역적의  공상당을  처즈러가자

역적의  김일성을  죽이려가자

대한민국  만세를  높이불우자 

Let us march north and kill traitor Kim Il Sung

Let us march north and smash communist traitors

Long live the Republic of Korea!

A popular 'March North' song in South Korea

March North At Last?

1950 was the most eventful and painful year of my life. When I heard that war broke out, I was elated believing that Rhee's troops would march in at any time, which they did not, and I felt let down by that old lying Rhee and his pro-Japanese traitors.  My "political" mood swung from anti-communism to pro-Kim Il Sung when I learned that Kim's troops were about to take Pusan.  I thought Kim Il Sung was a national hero, after all,  who would unite the country, as Yi Sung Gye had done some 500 years ago. I was proud of Kim Il Sung. But this euphoria did not last long, for instead of a united Korea, Kim Il Sung turned Korea into a ravaged wasteland, still divided to-date. His good intention had backfired, killing millions of Koreans and bringing tragedies  to the Korean people on a scale unprecedented  in our history.  Thanks to him, I lost my family and suffered countless personal problems. Kim Il Sung, in spite of his considerable credits for Korean independence, will be recorded on our history books as the man who started the Korean War and the man responsible for its consequences. The buck stops on his lap.

On the day the Korean War broke out, June 25, 1950, I was listening to Radio Seoul, call letters HLKA, at a friend's house. From various things I had seen and heard, I knew something big was about to happen and I had been by that home-made radio for several days until finally the good war news broke. The radio reception was unusually clear because, for some reason, the communists did not jam the the sky with buzzing static on that day.  Radio Seoul played the usual marching songs about killing Kim Il Sung and then there were special bulletins, one after another.  The announcer breathlessly stated that South Korean troops were marching on to Pyongyang and that People's Army soldiers were surrendering or retreating everywhere. It urged all anti-communist patriots to rise up and kill communists.

Sometime during the day, Radio Pyongyang said that Rhee's troops invaded North Korea in large numbers, killing many women and children, thus confirming Radio Seoul's claims. But things began to unravel and I was totally confused. Later that day, both sides were claiming major victories. I did not know who to believe, but wished that Rhee's troops would beat Kim's boys.  I could then go back to Kapsan and reclaim my land and other properties, and take care of the communists who killed my brother and kicked us out from Kapsan. Even though skeptical, I wanted to believe the Seoul's version and dreamed of marching to Kapsan with Rhee's troops.  But this was not to be.

Official records show that the North Korean invasion began at 4 a.m. on the troubled Onjin Peninsula. North Korean guns started shelling Kaesong at 5 a.m. The ROKA 12th Regiment panicked and fled south. By 9:30 a.m., Kaesung was in North Korean hands. Several US military advisers were taken captive. The North Korean Army 3rd and 4th divisions at Cholwon spearheaded the main thrust. The ROKA 7th division collapsed at Cholwon and North Korean tanks raced toward Seoul.

On June 26 at 9:30 am, from Pyongyang, Kim Il Sung officially declared war on South Korea. Kim said in his deep rough voice: “Dear brothers and sisters (dong-po hyong-je ja mae yo-ruh-bun)! Great danger threatens our motherland and its people! What is needed to liquidate this menace? Under the banner of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, we must complete the unification of the motherland and create a single, independent, democratic state! The war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and independence of the motherland and for freedom and democracy.”  

kis625.jpg. Kim Il Sung declaring war on June 25, 1950.  Courtesy: North Korean government archives.

Then at 11 a.m., Radio Seoul, said that the Fierce Tiger unit, The Maengho Dae of the 17th Regiment had liberated Haeju City on the Onjin Peninsula. The broadcast said that South Korean soldiers had just killed 1,580 North Korean soldiers. Col. Kim Chong Won, formerly a sergeant in the Japanese Imperial Army, who fled North Korea in 1945, led Maengho Dae. The 17th Regiment and the ROKA 1st Division were made of Japanese collaborators who fled the North. These units were commanded by two brothers, formerly with the Japanese Imperial Army, Paek In Yop and Paek Sung Yop, respectively.

US Ambassador Muccio ordered evacuation of all American civilians. Some 700 Americans were hurriedly loaded onto a Norwegian fertilizer ship at Inchon. MacArthur was not worried, believing that the ROKs would regroup and throw back the invaders. He was angry at Muccio for ordering the American evacuation even though North Korean Army artillery was closing on Seoul at that very moment.  Later that night, Rhee Syngman decided to flee Seoul without asking Muccio's permission. A special train was requisitioned to carry Rhee and his close associates and their relatives. The train left in the dark of the night. Somehow, the American CIC failed to inform Muccio of Rhee's flight This early flight of Rhee gave rise to a conspiracy theory, which claims that Rhee and MacArthur connived to seduce Kim Il Sung into starting the Korean war.

The Han River Bridge – Who Blew It Up?

By June 27, a general panic hit Seoul citizens and tens of thousands of refugees clogged roads leading south. Two days earlier, the ROK army engineers had placed explosives on all bridges on the Han River. There were heated debates among the general staff officers on when to blow up the bridges.

Even when People’s Army troops were rushing into Seoul, Rhee's radio address still claimed that his heroic troops had “annihilated the Communist invaders” and were now advancing toward Pyongyang. Rhee urged all citizens of Seoul to stay put in Seoul with him and support his war against the communists. Of course, Rhee had already slipped out of Seoul in the cover of darkness at 2 a.m. on June 27. He had pre-recorded his radio address and had the Seoul radio station broadcast it long after he had fled south. Rhee's inner circle followed his despicable example and abandoned their post. Rhee's Defense Minister Shin and his chief-of-staff Chae Byong Duk bugged out after issuing a “stay put and fight to the end” order to their troops.

The great majority of the South Korean elite were taken in by Rhee's “we are advancing to Pyongyang” speech and stayed put in Seoul, undisturbed by the approaching sound of artillery. Among those caught off guards were 62 members of the National Assembly, 44,000 ROKA troops, many of Rhee's cabinet ministers, top scholars, army generals, police chiefs and at least 5,000 wounded ROKA soldiers in Seoul hospitals.

When Seoul’s residents at last realized Rhee's deception, panic spread throughout the South Korean capital and a chaotic mass exodus began. At this moment, one of the worst criminal acts of Rhee occurred. The Hangang Bridge, crowded with retreating Korean soldiers and desperate refugees, was blown up at 2:30 a,m., June 29th. Several hundred soldiers and civilians were blown to pieces and tens of thousands of Rhee's troops and refugees were stranded in Seoul and fell into enemy hands.

It is written in some history books that Col. Choe Chang Sik, Rhee's chief engineer, was responsible for this cowardly crime. Indeed, Choe was court-martialed and sentenced to death on September 15, 1950, and was shot shortly thereafter - although he vehemently denied his guilt and claimed he war ordered by a superior officer. Many years later Choe's conviction was belatedly reversed and his honor was restored. It was established beyond any doubt that the order to blow up the Hangang Bridge came from above and that Choe did his best to disobey the order.

The person who issued the final order was Rhee's chief of staff, Chae Byong Duk, known as Fat Chae to the Americans, and the person who ordered Chae to blow up the bridge was none other than Rhee Syngman, and both men reported to US Army Captain James Hausman, who stage-managed Rhee Syngman and Fat Chae. Two staff officers, Chang Chang Guk and Chung Lae-hyok, thought that Chae was not fully informed of the situation and rushed to the bridge to countermand Chae's order. But, the two staff officers were detained by Rhee's security forces a few blocks away from the bridge and could not reach Col. Choe, who was overseeing the demolition team on the bridge. A few minutes later, Col. Choe gave the order to pull the switch and the bridge blew up in smoke, blood and screams.

Who was the real culprit? It was most likely Hausman who told Chae to issue the order. Long before the world heard of Ollie North, this American ran the South Korean army as if it were his private army. He was a figure of absolute power in South Korea. When the Korean War broke out, he told Rhee to execute all political prisoners, and in fact, Hausman personally shot several Korean officers in close range with his own pistol.  In his memoirs, Hausman speculates that Chae was a communist mole and blew up the bridge on Kim Il Sung's order.

 Was Chae Byong Duk A Spy?

US Captain James Hausman claims that he had nothing to do with the Hangang Bridge disaster, although evidence indicates otherwise. He shared an office with Fat Chae, the two being together like a Siamese twin.  On the day of the disaster, they were riding in the same Jeep on the south side of the river, when the bridge was blown.  Hausman's claim that he was not involved in the bridge incident is hard to believe.

I heard and read about Chae Byongduk, "the top dog of Rhee Syngman's army, a pro-Japanese traitor and now a blood thirsty running dog of the Americans", months before the war.  My school staged a drama about his misdeeds of theft, rapes, murder and many other despicable crimes against the people. It may be that the communists made him look bad on purpose in order to mask Chae's true identity. The fattest kid in our school played Chae. That poor kid, although he was just play-acting, was hated by everyone. I shunned him because he stank on account of his poor hygiene and his habit of wearing the same clothes for weeks. He smelled like a walking latrine.

Figure chae.jpg. Chae Byong Duk speaking at a ceremony in 1949. Courtesy US military archves.

Chae was born in 1915, in Pyongyang, North Korea and completed his elementary and junior high education there. He entered the Japanese Military Academy in 1933, two years before I was born. Chae was graduated in the 49th class of the academy and became an instructor at the Japanese Artillery School. He was a Japanese army major in charge of the Inchon armory when World War II ended. Chae became a captain of the Korean Constabulary founded by the US military in 1946 and commanded a battalion.  His American nickname "Fat Chae" came about from an incidence in which he was caught naked in his office by an American adviser, who was shocked to see a commanding office naked in front of his troops and blew his top off, calling him nasty names. Chae was fat for a Korean and prone to take off his uniforms on hot summer days.

Song Ho Sung, who served in Kim Gu's army in China, headed Rhee's army until 1948,  when Song's old-time nemesis, Lee Bom Suk became Rhee's prime minister. Lee promptly replaced his personal enemy Song with Chae Byong Duk. The following year, Rhee fired Chae, after discovering that Chae was engaged in illicit money-making trades with North Korea.  His army trucks ferried electric and construction materials from South Korea to North and ferried back North Korean fish, which were sold in Seoul for fat profits. Chae was booted out of Rhee's army. 

Oddly, Rhee Syngman felt sorry for Chae and quietly restored Chae to his old job, thus Chae had the "honor" of being the top commander of Rhee's army when the war broke out. Captain James Hausman was with Chae until Rhee Sygngman fired Chae for the second time on June 30th. Chae failed to grasp the reality of war and believed in his invincibility.  He told the National Assembly in Seoul that  everything was under control and that his troops were in fact marching north as he spoke. Hausman claims that Chae was dejected and empted a bottle of brandy on the night of 27th and attempted to commit suicide.  

Rhee made Chae commander of a non-existent "Kyongnam army" to save Chae's face and Jung Il Kwon was made Chief-of-Staff. Chae fled South in a jeep without his American adviser, Captain Hausman. On July 23rd, Chae received a letter from Rhee's Defense Minister, Sin Sung Mo, ordering him to organize stragglers into a fighting force and defend the Hadong Hill.  The letter ordered Chae to "stand in front" of his troops and fight to death. Instead, Chae offered himself as a guide and interpreter for the 3rd Battalion of the 29th Regiment, US Army. The American command assigned the battalion to defend the hill.  Bang Ho San, commander of the Sixth Division of the People's Army was waiting for the Americans. Chae led the American battalion right into Bang's trap and was the first to die. A bullet ran through his chin and head, and Chae died instantly. Several hundred American GIs were killed in this ambush. Thus Chae's military career ended at about 9:30 a.m., July 27th. Some historians say that Chae was shot by his own men, citing the fact the troops who shot him wore South Korean army uniforms.   

Was Chae a communist mole?  I don't know.  It is true that he was from Pyongyang and had relatives in North Korea, he did trade with North Koreans in 1948 and 1949, and he did blow up the Hangang Bridge that helped Kim Il Sung.  He led the American battalion into an ambush perhaps, intentionally, and the question of who killed him is yet to be answered. Was he shot by Rhee's special forces?  Perhaps.

 Seoul Falls

On June 29, 1950 at 8 a.m., Muccio picked up Rhee Syngman to meet MacArthur at Suwon. MacArthur's plane, nicknamed Bataan, was attacked by a North Korean YAK fighter, but no damage was done. Rhee met with MacArthur in private for two and half hours. No one knows what they discussed, but MacArthur soon stated, “Give me two American divisions and I can hold Korea.” After the secret meeting, Rhee and Muccio headed back to Taejon. Their plane narrowly escaped from another YAK fighter.

That same day, the North Korean Army took Seoul. We saw pictures of North Korean soldiers marching in Seoul and yet Seoul Radio was still claiming fantastic victories!!

Figure 15. People’s Army welcomed by Seoul citizens. Courtesy DPRK War Archives.

At last the sad truth emerged as a column of South Korean POW's passed through our town. Some were wounded and carried by fellow POWs. The column was lead by a South Korean army officer still proud with his head held high, but the rest were dejected and scared. Two women from the crowd threw rocks at the column. A North Korean army officer ran toward the women screaming epithets and the scared women ran away. The crowd was subdued and sad. Some people were crying openly. So this was what our 'liberators' looked like?

Dulles was voicing concern to Truman about the overbearing remarks and attitude of MacArthur and advised Truman to fire MacArthur, but Truman was scared of MacArthur, who “is involved politically in this country and he cannot be recalled without causing a tremendous reaction. He has been built up to heroic stature.” Dulles agreed with Truman, but promised his full support if Truman decided to fire MacArthur in the future.

Kim Kyu Sik, a founding father of the Korean Provisional Government in China, gave a welcoming speech for the Korean People's Army on June 30, 1950. He was named its foreign minister in 1919 and went to Paris’ Treaty of Versailles to petition for Korean independence, in vain. After liberation, he tried with other patriots to form a coalition government for all of Korea but failed. Kim managed to escape Rhee's assassins. What you won’t find in many history books is that Gen. Song Ho Song, former commander of the ROK Army, organized the People's Volunteer Army manned by South Koreans.

The US CIA dismally reported: “The ROK government's past failure to win the support of its restless student class could account for more than half of Seoul's students actively aiding the Communist invaders, with many voluntarily enlisting in the Northern army. Apparently attracted by the glamour of a winning army, the morale of these recruits may suffer rapidly if the going gets rough...The working class generally supports the Northern Koreans, while merchants are neutral and the intelligentsia continue to be pro-Southern...The streets are crowded, especially with youths engaging in Communist demonstrations.”

I found the easy victory over the South Korean Army bewildering. Newspapers were full of combat stories: South Koreans trying to stop tanks with hand grenades; South Koreans surrendering at the sight of a tank; South Korean soldiers turning against their own officers, and so on. The US intelligence agents were well aware of the impending invasion. As early as 1949, these agents routinely warned MacArthur of the invasion plan, but their warnings went either ignored or unreported to the US decision makers. Kim Il Sung caught the US intelligence guys with pants down. The CIA, the State Dept., the US Army and the Far East Command were in “agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at this time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent”, said Gen. Bradley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Harold Collins, was taken in by MacArthur, and earlier by Ike, and changed his mind about not sending troops to Korea. Earlier MacArthur was given the authority to send a regimental combat team to Pusan to safeguard it for evacuation of US citizens. Now, however, MacArthur wanted Gen. Collin's approval to send one or two regimentals teams to the front lines. Collins went over Bradley's head and got Truman's approval and told MacArthur: “Your recommendation to move one regimental combat team to combat area is approved.” Thus the US intervention in the Korean War began without the knowledge of its top military brass, Gen. Bradley. MacArthur had manipulated a weak president and grasping at a chance for new glory at the expense of the Korean people. MacArthur's personal ambition found lofty justifications in a CIA recommendation for military intervention in Korea: “Voluntary or forced withdrawal would be a calamity. US commitments abroad no longer would be trusted. Friendly nations might lose political control or feel compelled to seek an accommodation with the USSR. The USSR will proceed with limited aggressions. It would be politically and psychologically more advantageous for the US to mobilize in support of US and UN intervention in Korea rather than to mobilize after a withdrawal.”

The US CIA's Early Days in the Far East

I digress at this point and present some facts on the US CIA. I worked for various US intelligence services from 1951 to 1955 and so I have personal stake in telling the truth about these organizations.  In a way, my contacts with the American intelligence go back to 1949, one year before the war started.  Back in Hamhung, I hanged around with a group of young kids who hated communists for some reason or another, some kids lost their landowner fathers, other kids lost their homes to communists and so on.

An uncle of one of the kids fled to south in 1945 and joined a secret spy organization run by the Americans. He came back to organize anti-communist cells in Hamhung. I never got to meet the spy from South Korea in person, but I never doubted his authenticity. Communists security forces were out looking for him and in fact, I was stopped one day by a security officer, carrying a burp gun on his back, who showed me a picture of a man and asked if I had seen him.  I told him no, which was no lie. I heard about the spy but never met him. He waved me off and stopped other kids, which was a good thing, because I had a gun and some silly documents of our little anti-communist gang in my school bag. If the security officer had looked into my bag, I would not be writing this book today.

I had another close call. One evening, I was walking home after attending a meeting with my anti-communist friend, when a People's Army colonel stopped me. "Hey, comrade, stop!"  I stopped and turned around,  There stood an officer fully armed staring at me. My heart stopped and I thought this was the end. But soon I realized that he was drunk and smelled alcohol like a skunk. He was apparently new to Hamhung and got lost.  He gave me his address and begged me to lead him to his home, which I did.  He could hardly walk and I had to more or less carry him.  By the time, I found his house, he was a walking stiff out cold  snoring.

The Korean War caught the US CIA and the US Far East Command of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in total surprise. In spite of the mounting intelligence clearly indicating the imminent invasion from north, the CIA and MacArthur saw no imminent invasion in Korea. When the invasion occurred, Truman sacked the DCIA, Adm. Hillenkeeter and authorized emergency funds for rapid expansion of the CIA in the Korean theater. Truman ignored the fact that MacArthur opposed any major CIA presence in his domain and was, in fact, the real culprit for the intelligence gap, and the CIA took the blame.

When the Korean War broke out, the CIA had only a tiny three Office of Special Operations operatives cell in the theatre, headed by George Aurell. They had to work out of their hotel rooms, since MacArthur would not permit them to have an office. When the CIA men ventured out, the general had Japanese agents shadow them. But the new DCIA, Gen. Walter Smith, whipped the demoralized CIA into shape and dispatched Wisner, the OPC chief, to Tokyo. On June 27, 1950, Wisner appointed his old OSS friend, Hans Tofte, to head the CIA OPC operations in the Far East. Hans Tofte turned out to be a shady character of a dubious background and was replaced in 1951. A few years later, Wisner himself was fired, went insane, and committed suicide.

Tofte claimed that he was born in Denmark and lived in Manchuria for eight years and spoke Chinese fluently. During World War II, he immigrated to America and joined the British intelligence unit working out of New York. He was sent to Burma to organize native labor crews to ferry war supplies to China. He also led guerrillas to fight the Japanese. Tofte then returned to US and enlisted in the US Army as a private.

According to Tofte, he was assigned to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) because of his background. In 1943, Tofte organized a mini-navy to supply Tito's guerrillas in Yugoslavia. At the end of World War II, when the OSS was disbanded, Tofte returned to his native country and worked as manager of an American airline. The airline was used to carry secret documents to the US. He returned to Mason City, Iowa in 1947 and managed a family business until June 1950.

In the early days, most of the CIA officers were white men from upper-class economic strata. They were mostly racists and treated the Korean agents with low esteem and deemed their lives expendable. The CIA officers came from Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and some non-military agencies. CIA "officers" had dual ranks, a "service" rank (the real one), and a CIA ("agency") rank that could be anything depending on the mission. For example, Hans Tofte was a lieutenant colonel in the US Army but a major general in the CIA.

Tofte was given 'unlimited' funding and began to build a CIA OPC empire in the Far East, code-named "Documents Research Section V". The second in command was Colwell Beers, a former government bureaucrat. Huge new buildings were built at the Atsugi Air Force Base.

The US CIA in Korea

During the early days of the War, the CIA had two quasi-independent operations in Korea: Office of Special Operations (OSO), led by George Aurell, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), led by Hans Tofte. The former engaged in espionage while the latter engaged in covert actions. On July 2, 1951, both operations were merged into JACK - Joint Advisory Commission - Korea.

Aurell's OSO team had several cells in North and South Korea. A communication cell in Seoul maintained contacts with the cells in Korea. When the War broke out, the OSO communication cell was expanded because it was the only link between the American officials trapped in South Korea and the US government. OSO recruited Korean agents for collecting tactical intelligence. The Koreans were trained to cross lines ('line crossers'), to jump off a plane, to stay behind and do other espionage activities. The OSO operations were run under the cover name “Department of the Army Liaison Detachment” while the OPC operations used the title, the Far East Air Forces Technical Analysis Group. Both organizations used the Fifth Air Force Special Air Missions Detachment, the 6167th Air Base Group. The USAF planes were augmented by the CIA's own air force, CAT. Gen. Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer originally formed CAT in 1946 to provide air transportation in China. The cargo business was supplemented by covert action missions for the CIA dating back to Oct. 10, 1949, China's national day. CAT was ejected from China in January 1950 and it followed Chiang Kai Sek to Formosa. By early 1950, CAT's commercial and CIA business had dried up and Chennault and company faced imminent bankruptcy. On March 24, 1950, the CIA purchased CAT outright. In July 1950, the CIA assigned three CAT planes to ferry CIA agents between Korea and Japan.

The CIA OPC Yong-do Base

Hans Tofte recruited Han Chul Min to head up the CIA OPC training camp at Yong-do, a small island in the Pusan harbor. Han fled North Korea in 1945 and worked for Rhee Synman as an aide. He attended and graduated in the eighth class of the Military Academy in January 1949. Han was assigned to a special operations unit because of his North Korean origin.

Captain Han was wounded in the early phase of the Korean War. While recuperating at a hospital in Pusan, he was approached by Yun Chi Young. the former Minister of Interior, and told to volunteer for a special mission for the US CIA. In late September 1950, Capt. Han established the first training camp near Pusan and recruited several hundred North Korean refugees for the US CIA OPC in Korea. Fifteen of the agents were sent to Japan for advanced training.

Figure 16. Col. Hans Tofte, Capt. Han Chul Min and Lt. Col. ‘Butchy’ Kramer. Kramer headed the CIA section in Korea in 1950. Courtesy: CIA archives

In February 1951, Hans Tofte moved Capt. Han's group to Yong-do for security reasons and named it the 'Y' unit. By this time, the Y unit had more than 1,200 members, divided into 4 operational groups: Yellow Dragon covering North Kangwon and South Hamgyong Provinces, Blue Dragon, covering central regions of South Hamgyong Province, White Tiger covering northern regions of South Hamgyong-Province and southern regions of North Hamgyong Province and Owl covering northern regions of North Hamgyong Province.

The Y unit headquarters were: Han Chul Min, commander-in-chief, Park Sun Man, deputy commander and operations, Kim Sung Ho, personnel, Ma Dong Hun, intelligence and Han Myung Suk, supplies. Choe Jae Bu was the commander of the regiment made of the Blue Dragon and the White Tiger brigades. Lee Yi Sup commanded the former brigade and Im Bong Ok commanded the latter brigade. Im Yuh Sung commanded the Yellow Dragon brigade and Jung Yung Yun was his deputy.

The White Tiger Brigade

On April 29, 1951, 104 members of the Y unit went ashore in North Korea. Twelve members of the White Tiger Brigade’s C Company, led by Kim In Sik, went ashore near Chungjin. A month later, 15 men of A Company, led by Lee Nam Soo, and B Company led by Han Chnag Duk, landed safely. On July 1, Choe Che Bu led a landing party of 52 members and linked up with C Company.

Kim In Sik was killed in action while attempting to secure food for his troops. Choe Che Bu managed to collect what remained of his scattered and battered units at one place. On August 25, Choe established contact with the CIA headquarters and subsequently, two US planes dropped 31 replacements and much needed supplies. By this time Choe had 60 members, and 40 new members had been recruited locally.

A captured North Korean army captain revealed that the Communists were organizing a major campaign to wipe out the CIA guerrillas and Commander Choe decided to mount a preemptive attack. In a daring, swashbuckling move, Choe led a force of 30 and attacked the enemy killing several hundreds of the enemy and capturing 60 rifles. Choe soon received the word that the enemy troops regrouped and party cadres were meeting at Kapsan to coordinate a major offensive to wipe out the CIA unit. Choe radioed the Youngdo base for air strikes on Kapsan, whereupon eight US bombers came over and flattened the town, killing most of the party cadres.

The North Koreans mobilized several thousand security troops and mounted a major campaign. Commander Choe was killed trying to cover his unit's retreat. Ji Yong Su quickly replaced Choe as the regimental commander.

On September 17, as hell raged and battle lines to the south hardened between UN and Chinse and North Korean forces, the CIA OPC dropped 36 replacements in the White Tiger’s North Korea area of operation. In preparation for the oncoming winter, the surviving members split into small bands of about 10 each and attempted to move in different directions. On November 5, an enemy force of over 1,000 regular troops surrounded the White Tiger unit. Those few who managed to escape disappeared in the vast mountains.

The Blue Dragon Brigade

Fourteen members of K Company led by Kim Myong Ryon boarded a US warship on April 29, 1951 from a staging area located at Yong-do in the Pusan Harbor and landed at Yum-bun-ri, North Korea. They reached the target area without any incident. Another 14 men of C Company led by Kim Young Jung were parachuted on May 24. Kim's chute did not open and he was killed. Chu Jong Bin took over command. That same day, 16 men of A Company led by Yun Dong Ju, were dropped, followed by a team of 14 led by Lee Yi Sum. On July 6, 52 men of Company A, and 48 men of Company C landed at Sin-chang, North Korea.

On September 14, Kim Myong Ryon led an attack on an enemy cavalry unit and killed 82 enemy soldiers and 13 horses. But in the process, Kim was captured. The enemy also captured Commander Lee Yi Sup

The brigade ceased to operate effectively. On July 7, 1952, Kim Myong Ryon and a handful of the members managed to escape and returned to the Yong-do base.

The Yellow Dragon Brigade

On May 1, 1951, 12 men of C Company, led by Park Hee Bong arrived at a staging area at Yo-do Island on Seoul’s Han River. Kim Jung Wahn's team of 12 men landed at Ahn-byon. In addition, Lee Bong Gyu's team of 57 men landed safely. From June `18 to June 20, Choe Yun Chan's team of 61 men parachuted down safely on to sacred Mt. Paikdu in the North Korean highlands near the Russian and Chinese borders.

Since the brigade's area of operation was close to the frontline and also because the members are poorly trained, its performance was not as expected. Only a handful survived to return to the Young-do base.

Nowadays, Yongdo Island is a picturesque place in Pusan Harbor, with a splendid recreational park and a view from its craggy south side of the sea that no visitors should miss, but with the Armistice of July 1953, the CIA OPC base at Yong-do Island closed but its operations continued elsewhere. From 1950 to 1953, some 770 CIA-trained Korean partisans were lost in North Korea. In 1955, the US government awarded bronze medals for freedom to Chu Hong Gil, Kim Chi Min, Hwang Bo Hyon, Han Su Sin, Lee Gyong Su, Park Gi Ju, Hong Man Hak, Im Han Young and Hong Sun Su in recognition of their heroism.

CIA Sea Operations

After the 1953 armistice, which forbade military operations, the CIA turned to sea operations. The Yong-do unit was primarily a partisan unit, whose mission was to operate behind the enemy lines. The sea operations units were led by Park Young Jo, Kim Sung Man and Kim Gook Yul. The two mother ships were Hae-ma, the Sea Horse and Hae-ryong ,the Sea Dragon. The key agents were: Lee Chun Sung, Lee Chun Won, Choe Bong Man, Gam Hah Baek, Kim Dong Hee, Kim Duk Hung, Yu Dong Wuk (all of them in the 66th class of the Police Academy.)

The largely untold and unsung exploits of these post Armistice Agreement missions read like scripts to a high adventure movie. Operations ranged from Ho-yum Island in the mouth of the Yalu River, to seizing of a Chinese military ship, the Ahn-hoe 14, a supply ship captained by a Chinese officer plyingt the waters between the Manchurian port of Dairen and Chinnam-po, a North Korean port along the Yellow Sea and the Taedong River estuary below Pyongyang. The Sea Dragon (#7777) team led by Kim Sung Man captured the ship.

Figure 17. The Sea Dragon team of Kim Sung Man – Operation TP-Stole. Courtesy Kang In Mo

A supply depot on the North Korean island of Wang-ga was blown up, the spectacular operation filmed from the air and confirmed, Another mission cut the under-seas cable between Shanghai and Chinampo, and the daring participants were rewarded with leather jackets made in Japan.

Korean Agents: Who Were They?

Korean War ear spies came in various ranks. At the bottom of the ladder was the 'footers', the line-crossers, most expendable spies. Footers were placed a few miles behind lines and they walked back to the front to be captured. Footers were normally common soldiers or women. They observed enemy positions, formations and equipment, and got debriefed when they were recovered.

Less than one out of hundred made it back. These people were also used for spreading disinformation. The quality of intelligence a line-crosser brought back was useful in verifying information obtained from prisoners or recon units. The more qualified an agent, the deeper his injection point. It did not take much to train a line-crosser; and loss of a footer was no disaster. All footers were trained in the basics of sabotage and encouraged to sabotage something if possible.

At the top of the ladder were N Korean army officers. They were injected so that they could return to their former units. They were placed on a mountain path used by North Korean guerrillas or stragglers returning home. These agents required much longer training. Their main value was in their ability to mole into communist hierarchy. Such moles were activated only when they were needed and left alone, all unnecessary contacts were avoided.

The "6006", a CIA affiliate, known also as NICK and 6004 AISS, ran the Korean Labor Organization, the KLO. The main function of the KLO was to provide physical labor for the American troops, such as carrying ammo and other supplies on their back, taking care of the dead bodies, unloading cargo ships in Pusan and so on. North Korean refugees largely manned the KLO, a gold mine for spy recruiters. The "6006" recruited spies among captured North Korean soldiers and civilians. Late 1950 and early 1951, CIA agents interviewed North Korean refugees and POWs on Kojedo. Those who were anti-Communists were enticed or pressed to join the operation.

Co. Ke In Je commanded the KLO in 1951. Ke was Rhee Syngman’s intelligence chief when the Korean War broke out. Rhee blamed Ke for the intelligence failure and wanted to make an example of him. Fortunately, a US CIC officer saved his neck just in time. He went to work for the CIA and participated in Lt. Clark’s Trudy mission to secure the Inchon landing. Ke graduated from the Manchurian Military Academy run by the Japanese. This academy trained Korean and Chinese cadets to serve the Japanese Emperor. After the Korean War, Col. Ke was reinstated by Rhee and retired soon after.

For information on the initial phase of the Korean War, see:

1) http://banmin.or.kr/n_chungsan60/gun/cbd.htm  Chae Byong Duk, Fat Chae, commander of the Rhee's army

2) http://banmin.or.kr/n_chungsan60/gun/kcr.htm  Kim Chang Ryon, Rhee's Counter Intelligence chief

3) http://www.kimsoft.com/1997/hausman.htm  James Hausman: The US Captain Who Managed Rhee Syngman - Hausman memoirs.

4) http://www.kimsoft.com/2001/ussr-kr.htm  Origin of the Korean War - USSR archives

For information on the early CIA activities, see:

1) In the Devil’s Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War, Michael E. Haas, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2000.

2) Spies and Provocateurs - Wendell L. Minnick, McFarland, N Carolina, 1992; an encyclopedia of spies uncovered; has an article on Tofte on p571.

3) Perilous Mission: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia - William M. Leary, The University of Alabama Press, 1984; contains chapters on several CIA covert operations in Korea and China.

4) The Man Who Kept The Secrets - Richard Helms and the CIA - Thomas Powers, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., NY; an inside story of the CIA history and evolution; has a footnote on Col. Hans Tofte. pp 323-4.

5) The Espionage Establishment - David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Random House, 1967; has a chapter on the Chinese spy operations; has a footnote on Col. Hans Tofte on pp 164-5.

For general information on Korean War, see:

1) Korea The Untold Story of the War - Joseph C. Goulden, McGraw-Hill, Inc., NY, 1982: another Pentagon paper on the Korean War with extensive references to US classified documents.

2) Korean War History and Tactics - Consultant Editor David Rees, Crescent Books, NY, 1984; some basic facts on the War.

3) US Military Operations 1945-1985 - Kenneth Anderson, The Military Press, NY, 1984.

4) The Hidden History of the Korean War - Isidore Franklin Stone, Monthly Review Press, NY, 1952; the first attempt to describe the real Korean War.

5) In Mortal Combat - Korea, 1950-1953, John Toland, William Morrow and Co., NY, 1991.

The following FOIA documents are available from the National Archives:

US Central Intelligence Agency, Implementation of Soviet Objectives in Korea, Office of Research and Estimates 62 (18 November 1947)

US Central Intelligence Agency, The Current Situation in Korea, Office of Research and Estimates 15-48 (18 March 1948)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Prospect of the Survival of the Republic of Korea, Office of Research and Estimates 44-48 (28 October 1948),

US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Capabilities in South Korea. Office of Research and estimates 32-19 (21 February 1949)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of US Troop Withdrawal From Korea in Spring, 1949. Office of Research and Estimates 3-49 (28 February 1949)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Current Capabilities of the North Korean Regime, Office of Research and Estimates 18-50 (19 June 1950)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Possible Communist Objectives in Proposing a Cease Fire in Korea, Special Estimate 8 (6 July 1951)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea Through Mid-1952. National Intelligence Estimate 55 (7 December 1951).

US Central Intelligence Agency, Military Indications of a Possible large-scale Communist Attack in Korea in the Immediate Future, Special Estimate 25 (28 April 1952)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea. National Intelligence Estimate 80 (3 April 19531)

US Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible UN/US Military Courses of Action With Respect to the Korean War. Special Estimate 41 (8 April 1953).