Chapter 10

“So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak. Water shapes its course according to nature, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his enemy and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.”

The US Intervenes

On July 1,1950, Muccio sent his deputy Noble to meet with Rhee Syngman. As Noble asked Rhee to evacuate to Taegu, Rhee flew into a rage and blamed MacArthur, Truman and Muccio for the disaster unfolding in South Korea. Rhee announced that he and his wife were ready to die in Taejon, and that there would be no more retreat. Rhee's wife finally talked the old man out of his madness. Rhee and his cabinet retreated to Taegu, almost 100 miles south of Taejon.

On July 2, Col. Charles Smith, in Tokyo, received his marching order from Maj. Gen. Dean, commander of the 24th Division, the butcher of Cheju-do. Dean did not know where the ROK Army or Rhee was, and he did not care. Col. Smith and his unprepared task force were given a Messiah's welcome at Pusan, complete with a marching band.

US war planes mistakenly bombed ROK Army headquarters at Suwon, as well as ROK tanks, ROK ammunition trains, and civilian targets still in South Korean hands. Rhee wanted to know just whose side were the Yanks on and MacArthur ordered US planes to stay north of the Han River. South Korean police committed one of the worst mass massacres at Suwon under the supervision of the US CIC’s Donald Nichols. About 1,800 political prisoners were shot dead by the retreating police. Two American bulldozers were kept busy digging ditches and burying the victims. The prisoners were brought in from nearby prisons in army trucks. They were lined up along the edge of a ditch and shot in the head while Donald Nichols dutifully photographed the grisly scene.

North Korean tanks rolled over Osan’s Jukim Pass and onto the first American unit sent to Korea, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division on July 5^th. Code named Task Force Smith, after its commander, Col. Charles Smith, the task force had 540 men, 120 rounds per M1 rifle, two 75mm recoilless rifles, with 12 rounds, four 4.2" mortars, two days of C-rations and no working radio. The disastrous encounter saw Smith escape south with 86 survivors. The wounded, dead and heavy equipment were left behind.

Some American historians make Rhee Syngman out to be a kindly Christian crusader who saved the Korean people from the evil communists. Rhee is depicted as a devout Christian and a firm believer of democracy. Nothing can be further from truth. He was perhaps the worst mass murderer ever known to humanity standing beside Hitler. The case of Kim Sung Ju is typical of Rhee’s anti-Christ deeds. Kim Sung Ju's murder was closely connected with Kim Gu's assassination in 1949. Kim Sung Ju was deputy leader of the Northwest Youth Corps at the time of Kim Gu's murder and he led the Koreans who believed that Kim Gu's assassination was justified and that the assassin, Lt. Ahn Du Whi, was a hero. The US military made Kim Sung Ju governor of South Pyonahn Province during the brief occupation of North Korea by the UN forces. However, Rhee Syngman had his own man for the job, Kim Byong Yun, which soured Kim Sung Ju’s friendship with Rhee. Kim felt that Rhee betrayed him.

In 1952, Kim Sung Ju helped manage Cho Bong Ahm's unsuccsful bid to unseat Rhee in the presidential election, for which Rhee had Cho killed. Kim Sung Ju also made it public that he had Ahn Doo Whi shoot Kim Gu on Rhee's order. On June 25, 1952, Kim Sung Ju was arrested on a trumped-up charge of a conspiracy to kill Rhee. He was also accused of being a communist. Kim was tried by a military court and sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. Rhee was enraged at this light sentence and issued a direct order, hand-written in English mixed with some Chinese characters, to Gen. Won Yong Duk, the ROKA Military Police commander at the time:

“General Won: Kim Sung Ju, now in jail must be sentenced to capital punishment. He was appointed governor of Pyongyang by foreigners and tried to kill Moon Bong Je whom the Government appointed as police chief. It is clearly a treason case and must be treated as such. To prevent another such traitor in the future, he must be punished according to the law. I told the Defense Minister and I am telling you now: please see to it without delay and without much noise. S.R.”

Gen. Won kept this memo and produced it as a defense document at his trial in 1960. Won claimed that he agonized over this illegal direct order from Rhee but he carried out the order anyway. Kim Sung Ju was brought to Won's house, where Won had an assistant shoot Kim Sung Ju and buried the body in his backyard.

Even today, many wonder how many directories Rhee issued to kill in English, for his Korean was poor.

At the outbreak of war in 1950, one of the first acts of Rhee Syngman was to order the execution of political prisoners, whose deaths were reported to be caused by the communists. In Seoul, the prison guards and wardens deserted the inmates in their rush to cross the Han River to safety. Upon learning that the inmates were left untouched in Seoul, Rhee dispatched a death squad to kill as many inmates they could find in the Seoul prison. The squad shot only one hundred or more of the Seoul inmates. Rhee also had ample time to kill his political enemies in other cities. As he retreated, his death squads loaded up prison inmates in trucks and took them to farm fields for execution. Rhee executed more than 100,000 political inmates in South Korea.

Some 1,800 political prisoners were killed at Suwon. By a strange twist of things, Donald Nichols, who had set up Rhee’s Gestapo, chronicled the grisly event in his memoir (See How Many Times Can I Die? in the Bibliography). When the war broke out, Nichols was based at Pupyon between Seoul and Inchon and he was the last American to leave Seoul. On his flight south, he participated in one of the many mass killings of civilians in the war. Some 1,800 political prisoners were systematically shot by the South Korean troops at Suwon. This degenerate American adventurer’s very soul would be troubled by these atrocities. Nichols narrates:

“I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bulldozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned (Communists) arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave.”

“I tried to stop this from happening, however, I gave up when I saw I was wasting my time. I was the only foreigner there...I think I'd rather have gone with the dead and gotten it over with quick and easy - then I wouldn't have these terrible nightmares. The worst part about this whole affair was that I learned later that not all the people killed were communists.”

“The least I could do was to make a photographic record of this stinking episode. Then the manner of their deaths would never be disputed or falsely blamed. These photos I still guard, as I have since that miserable day in July 1950, so that they would not fall into hands that would misuse them for false or treasonable motives, personal gains or exploitation.”

True to Nichols’ fears, Rhee and US government agencies claimed the opposite of what happened at Suwon: they claimed that the communists killed peaceful South Korean peasants.

Figure taejun.jpg: The Taejun massacre of 6,000 civilians by Rhee's forces was blamed on Kim Il Sung, whose troops killed less than 500 captured Rhee's followers in Taejun.. Courtesy of the US Army archives.

On July 6, one of the worst atrocities of the war occurred in Taejon. The South Korean police, under the guidance of US advisers, murdered some 5,000 imprisoned guerrillas from Cheju, Taebaik, Yosu and other areas in the village of Yangwol near Taejung. The local farmers were forced to dig mass graves for the dead while the Americans filmed the massacres from their jeeps.

Ironically the Taejon massacre of the 5,000 political prisoners is recorded as one of the worst war crimes 'worthy of being recorded in the annals of history along with the Rape of Nanking, the Warsaw Ghetto, and other similar mass extermination by Kim Il Sung! The Taejon massacre, as projected by US propaganda, presumed to show the God-less communist brutality. The naked truth of this war crime came to light only recently when a prison guard confessed his crime that was supported by a US army secret report on the massacre.

On August 10, 1950. Sgt. Frank Pearce of the 545^th US MP Company witnessed a mass execution near Taegu and filed a secret report (US National Archives):

Shooting of Prisoners of War by South Korean Military Police

Between the hours of 1500 and 1630, 10 August 1950, while on routine patrol on the highway between Taegu and Waegwan, Korea, a large volume of gunfire was investigated by the undersigned and Pfc. Raut. This gunfire came from a canyon near the top of the mountain that is situated approximately eight miles north of Taegu.

Investigation disclosed that the South Korean Military Police, under the command of a captain of the South Korean Army, were in the process of the killing of a group of Korean Nationals, estimated to be between 200 and 300 persons, including some women and at least one girl. It is the opinion of the undersigned that this child was approximately 12 or 13 years of age.

The methods used by the Koreans in the executions were the placing of about 20 of the condemned persons in a line on the edge of a cliff, and behind each of the victims was placed one military policeman with a carbine of American Army current issue. At the command of fire, given by the commanding officer of the group, the military police fired at the head of the prisoner that was in front of him. It was noted in several of the shootings, that due to poor aim of the weapon, the prisoner was not killed immediately, but it was necessary for several other shots to be fired into the body of the victim, and in some cases the mercy shot was not administered, and about three hours after the executions were completed, some of the condemned persons were still alive and moaning. The cries could be heard coming from somewhere in the mass of bodies piled in the canyon. One man was lying [sic] a short way apart from the main mass of bodies, and even though unconscious, was noted to be still breathing.

A survey was made by the undersigned of the prisoners that remained on the side of the mountain awaiting their turn to be shot, and it was noted that their hands were tied behind by trussing two of the condemned persons together, and the hands were tied so tightly that there were cries of severe pain coming from the prisoners. One of the woman prisoners, a girl of about 19 years, had fallen and in the fall the flesh had been torn from her hands. Extreme cruelty was noted from the Military Policeman to the condemned persons such as striking them on the head with gun butt, and kicking them on the body for no reason.

The commanding officer of the execution group stated that the prisoners were being killed, as they were “spies”. No other information was given.

The bodies were not properly buried, but were partly covered with dirt and brush, and the cartridge cases were left on the ground. In the event of the fall into the hands of the red army of this area, all of the evidence left by the South Korean Military Police would indicate that the killings were perpetrated by the American Army and not the South Korean Army. The bodies had been stripped of clothing and it would be hard to determine whether the victim was civilian or North Korean Military Personnel.

Frank Pearce, Sgt 1/c

Division Investigator, 1^st Cavalry Division, Taegu, Korea

China Prepares for War in Korea

Gone was the memory of the Chinese viceroy in Seoul during the final years of the Yi Dynasty over a half-century before boasting that he was King of Korea, whenever it pleased him. No one at Hamhung, Washington or within the US military recalled Chinese meddling in Korean affairs, which had wrought indescribable, suffering to the Korean people during the 1894 Sino-Japanese War, reducing Pyongyang to a rubble and wasting thousands of imperial Chinese troops on Korean soil. But now, on July 7, 1950, Beijing, Mao saw a disaster looming for Kim Il Sung and ordered his military to prepare for military actions in Korea. Gen. Nie Rongzhen, acting Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, convened a series of meetings of the military affairs committee.

That July 8, the US military worried about the Soviets stirring up trouble while US was tied down in Korea. A CIA internal report stated:

“It is not yet clear whether the USSR will force the Chinese Communists to give open support to the Korean operations or to start a new operation elsewhere in the area. The Peiping regime is unlikely to commit military forces to operations outside China on its own initiative, but almost certainly would comply with a Soviet request for military action. Chinese Communist troop strength and dispositions would permit intervention in Korea with little or no warning.”

“The Soviet leaders would be justified in assuming a substantial risk of general war during the remainder of 1950, arising either out of the prosecution of the Korean incident or out of the initiation of new local operations. Soviets are capable of employing against the continental US the twenty-five A-bombs estimated to be currently available. The Soviets may use TU-4 bombers possibly disguised with US markings on one-way missions, and clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into key harbors by merchant ships.”

On July 9, 1950 in Tokyo, MacArthur saw his glorious career going down the drain. His army, which now outnumbered the communists, was losing badly in South Korea. America’s would-be Caesar wanted to use A-bombs in Korea, and Rhee urged him to drop the A-bombs right away. Rhee did not mind Korea being turned into a no-man's land as long as he retained his power. The man who had embezzled Korean patriots in 1925 wanted his country destroyed so that he could stay in power.

MacArthur asked for ten to twenty A-bombs: “I would cut them (Chinese and Russians) off in North Korea. In Korea I visualize a cul-de-sac. The only passages leading from Manchuria and Vladivostok have many tunnels and bridges. I see here a unique use for the atomic bomb - to strike a blocking blow - which would require a six-months repair job.”

Fortunately for Korea, cool heads in Washington squashed MacArthur’s “nuke ‘em” request. If no nukes, then MacArthur said he needed four more infantry divisions in addition to the four he had requested two days earlier.

As the American and South Korean troops were bottled up in the Pusan perimeter on July 10, 1950, North Koreans were trying to hit Pusan from the west. The North Korean 2nd Army, led by Gen. Mu Jong, pushed south along the west coast. The Pang Ho San Unit, the 6th Division of the Mu's 2nd Army, took Chinju. The People's Committees were restored in liberated areas in South Korea. Guerrillas came out from their hideouts and joined the North Korean Army.

What you won’t find in most history books is that more than 60 members of the Republic of Korea National Assembly joined the North Korean cause. It was like lapsing back to the early days of 1945; we were getting liberated from the American colonials and their Japanese collaborators; Kim Il Sung was our national hero after all.

Then on July 14, 1950, Rhee Syngman turned over all South Korean forces to General MacArthur under the UN mantle:

“In view of the common military effort of the United Nations on behalf of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been placed under your operational command, and in which you have been designated Supreme Commander United Nations Forces, I am happy to assign to you command authority over all land, sea, and air forces of the Republic of Korea during the period of the continuation of the present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by you personally or by such military commander or commanders to whom you may delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or in adjacent seas. The Korean Army will be proud to serve under your command, and the Korean people and Government will be equally proud and encouraged to have the overall direction of our combined combat effort in the hands of so famous and distinguished a soldier who also in his person possesses the delegated military authority of all the United Nations who have joined together to resist this infamous communist assault on the independence and integrity of our beloved land.”

Sabers began rattling from other Chinese factions. On July 19, 1950, Chiang Kai Sek offered to send three of his best divisions to help Rhee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff smelled Chiang was trying to exploit Rhee's problems and gain a new foothold on the Asian continent. Truman told Chiang to mind his own business: “The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa are to be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations.”

North Korean newspapers of July 20, 1950 were full of pictures of inhuman atrocities committed by the American soldiers: whole villages burned down, women and children machine gunned, captured soldiers beheaded and so on. The Americans routinely burned villages suspected of harboring guerrillas. Many were burnt just to deny sanctuary to the communists. Children and women were valid targets for the Americans.

Gooks

Today’s multi-cultured and diversity classes teach that every culture imbeds certain blinders that allow people to practice and deny racism. The Americans showed no respect for the Koreans, especially the ROK Army. The South Koreans did most of the combat, and yet they were hardly mentioned in any war news or briefings. American units routinely diverted war supplies intended for ROKA to their own units.

“Gook” is the Korean word for people, and now Americans twisted the word “gook” into a term of hatred for all Asians. The American racism was not limited to the lower-level roughneck grunts. Gen. Hobart Gay, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, stated in public that he did not consider ROK troops ready for any serious combat. Gay evicted all Korean civilians, women and children, from his area of operation. His eviction included South Korean police as well. The ROK government officials, including Rhee, were kept in the dark like clocks without arms by the US military and Rhee got war news from newspapers.

On July 20, the front lines stabilized around Taegu, 200 miles south of Seoul. The UN forces now outnumbered the North Koreans by close to 100,000 men. The ROKA was back to 45,000, roughly 50% of its pre-war muster. The US commanders knew that the Korean units were filled with farmers and youths pressed into battle with virtually no training. These conscripts were led by equally green seven-day wonders, second lieutenants mass-produced by the South Korean seven-day officer school.

On July 23 from Tokyo, MacArthur cabled the JCS: “Operation planned mid-September is amphibious landing of a two division corps in rear of enemy lines for purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction with attack from south by Eighth Army. I am firmly convinced that early and strong effort behind his front will sever his main line of communication and enable us to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. The alternative is a frontal attack which can only result in a protracted and expensive campaign.” None of the communist intelligence services picked up this cable. Had they, the course of the US effort would have greatly changed.

Ten days later in Formosa, Arthur was given a hero's welcome in Taipei. In an earlier secret cable to Truman, Chiang Kai Sek offered to resign and make MacArthur the new Generalissimo of Formosa (NB: the five-star general was offered the job of Field Marshall of the Philippines in 1940's). Here was a strange case: an American general was being interviewed for a job with a foreign government. MacArthur talked, with Chiang with Chiang's American-educated wife interpreting. No outsiders were present. No one including the CIA, even today know what these old men discussed. MacArthur wanted to expand the war while Chiang wanted the Yankee purse opened for him again.

Other events off the Peninsula would also impact on Korea. On August 1, 1950, Mao Zedong and the Soviet foreign minister Molotov discussed the Korean War. The CIA report on this Beijing meeting reads: “Thus the stage has been set for some form of Chinese Communist intervention or participation in the Korean war. Overt participation by regular forces would preclude admission of Communist China to the UN, while covert participation of Manchurian volunteers might ensure continued localization of the conflict. Intervention could be launched to restore peace by preventing further US aggression and could be linked with the USSR sponsored peace campaign. It is impossible to determine at this time whether a decision has been made. In any case, some form of armed assistance to the North Koreans appears imminent.”

Kim Il Sung’s Army Runs Out of Steam

Between both North and South Koreans, the toll was probing to be debilitating. On August 3, 1950, the best-known surgeon in North Korea, Dr. Lee, was killed in South Korea. Dr. Lee was the only Korean surgeon in Hamhung before the liberation. He was much respected even by the Japanese. After the liberation, he taught at Hamhung Medical College. When the War broke out, this gifted surgeon volunteered to serve the People's Army fighting in South Korea. American bombs wiped out his medical unit near Taejon.

The next day, a 500-pound bomb exploded on the roof of an abandoned factory 20 miles from Pusan at the North Korean People's Army Front Command Headquarters. The bomb broke Gen. Kang Kon's arm, chief of staff and Kang Kon died on September 8, 1950 in a land mine explosion. That nearly missed Gen. Kim Chaik, the front commander. It destroyed the radio room and left only a single radio still operating. Kim Chaik realized that he had missed a golden opportunity to take Pusan, he had wasted too much resources and time in his ill-conceived mop up operations in South Cholla Province.

The temptation to hammer one another outside their own borders continued its seductive, and for Koreans, disastrous course. On August 5, 1950, the Military Affairs Committee in Beijing ordered Gao Gang, commander of the Northeast Military District, to complete combat preparations. By the middle of August, Gao Gang had four armies, three artillery divisions and air units under his command.

That August 6, Mao Zedung met with his top generals, Chu Te, Peng Tehuai, Su Yu, Nie Rongzhen, Deng Xiaoping, Ho Lung and others, to discuss the Korean War and the Taiwan invasion plan. Peng and Su advised Mao that the People's Liberation Army was not ready to invade Taiwan. The Army would need modern weapons and transports. Besides, the US Navy was in the way because of the Korean War. Thus the invasion must be postponed until the Korean War was concluded and the US Navy withdrawn from the Strait of Formosa.

Gen. Nie, acting chief of staff, PLA, reported that the North Korean Army had bogged down and the tide was about to turn against Kim Il Sung. Nie was also concerned about the excessive loss rate of more than 40 percent of the North Korean Army. Gen. Su Yu, in charge of the Taiwan invasion army, asked – “What is China supposed to do about it?” to which the PLA Supreme Commander, Zhu Te, replied: “The Revolutionary Committee has spent a great deal of time discussing the possibility - and I emphasize the tentative nature of our talks. The Committee feels, after giving the matter lengthy consideration that we should urgently prepare contingency plans to back up the Korean People's Army if the situation on the Korean battlefront deteriorates. There seems little likelihood of this happening, but I need not remind you of the need for planning for any and every contingency.”

Gen. Ho Lung asked: ”Is there any chance of the Americans using the atomic bomb?” Nie responded that it was not likely because Stalin had the bomb, too. But, would Stalin help? Another general asked if the PLA was not up to invade Taiwan now, how could it fight the Americans in Korea? After many debates, the generals agreed that China must be prepared to help Kim Il Sung.

Peng’s assessment of Korea was chilling and precise: “There is every indication that this bridgehead will be eliminated within the next two weeks. If it is not, then the possibility of protracted war in Korea cannot be ruled out. Look carefully at the geography. The Korean peninsula, long and narrow. Remember the enemy. MacArthur the - what's the word? - The 'island-hopper.' The Korean peninsula lends itself to amphibious operations, though this will require a lot of daring. Our Korean comrades discount the possibility, but remember, whoever makes the first move, wins.”

“Remember also that a long and narrow landmass imposes its peculiar limitations on our field armies. In past campaigns we have habitually traded space for time when confronting a better-equipped opponent. Korea has no such space. It could turn out to be a straitjacket. A peninsula presents unusual supply difficulties. This occurred to me when I reviewed the American situation in Pusan. The Americans problems are considerably eased because distances within the Pusan perimeter are short. Although it is true that the enemy is forced to transport men and materiel great distances by sea. those supply lines are inviolate. They cannot be cut.”

“Our Korean comrades, on the other hand, are operating a long way from their supply bases. This is becoming a dreadful disadvantage. American air attacks on those supply lines are causing serious losses. The basic problem of Korea, for either side, is that the farther you advance the slimmer your supplies are likely to become. China will become involved in hostilities in Korea only if the integrity of their Democratic People's Republic is directly threatened. There is no likelihood of any such disaster at present. Still, it is our business to cover every contingency, so let us assume that some incredible turn of fortune enables the American imperialists to launch a full-scale invasion north of the 38th parallel. The Chinese response, in my opinion, should be on a limited scale, sufficient to warn the aggressors. If that fails, we should attack with the full weight of the People's Liberation Army.”

As blood spilled in Korea and the communist Chinese leadership set their policy, Harry S. Truman wanted to know exactly what MacArthur had promised Chiang, but the old fox hedged. Truman sent Averell Harriman to Tokyo to grill the general and determine if he was mentally and physically fit for his job. MacArthur told Harriman that: Chiang had offered him a full-time job commanding Chiang's troops, but Mac declined, instead offering Chiang consulting services, and that purely military matters had been discussed. MacArthur then proposed to Harriman to “let Chiang land on Chinese mainland and get rid of him that way.” Harriman believed the old general was going insane or senile

On August 8, 1950, American bombers appeared daily and bombed railroad and bridges in Hamhung. Some 47,000 Americans were fighting in South Korea and they now outnumbered the communists. The North Korean Army had lost its momentum and the front lines stabilized on the Pusan perimeter, from Pohang on the east coast, Chinju on the southwest and Taegu on the north. The NKPA 6th Division was stopped at Pohang and failed its mission to drive south along the coast to Pusan, the first, and the fatal, defeat of the North Korean Army.

We had a sudden increase in wounded soldiers arriving in our town by August 1950. The Hamhung Medical School was turned into an army hospital. My brother was only a sophomore at the school but my father was afraid that he would be drafted as an army doctor at any time. The army hospital was located at the foot of Mount. Sung-ryong, only a few blocks from my house. The wounded soldiers were allowed out to roam the neighborhood and mingled freely with the civilians. The soldiers picked flowers in the meadow across from my house, where the hospital backed into the meadow. I spent hours listening with fascination to the war stories of these veterans fresh from the battlefields of South Korea.

I got to know Comrade Choe very well, who was 35 years old at the time; Koreans working for the Japanese in Manchuria killed his family. He joined the Chinese 8th Route Army at the age of 14. I had met him a few days earlier in the meadow across from my house in back of the Hamhung Medical School, which was turned into an army hospital. As usual I was chatting with a group of wounded soldiers sun bathing in the meadow. I asked about the famous Chinese 8th Route Army - using the derogatory "Ddong ddae nom", meaning dirty chinaman.

Comrade Choe gave me a tongue lashing for using that term, and he told me the story of how he was taken care of by Chinese peasants when his family was wiped out in Manchuria. Choe went on to relate his war experience in China and South Korea, noting that the American soldiers relied on tanks and airplanes. They were no matches for us, man to man, but they did have more tanks and planes, which we did not have. He pointed to a wounded tank commander sitting next to him. His tank had shot down an American B29 plane, but not before he was wounded.

Comrade Choe said that the American soldiers were afraid to die. At the first sign of a trouble, they would panic and abandon their weapons. The Americans liked to play opossum. Choe recommended shooting dead Americans at least twice in the head. The soft Americans were afraid of night fighting because their airplanes could not help them during night. They depended on trucks and jeeps for mobility, they didn't like to walk any long distance, and if you destroyed their vehicles and they surrendered without fight. This hardened communist battle veteran told me his winning secret was to slip a few men behind the enemy positions and fire a few shots. This spooked the Americans into panic and caused frantic calls for help. Choe was leading an attack when friendly covering fire by a greenhorn gunner hit him in the left foot. Choe had no bad feelings towards the gunner and he was eager to rejoin his unit.

Dr. Choe Myong Hak, the noted surgeon and the president of Hamhung Medical College, was killed in the Nakdong battle field. He was educated in Japan, one of the best surgeons in the Japanese Empire before Liberation. He was also a close personal friend of my fathers. Dr. Choe was a communist and an ardent follower of Kim Il Sung and volunteered to serve in the front area and died while trying to save a dying soldier.

There I was a youth of 15 listening to the thoughts and tactics of one of Kim Il Sung’s tough veterans inwardly dreaming of fighting these communists. All I could relate to at the time was what reached my eyes and ears, and much of my spare time in the coming decades has been spent piecing together other qualities that were touching us. As I listened to Comrade Choe, none of us could know that on August 20, 1950, Stalin realized that Kim Il Sung’s Waterloo was at hand and sent a military commission, headed by Gen. M. V. Zakharov, deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, to Pyongyang. Zakharov was to coordinate various military options, including guerrilla warfare, Soviet volunteers, Chinese volunteers, and so on.

On August 24, 1950 in Beijing, Gen. Deng Hua, Commander of the Northeast Defense Force, reported to Mao that Kim Il Sung's rapid advance had resulted in excessive extension of supply lines, that the great gap between forward and rear areas were likely to invite MacArthur to launch amphibious operations in the vicinity of Seoul or Pyongyang. Mao agreed with Deng Hua's assessment and warned Kim Il Sung and Stalin to slow down and beef up coastal defenses.

Mao was worried that Kim would get China sucked into his war. China had been fighting for over 20 years and it had only just been unified. The internal devastation had to be repaired, and land reform in newly liberated areas was in an unfinished state. In border districts there were bandits, spies and Kuomintang remnant forces. Mao preferred to prepare for liberation of Taiwan and Tibet, but the US imperialists about to wipe out Kim Il Sung and help for the North Korean chieftain took priority.

On August 25, 1950, American Maj. Gen. William Dean, commander of the 25th Division, was captured while hiding in a rice field near Taejong. His picture was a front-page news. Dean was in charge of the Taejong defense on July 19. The guerrillas and North Korean troops wiped out his troops, but Dean escaped and went into hiding. Finally, he was spotted and captured. He was the ranking American POW of the Korean war. For the record, Col. Lee Hak Ku was the ranking NK POW. Gen. Walker, commander of the 8th Army, was the ranking KIA and Gen. Kang Kon, commander of the North Korean Army (South) was the ranking KIA on the communist side.

Operation Trudy

The same day, Dean was captured, the first major US CIA operation, code named Trudy Jackson, was started by a US team led by 39-year old Lt. Eugene Clark of the US Navy. Clark was a Japanese linguist attached to MacArthur's G2. He volunteered to lead a CIA team made of Lt. Youn Joung, ROK Navy, Col. Ke In Ju, ROKA, a US Army captain and 10 Korean agents trained by Hans Tofte. Col. Ke was formally an intelligence officer who had been fired by Rhee for his failure to predict the invasion.

Within several days, Hans Tofte flew Clark and the two Korean officers to an OPC camp at Sasebo. There they received a quick lesson on covert operations and got teamed up with a CIA radio team. Tofte gave Clark enough weapons, rice, dried fish, sugar, whiskey and gold bars to form a guerrilla army.

As the Trudy men were shuttling through air space to Japan, Kim Il Sung ordered his final campaign to wipe out the Pusan perimeter. Pohang and Chinju and Nakdong front lines crumbled, but the US 8th Army regrouped and stopped the campaign. This was the turning point of the war. The North Korean Army ran out of steam and went down hill from this time on. The bulk of the seasoned, hard core Korean vets of China were dead or wounded or captured.

On August 31, 1950, the Trudy team boarded the British warship HMS Charity and left for Inchon. They were transferred to the South Korean warship PC-703 at the entrance of Flying Fish Channel. On September 1, 1950, Lt. Clark and his team landed at Yonghong Island, 14 miles from Inchon, in preparation for the Inchon landing. Clark pressed some 50 islanders into scouting missions in Inchon, but informants called in the North Korean troops and the commandos escaped to the nearby island of Palmi-do leaving behind the islanders. The communists shot those who helped the Americans.

Figure 18. The Trudy team securing Inchon access. Lt. Clark is standing at far right and Col. Ke In Ju, the KLO leader, is at the center standing. The scouts were local kids.

By September 1, 1950 in Shenyang, Manchuria, Gen. Peng Dehuai established his secret army (Chinese Volunteers Army) headquarters at an old Japanese armory. Peng moved in with two battered suitcases and one book on butterflies, his only hobby, as Kim Il Sung's final offensive, involving 133,000 ill-trained troops, to crush the Pusan perimeter came to a grinding halt at the Naktong River. For the first time, the UN forces matched the North Korean Army in numbers and firepower. By now the entire infantry fighting manpower of America was in Korea. On September 8, 1950, Kang Kon, commander-in-chief of the North Korean Front Army and many of his staff were killed by a land mine. Kang was born on June 23, 1918 in South Korea and joined Kim Il Sung's army in 1933 and stayed with Kim until his death on the banks of Naktong, Two days later, tearful Kim Il Sung held a solemn state funeral for Kang in Pyongyang.

“Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.”

Kim Il Sung failed to shape his tactics to fit the changing war circumstances. The Americans could and did read Kim's movements like a clock. Kim’s brute force tactics wasted away his troops.

Peng Tehuai sped up his preparation in Manchuria for Korean intervention. Peng saw that Kim Il Sung was losing steam. The Chinese general was faced with the enormous problem of assembling an army of a quarter of a million men: most field officers had no experience at fighting a conventional war against a well-organized army, and transportation and communication were virtually non-existent. Mao Zedung thought three weeks would be enough to place armies in North Korea, but Peng knew that it would take him at least two months.

Peng planned his counter attacks using a giant relief model of Korea. He told his staff that the Korean situation was indeed very bad for Kim Il Sung. Peng had three field armies - the 38th, the 40th and the 42nd, and the finest of the 4th Army at his disposal. Two additional field armies, the 27th and the 39^th, were being brought in from South China.

“In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power. Manpower alone will not win a war in Korea. Korea will be a battle of supplies.” Peng observed.

“Our planning must be flexible. In war, there are no constant conditions. We must match our methods to the prevailing circumstances: the terrain, the weather, and the state of the enemy. Given the theoretical situation we have here, knowing our weaknesses as well as our strengths, I would oppose an all-out initial assault. But I would not advocate a purely guerrilla-style campaign.”

“Our first response to an American invasion of North Korea should be limited. The PLA has not the equipment, the supplies, or the time to launch large-scale operations deep into Korea. If by some mischance the Americans and their allies ever invade the DPRK, we should halt them north of Pyongyang at the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula.”

Peng doubted if MacArthur would be so stupid as to move into the mountainous north and overreach himself, especially if he detected a large Chinese force in place. Peng ordered more supply and engineering units; and three more field armies arrived. Peng ordered mobilization of local civilians for war.

Meanwhile, Washington was in disarray. On September 12, Truman fired Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, for insubordination and for leaking confidential information to Truman's political opponents. Johnson had been a staunch supporter of Chiang Kai Sek and MacArthur. Gen. George Marshall was recalled from retirement to take over the Defense Department. Truman also axed his head spook, Adm. Hillenkoetter and put Gen. Walter Smith in charge of the CIA.

That September 15, 1950 in Shenyang, Gao Gang, the boss of Manchuria, called for an emergency meeting. He was informed of the latest intelligence on a large American naval task force near the South Korean coast. Half way through the meeting, a signal officer brought in the news of Inchon landing. Peng Dehuai calmly told his staff:

“The American counterattack has begun. This morning the imperialists landed on the Korean coast close to Seoul. The place is called Inchon.”

The Young Duk Landing

MacArthur wanted a decoy landing on the east coast to deceive Kim Il Sung into believing that it was the main thrust and catch Kim unexpectedly at Inchon, the main show. The job fell on the Myong Guerrilla Brigade of the South Korean army. When the war broke out Capt. Lee Jong Hoon headed the psychological war section. After retreating to Taegu, he organized a paramilitary unit of students and anti-communist youth numbering about 800.

On September 9, Lee’s unit was sanctioned officially as the First Guerrilla Brigade, code-named the Myong Brigade. On September 12, Lee was ordered to land behind the enemy line at Young-duk and engage the North Korean Second Corps under Kim Mu Jong. The actual landing site was Changsa-dong, north of Pohang.

Figure lst-120.gif: ROK Navy Munsan-ho disabled and stranded in a botched guerrilla operation. Munsan was formerly US Navy LST-120. Courtesy US Navy History Archive.

On September 14^th, the brigade boarded the Munsan, a 2,700 ton South Korean Navy LST, formerly US Navy LSt #120, and headed north toward the landing zone. On board the LST were 772 guerrillas, 12 radiomen, 42 crewmembers of the ship, five navy policemen, one American adviser, one interpreter and several other observers. When the ship was about 4km from the beach, the enemy spotted her and began to fire at her. The captain’s cabin suffered a direct hit and the American was killed. The ship’s engine room was damaged and the ship got stranded. The enemy fire intensified and the command was given to start the landing operation.

The original plan involved air and naval support, but the only support actually given came from a British destroyer. The landing forces were decimated but they managed to secure the beach. However, the enemy forces regrouped and counter-attacked with tanks and canon fire. The partisans were surrounded, losing all radios and radiomen. The ship’s captain and most of the crew were dead also. Two volunteers were dispatched to inform headquarters of the situation and their determination to stay put and fight to the last man. Fortunately for the partisans, an American helicopter found them and called for help. Another South Korean ship and a small flotilla of US Navy warship, including USS Helena, were sent to rescue the stranded partisans. A rope was strung from the beach to the ship, parked some 200 m away. The survivors used the rope to the safety but many lost their grip and drowned on the way or shot dead by the enemy.

Soon the enemy shells began to fall near the rescue ship and her captain gave the order to move out. There were some 30 partisans still to be rescued. The partisan commander pulled out his pistol and commanded the captain to turn back, but the captain ignored the threat and the ship sped away leaving the partisans behind.

The Inchon Landing

MacArthur's September 15 Inchon landing took the North Koreans by surprise. It broke the back of the North Korean Army. None of the communist countries, North Korea, China or USSR, saw the landing coming. Green units defended the Inchon and Seoul areas. North Korean Army 3rd, 8th and 12th divisions were completely destroyed. The North Korean commander of the Seoul garrison ordered an immediate evacuation of all foreigners, mainly Russians and Chinese, and party cadres. The top priority was given to the Soviet advisors. Russians filed onto an old bus and left Seoul. Communist cadres and their friends fought each other to get on whatever vehicles were leaving Seoul. A trainload of the communists managed to leave Seoul, but were bombed just outside of the city with heavy casualties.

The command center was in utter chaos. Some North Koreans officer ran around and screamed at each other without knowing what to do; while others were furiously burning documents. The commanding general, Mu Jung, faulted his intelligence for bad information. He had been informed that "it is impossible to launch a full-scale amphibious operation at Inchon". On paper, Mu Jong had one division guarding Inchon, three divisions guarding Seoul and four divisions guarding Pyongyang. But, he knew that all these were divisions in name only and that he had at best 6,000 men to fight the invasion force of the American X Corps, nearly 40,000 men strong. More than 4,000 North Koreans died. Civilians were indiscriminately napalmed and several captured North Korean nurses were shot dead by the Americans. Mu Jong's rear-area defense collapsed in spite of his summary executions of senior commanders for desertion and Pyongyang was left defenseless. Kim Il Sung booted Mu Jung out of his army for the Seoul and Pyongyang fiascoes.

By September 22, Kim Il Sung had no choice but to order a general retreat. The US CIA estimated that out of the original North Korean force of 165,000, less than 40,000 managed to return home. All equipment in South Korea were lost. The North Korean Army had 30,000 to 50,000 new recruits in North Korea. The CIA estimates were way off the mark. The fact of the matter is about 30,000 of the invading force of 90,000 returned to North Korea. Virtually all of the senior commanders made it back to North Korea. In addition, North Korea had a reserve of over 125,000 men still intact in North Korea and Manchuria.

Rhee Syngman's hand-written note ordering Gen. Won Yong Duk to kill Kim Sung Ju was presented as evidence at Won's Court Martial: http://www.kimkoo.pe.kr/ass19490626/ass19490626.htm (Korean National Assembly - Report on Kim Gu Assassination). He claimed that he was ordered to kill Kim by Rhee Syngman and so he was not guilty, but the court found him guilty.

1) Enter the Dragon - China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51, Russell Spurr, New Market Press, NY 1988: eyewitness accounts of the Korean War by the Chinese.

2) In Mortal Combat - Korea, 1950-1953, John Toland, William Morrow and Co., NY, 1991.

1) Korea The Untold Story of the War - Joseph C. Goulden, McGraw-Hill, Inc., NY, 1982: another Pentagon paper on the Korean War with extensive references to US classified documents.

2) Korean eyewitness accounts: personal correspondence with Kang In Mo and participants.