street between field and rear. Long explanations should not be necessary for strange items you need, as, in many cases, the time element will of vital importance.
This applies mainly to small, commonplace items available through inter-service supply channels. Common sense must be exercised in all requests for external support, particularly concerning large deliveries where complications may arise. This type of delivery must be preceded by planning and arrangements that fall better within higher headquarter’s jurisdiction.
I mention the supply situation because the problems because it was brought to my attention vividly by observing isolated in Korea wilt on the vine from lack of support. What success my operation achieved, I contribute largely to the support received from my headquarters. Such support, combined with farsightedness, is essential when you must improvise and "play by ear" until you are a going concern, since many operations of this type initially begin on a shoestring and as a calculated risk.
This was the case with our operations in Korea. During December 1950 and January 1951, word reached EUSAK G-2 of the presence of large forces of North Korean civilians who had banded together under common leaders, and were operating behind enemy lines against the CCF and KNA on just such a shoestring. At this time there were numerous intelligence gathering agencies operating behind the lines but no real active guerrilla forces.
Because of the recurrence of such reports, a senior officer long experienced in guerrilla operation, was designated to investigate and exploit these forces should this be deemed advisable. Therein lay the "calculated risk." The first step in implementing such a program was to contact on these leaders, bring him to the rear and interrogate him in an effort to determine the status of such groups.
With the aid or the ROK and marines, and the British blockade fleet in the Yellow Sea, I was transported to the North Korean Yellow Sea islands and made contact with of these self-appointed leaders who had been operating behind enemy lines. I don’t fee that the mechanics of determining where to go, who to bring back, how it was accomplished is particularly important, except to say that we focused our attention initially upon the largest group reported, and attempted to bring out the most capable and active leader we could locate, based on the intelligence and other reports made available to us.
The leader finally contacted was a North Korean civilian who was formerly the mayor of a medium sized town in North Korea. He was returned to EUSAK Headquarters, along with this ‘second-in-command," where they were thoroughly screened and debriefed. They were made to repeat their stories time after time in an effort to check its validity. Results were most gratifying and it was felt that the "calculated risk’ was worth taking to achieve a controlled guerrilla force.
These groups, composed entirely of North Korean civilians, were held together by common sympathies and interests. They had banded together because of discontent and hostility toward the established civil and military authority than ruling their own country. They had dedicated themselves to do their utmost, by various overt and covert activities, to combat that authority, thus aiding the locality in which their homes, livelihoods, and particular society resided. Their operations closely paralleled that of a resistance movement.
These people were basically partisans, allied in this resistance of their own accord, and volunteering their services to the Un to combat a common enemy. Therein rested the spark of motivation which we had to fan into a flame of activity if we were to organize a guerrilla force within this resistance movement.
Guerrilla warfare alone is not capable of bringing about a military decision against regular forces. However, we wanted to nip the bear’s heels sufficiently to cause him to focus attention of that sector, possibly by a diverting a portion of his forces from the front lines, to provide security for his rear areas. Our mission then, along with one of intelligence, was to kill communists and wreck havoc in rear areas.
To do this, we recognized the potential in people who desire to free their very doorstep so to speak, and further realized that a nab will fight more tenaciously in such a situation, so we planned to use these forces in the area of their choice, and not move them about North Korea as if they were a raider force.
To develop this spirit, we also attempted to secure natives as leaders who were, or had been, prominent in local government. Such individuals as former mayors, chiefs of police, and various other local office holders were already established as leaders in their community thus making the transition relatively simple. Politics did not enter into the choosing of these leaders from our standpoint. Perhaps I should say approving their appointment instead of choosing since they were chosen by each group.
If groups such as these are to operate successfully in an integrated effort, these can only be organized among people who have the courage and ability to endure hardships and face death at all times while fighting innumerable odds. You may find people who possess such qualities, but more important, you must find leaders capable of welding them into a functioning organization, cutting off the fat, and molding them into a smooth, hard-hitting, fighting unit as opposed to a disorganized, compromising mod posing as a military force.
That, I feel, will be one of your most difficult tasks should you find yourself with the mission of organizing guerrilla forces comprised of indigenous personnel. You must be alert to recognize and separate those leaders who are incensed with power and personal greed from the group of sincere individuals who are willing to fight with their forces in accomplishment of a common goal. You must take a certain amount of risk on individuals initially designated as leaders but be willing to relieve them immediately should they prove incapable. This was the case in our operation. They continued to serve as leaders until their results no longer served our purpose through reasons of inefficiency, personal greed, or political rivalries.
After the decision was made to launch our operation, an additional four leaders were contacted and put through the same process as the first leader. This group was then taken to a safe-area north of the 38th Parallel where we began the task of debriefing them for specific information which would be helpful in our job of training, organizing, equipping, and employing these groups. Some of the more pertinent information we desired was:
Very briefly, our guerrillas were organized along the following lines. In critical designated areas, we assigned one group whose responsibility was to carry out unconventional warfare within that area. We were very strict about these assignments and allowed no poaching. The leader was absolute authority in his zone, responsible only to us. Such groups were further broken down into cells, under subordinate leaders, responsible to the overall guerrilla leader of the area. It was by this method that we planned to blanket an area.
We tried impressing on them that initially each cell should not know the location and operations of a brother cell, and that all operations would be coordinated by their area leader, acting upon orders from our headquarters. This, of course, was for security reasons, that is, to insure that the entire operation did not become compromised by the capture of some forces or ndividuals. Whether this plan was actually carried out as outlined or not is something I will never know for certain.
During this time, our headquarters was established on an island in the Yellow Sea north of the 38th Parallel, and behind the lines. This island was used for training and a command base for operations and supply. We made it a point to establish this base as far north as possible for many reasons. The most important one I believe was because we brought these people from the mainland in ragged condition as far as clothes and personal belongings, and sent them back in the same ragged condition.
This was done for a solid reason. If they were returned to Taegu, Pusan or Japan, they would become spoiled by easy living compared to what they were used to and would not relish the idea of going to their miserable existence behind the lines to operate for us. We purposely avoided this by giving them only the tools of war they desired, but no fancy uniforms or personal luxuries. I bring this to your attention as an important consideration when working with indigenous personnel since cases actually happened where personnel refused to return for the job for which they were trained after seeing how the "outside" lived.
The only clothing they ever received from us was during winter months. We supplied them with North Korean style shoes, gloves, and fur lined caps. Money was not paid these people during the entire operation with the exception of a reward given to the individuals who rescued UN airmen downed behind the lines.
As I think back over the operation now, I wonder if we didn’t make a mistake in the matter of money. I feel that such personnel should have been paid by, and given recognition as and active force of the ROK government. They took a great many chances, lived day to day, and accomplished much in support of the UN effort, yet were not recognized by any but the military forces having direct knowledge of their operation. Had we focused on such long range planning, we would have been assured that these people were carrying on the fight even though our military forces were withdrawn.
Along these same lines, it would have helped immeasurably for these units to have been recognized as a unit of the ROK government. Imagine if you can what an instrument of motivation that have been in our favor. I believe this point must be considered, regardless of what part of the world you may be employing such forces. In spite of the many problems which arise, once money starts changing hands, I am convinced that, if handled properly, it can be done without making them into a uniformed and lavishly equipped force.
During this period of interrogation our five leaders, sufficient American technical personnel, interpreters, and various items of equipment had arrived on our base to make it possible to begin the long hard task of training these people to carry out their assigned tasks. We didn’t bring the entire group back for the training period but took from each group, in addition to the main leader, the four sub-leaders, their second in command, and three men for individual instruction in demolitions, radio, ambush tactics, map reading, survival behind the lines, and raids. This made a total of about twenty men from each main group or a total of about one hundred men in all.
Our plan was to train certain personnel from each group in these subjects plus various allied subjects like first aid, etc. It would become the responsibility of these men to train other personnel from their unit in these subjects. Not only did this allow us to conduct smaller, more interesting classes, but offered a certain amount of prestige to those receiving individual instruction. As it turned out, they were all very proud of their accomplishments and were only too willing to pass on what they had learned from the Americans to their peers when they returned to their units.
During the training cycle, the trainees were billeted on the base island. We did not promise them that they would be employed by us when they finished training but we knew that we would employ these groups ultimately. The reason for not promising they would be used was that we were interested in seeing how certain key personnel reacted to the training before making a definite commitment. I believe this was a wise move as it increased the spirit of competition. This increased interest and attentiveness on the part of all concerned.
One of the more important areas of instruction was communications. A designated radio operator from each group instruction in the Army’s ANGRC-9. We acquired five of these sets with component parts and assigned one to each of the five different group’s radio operators. They checked it out in the morning, retained it during the day’s instruction, cleaned it, became familiar with packing and carrying, and checked it in to the supply tent every night. I never have seen anyone prouder or more jealous of equipment. We instructed them on all aspects of the equipment, taught them preventative maintenance and the few repairs a field operator could do. They were taught how to set the radio up, tune the set to the proper frequency, how to send and receive, and using the our Korean codes. The codes were set up beforehand.
They had hours of practical transmitting and receiving. This was done by setting the radios up at different places on the island base and the students would sent to each other. By the time they completed instruction, they were surprisingly proficient in using the radio and codes. From this group we selected and trained four operators as our NCS (net command station) which would keep contact with guerrilla forces once they were committed to the mainland. During this training, we supplied batteries and spare parts for the sets. Our American technicians repaired them at base when these became inoperative.
Weapons instruction presented some problems but we were able to obtain captured weapons through EUSAK to be used for training and as a token issue to the guerrillas. The weapons included Russian rifles, Russian automatic rifles, Japanese Model 99 rifles, and a mixed bag or German, Polish and other weapons.
Small amounts of ammunition was furnished for this odd assortment during training and on deployment. We did furnish each group a small number of American M-1 rifles and carbines for which we supplied the ammunition. We let it be clearly understood that, other than this small issue, they would not receive more American rifles or captured weapons and that if the leader desired more weapons and ammunition to build up his forces, it was up to him to capture these.
In this we had motivating factors factor that worked in our favor. It forced the leader to attack and capture weapons if he wanted his force to expand and it took the burden of supply off the base headquarters. By making the guerrilla leader capture his own weapons, it meant he would have weapons that used same ammunition as the enemy. If we had furnished all American weapons and ammunition, we would have been required to furnish the ammunition. This would have caused a logistics problem far beyond our means.
For weapons instruction, we trained two men from each group as armorers. Training was conducted on American and captured rifles and included the principles of operation, maintenance, capabilities and limitations, and basic marksmanship. It was to these men that we gave the cleaning materials, the spare parts, and taught them how to improvise for future needs.
We didn’t attempt to make expert riflemen out of our students, but rather tried to impress upon them the importance of appreciating and caring for their weapons. Equipment is so critical to forces of this type that you can not over-stress care and maintenance of all items they use.
American demolitions were used entirely and we trained three men in each group in this field. Training was conducted with C-3, TNT, and various other explosives. Besides this, they were trained in using primacord, fuse lighters, caps, hand-grenades and other allied items. We trained to disarm only the most common type Russian mines used on the mainland.
This was due to the difficulty of obtaining the many different type of mines, explosives, and grenades used by the CCF and NKA. In practical training, the students actually cut rails, downed trees, destroyed model bridges, and blew craters. They quite surprised and pleased with the potential of explosives.
he ambush and raid expert was the individual designated within each group as operations officer by the leader. It was difficult for these people to realize the mechanics of an ambush, and the intelligence functions that must precede such an operation. The term "ambush" to them meant any time you took a pot-shot at an enemy when he wasn’t looking so up to then, "ambushing" had been a disorganized bushwhacking process.
We placed much emphasis on the ambush, impressing them with the need of detailed, before operations planning, the through intelligence upon which it must be based, its development under ridged security, and its execution with surprise and determination. Training included both day and night convoy ambush tactics and methods of raiding headquarters and supply depots.
In each case we stressed the use of maximum firepower from automatic weapons and grenades at close range, and that careful reconnaissance beforehand of enemy positions since this offered maximum surprise and confusion. We instructed in the necessity for rehearsed hit and run tactics, and methods of breaking contact so they could keep from being tied down in a sustained action.
The same general coverage was used in tactics of a raiding force. During the practical phase on our base island, the students executed various basic techniques time and time again, using whistles and the like for signaling, and throwing rocks (in place of real hand grenades) to learn how to clear ditches when enemy troops took cover. Behind the lines survival included a multitude of subjects.
This course was mainly for the group leaders and the subordinate leaders of the cells within the group. Very generally, such training included the method of establishing their headquarters, setting up their radio, and evasive tactics should they become routed by the enemy. We instructed them in runner communication and means of infiltration. The actual means of identification were left entirely to the individual leaders concerned once they were in their area of operation.
Writing, carrying and destroying messages, as well as signal and identification procedure for allied air drops and helicopter pickup were covered in great detail. In fact, a system of signals was worked out and successfully used for air drops during the hours of darkness where on special equipment was used, not even a flashlight.
Escape and evasion and the method of friendly identification to pilots down behind enemy lines, as well as establishment of safehouses, was explained and practiced. Twelve pilots were picked up and returned to duty, either by our guerrilla forces directly, or because of the existence of the overall operation. They included British, American Air Force, US Marine and Navy pilots.
Training also included movement by night and by day, both by groups and by individuals. The training also included the use of rallying points. We had difficulty impressing them with the fact that for most operations of the guerrilla warfare nature, small mobile groups, lightly armed and thoroughly rehearsed in their individual job, was more effective than the large, unyielding, uncontrollable force that was usually detected and destroyed.
It was difficult for our leaders to understand why they couldn’t meet the regular CCF and NKA forces in an open warfare type of engagement. In spite of our precautions, it took one or two bloody noses before they were convinced that a small force can accomplish its mission, then separate and drift into the hills, and be absorbed by the country without being noticed.
There are two schools of thought in the world over the merits of the large guerrilla force versus the small one. Personally I would much rather be part of a small, compact, highly trained force with a definite purpose in mind, than be part of a large stumbling force that is likely to compromise the entire operation through lack of training, proper screening, and orientation of its individuals.
I mentioned a moment ago the importance of accentuation maintenance of equipment. One of the biggest problems facing our groups was transporting that equipment without it being detected by the enemy. We covered this subject in a quite detailed manner. One or two examples will illustrate how we partially solved this problem.
The Koreans cultivate their gardens and fields with human feces which they carry in to the garden or field in what the Americans laughingly call "honey buckets." There are two different types. One resembles a small nail keg with a stopper hole near the bottom and an open top. Two of these are carried parallel to the ground at each end of a pole that is balanced across the carrier’s shoulders.
The other type is larger. It looks like a small barrel with a hole in the side. This is carried by a man using a "A" frame shaped packboard. We took several of the second type and modified these so one end was removable. A small metal container was fastened just below the side opening and this filled with human feces. The empty space under the feces made it possible to conceal radio components or other equipment inside, sling it on the man’s back and off he would tramp, supposedly to fertilize lettuce. This method was used for all types of equipment, and, naturally, the larger the barrel, the more equipment could be carried.
Korean farmers suspend a bag beneath the tail of their oxen to catch manure that is also used as fertilizer. We utilized this bag to transport small pieces of equipment, messages and documents. We showed them how to make false bottoms for ox carts and how to transport demolition primacord camouflaged as ordinary cord and tied around bundles. Instruction also covered methods of obtaining ammunition and food. It included how to destroy weapons, radios and other equipment used by both the enemy and our guerrilla forces.
Workable methods of transporting equipment is an absolute necessity. The only rule of thumb is to let your initiative run wild and take full advantage of the customs and equipment of the people.
Use of maps presented a difficult problem. naturally the North Korean civilians had no experience in reading military maps and coordinates so it was necessary to begin with the most basic fundamentals, and with a much simplified version of map reading covering only those portions absolutely necessary for them to know. Teaching map reading to an English speaking military person for the first time is difficult, but doing this with a Korean civilian and through an interpreter is a brain demolishing task.
It was successfully accomplished and we had very few instances where they sent the wrong coordinates or misunderstood the pin-point locations where we sent them. We gave each group only one military map of their respective area. This was kept by the leader or his representative, usually the radio operator who encoded and decoded messages. We attempted to equip the remainder of the key personnel in the group with a small pocket note book atlas, something available in Korea and Japan.
Instruction was carried on by Americans using interpreters furnished by the ROK Army and Navy. During the instruction period, the five leaders continually visited each class of his group to observe his personnel and become acquainted with the subjects. This was done under the direction of an American officer. In addition, each leader was required to attend the entire course of instruction on such subjects as behind the lines survival, map reading, and some other courses. The training period lasted approximately two weeks during which time, a quite healthy spirit of competition developed between the groups, particularly among the leaders.
We continually pointed out important techniques to the leaders during the course of instruction. An example of this was the suitability of Korean terrain for guerrilla operations. The CCF and NKA forces could secure only limited areas along vital lines of communications, and certain build-up areas. This left extensive uncontrolled areas in the mountains which were ideal as hideouts and strongholds for guerrilla forces. It is imperative that leaders recognize and appreciate the potential of the terrain in which they must operate.
Upon completion of the training period, we sent each group, plus all items of equipment previously mentioned, to their assigned areas on the mainland. This included a radio set with instructions on the time schedule for each group to establish first contact with base headquarters NCS. Incidently, these instructions were verbal. A search was made of each individual before he departed for written notes or other items that might compromise our operation should these fall into enemy hands. In fact, the island where our base was located wasn’t even covered by their maps.
The number of sets we were able to contact on the mainland increased from the original five to eleven. We were in daily contact with some of these while others were heard from only sporadically. Our base NCS and the guerrilla sets were operated by Korean personnel using voice transmission and a code that we had supplied. We could have placed more sets on the mainland because, as the word spread, more "self-appointed" leaders volunteered their services to us in return for equipment and guidance.
It isn’t difficult in such a job to find people who will accept your support under the guise of taking up your fight. In Korea it would have been a simple matter to accept the services of masses of these people. It would have been easy to do this and then sit back and survey your domain becoming quite satisfied and complacent with yourself. Should this happen, it is the beginning of the end. Be aware in operations of this type that when you feel you have reached your peak efficiency, this will not be true. Search your operation twenty-four hours a day for means of improvement.
In this endeavor as in on other job, you must continually seek to become more proficient in your role as guerrilla commander-advisor. If this is not the case, you become lazy, slipshod and careless. You must resist that impulse. You will succumb to it only if you do not know your job and understand the people with whom you are working. Empire-building non-effectives will bleed you dry of materials and equipment needed by your effective groups.
In guerrillas you control a wild animal. Should you slacken your taut control for one minutes, you and your entire operation are doomed. Realizing this full well, we purposely held the groups down to those with maximum effectiveness and did not hesitate to take equipment away from groups who did not produce. One of the more basic reasons for not employing masses was not because we could not control them. It was because of our limitations in communications and logistical support.
We also installed a powerful SCR-300 radio operated by American personnel at out base headquarters. This set gave us direct communications by CW (morse code) with EUSAK, JOC, Air Force crash boats placed at out disposal, the British flagship and carrier group operating in the Yellow Sea. This net was incorporated within the existing SOI using normal code procedure.
Through this net we were able to coordinate air strikes, call in fire on targets along the coast, report crashes of UN aircraft, request evacuation of wounded personnel and all other matters where outside support was needed. We were also able to tie this communication net in with other intelligence agencies operating in the immediate area. This was not done with the official SOI but by improvising and cooperation at the working level. The exchange of information resulting from this was of invaluable aid to our operation.
As it turned out, this American radio net became a very smooth operation with utmost cooperation by all agencies operating therein. As a result of this comprehensive tie-in, I had the opportunity of visiting fleet ships many times to pin-point targets on the mainland for them. I visited the carriers operating in the Yellow Sea several time to brief pilots on our E&E program. During these trips I was offered rides in two-seated fighter planes over my guerrilla area of operations but I only took advantage of this offer once. The real benefit was that carrier planes would carry out aerial reconnaissance and photo missions for us.
Besides the guerrilla units on the mainland, we kept a small reserve on the island for security purposes, and as a pool of manpower for special operations such raids, blowing rails, bridges, and the destruction of tunnels. I use the term "destruction of tunnels" loosely since it was almost impossible for our people to carry enough explosives for complete destruction without being detected. In view of the manner in which tunnels are constructed and guarded, we concentrated on planting mines under the rails inside the tunnels. A train entering the tunnel triggered these.
Before sending any special teams from this reserve, we would obtain extensive intelligence coverage and, in some cases, photo coverage of the area or installation. We maintained the utmost secrecy in such an operation to prevent the enemy from being forewarned if our intentions. We would then draw up a detailed plan of the raid, assigning distinct tasks to each individual participant. Such plans, while detailed, also had to be a simple as possible and provide for unforeseen circumstances.
Each individual had to be thoroughly rehearsed in his job and in the exact layout of the target. This was particularly necessary in our case since our people did not possess sufficient military background to take the initiative when certain contingencies arose.
We tried to perform such operations during the hours of darkness, particularly if surprise was essential. Otherwise early dawn was the best time although the biggest problem with this time was breaking contact and making a clean withdrawal. These operations, I believe, brought vividly to everyone’s attention the necessity for a small, well-trained force which could hide their weapons and fade into the hills upon completion of the job.
These groups were landed on the mainland during hours of darkness in small Korean fishing vessels, and picked up on prearranged time schedules. The best lesson learned by all of us in executing these raids was that; regardless of what the target is, where it is at, or when you hit it, you can not discount the necessity for minute, detailed planning based on valid intelligence.
Missions were given to our guerrilla force by one of three general methods:
1. Passed to us from higher headquarters to have accomplished.
2. Missions originating from our base.
3. Targets of opportunity originated by the guerrilla leader.
Operations reports from each group reached our base every few days. These were consolidated and sent to our headquarters at EUSAK. We acted as a monitor for information sent in by the guerrilla units, organizing and consolidating these into a daily report, that is if sufficient information had been sent to us.
We experienced some jamming on our base radio but this was easily overcome by switching to other prearranged channels listed in our SOI.
Over the months, signal intelligence intercepted messages from enemy stations that gave the location of our base and at various times reporting that we had been destroyed by bombing, destroyed by shelling, invaded and overrun, and by any other method that apparently came into the enemy’s mind. We did experience a few light shelling from small mortars fired from a boat offshore. These never did any damage and the gunners were lucky to hit the island at all from their bobbing boat.
Look into your own future. If there is the slightest indication that you may be employing intelligence agents or guerrilla units, then I have one last bit of advice for you. Know your job because the life you save may be you own. In no other profession does that common cliche apply so aptly. I shall be most pleased to answer any questions you have. Speaking to you today has been a most pleasant experience, and I appreciate you kind attention.
Thank you very much.