만약전선에서   우리와함께  옛친구만나면

피로서  매저진  추억에노래를 유캐히부르리라

모여라  동모야  한책산  모여서  높이들자  술잔을

마시자  자유와  행복을  위하야  마시고  또부어라  

If we shall meet again, somewhere in a battle field, dear comrades,

We will sing joyously the songs of our past, stained red with our blood,

Gather together, comrades, around a table,

And raise glasses and drink to peace and freedom.

A Soviet Army ballad during WWII, popular in the Student Volunteers Army of Hamhung in 1950

‘Invading’ Kojedo

With the world we knew in rubbles behind us, we arrived at the south coast island of Koje on December 24, 1950, the final days of the worst and the most eventful year of my life.  "Koje" means greatly nurturing and it is the second largest island in Korea after Cheju Island. It is 399 square kilometers, including 10 inhabited and 50 uninhabited smaller islands. Thus, Koje Island is actually a group of islands.  In 757 A.D, the King of Shilla Dynasty, took possession of the island for the first time, until then a base of Japanese pirates.  In 1170, King of Koryo Dynasty escaped to Koje during a peasant uprising. In 1592,  Admiral Yi, Sun-Shin smashed a Japanese fleet near Ok-po. 

Figure kojemap.gif. Today's Koje Island is a modern city connected to the mainland by bridge. It is home for shipbuilding, sport fishing and booming tourism.  It was a poor sleepy island, nicknamed the beggar island in the 1950s. 

Our first stop was Jisepo, an old naval base during the Yi Dynasty, but now a sleepy fishing village noted for dried fish. It was blessed with a natural harbor with a large lagoon. Its climate was mild and the seashores teamed with edible seaweed and shellfish, an ideal location for war refugees. Its population was probably less than 2,000, but it was home for 150,000 refugees from North Korea.  Over one hundred US army tents were erected for North Korean refugees along the beach. To day, Jisepo is no more. In its place stands several thriving beach swimming areas, hotels and fine restaurants, catering to rich Koreans and American GIs bused over a bridge that connects the island to the mainland.

Our ship docked at a wooden pier sticking out in the harbor and the refugees from Hungnam were dropped off.  A small group of police and the village chief were there to welcome the refugees.  After the poor refuges were unloaded, we headed for the town of Jangsung-po, "po" means a port, the administrative center of Kojedo.  We rounded a lighthouse and several tiny islands at the mouth of the harbor and made a short hop to our final destination. 

Jangsung-po had a larger population than Jise-po and had several modern buildings. A detachment of scared South Korean police came aboard. We were shocked to notice that they were in Japanese police uniforms, black cap and black cloth. They even retained the Japanese name, Gei-sha-tzu! I guess the North Koreans were not lying about the South Korean police being made of Japanese collaborators. This was not a good omen: maybe we had made a big mistake switching sides?

The policemen didn't want a group of heavily armed North Koreans landing in their town. We outnumbered them and probably had more lethal weapons than these guys who carried flimsy American carbines. We had several Maxim heavy machine guns with boxes of ammos, burp guns, grenades, anti-tank rockets and poison gas canisters. We could  have easily taken over the island from these pro-Japanese traitors. They wanted to know: Who are your? Why are you here? Why pick Jangsungpo? No one knew for sure who had the authority over us or even our legal status. Who would pay for our lodging and food? Refugees were taken care of by the UN and South Korean soldiers were taken care of by Rhee Syngman. But who was responsible for us? We were neither refugees nor soldiers. We did not fit into any category. We were neither enemy nor friends to the police.

Some comrades thought that the education minister was our boss and so, he must have sent us here. After all, we were part of the 'Student' Volunteers Army, but others thought that the defense minister was our boss, for precisely the same reason. After all, the captain was ordered by his boos to take us here, but then who told his boss? Our commander was called into the discussion and started negotiating. The Navy captain had his orders to move on to another assignment and wanted to unload us right away. The village chief wanted a written order from the central government, but the angry captain shouted back that he had none and he was going to dump the North Koreans anyway and that was the end of his duty. 

After a long heated meeting, the policemen finally agreed to let us land and provide a temporary lodging to us, but first, they wanted custody of all of our weapons. They also wanted a written order from a South Korean authority clarifying what we were doing here as soon as possible. We agreed to donate all the rice and other supplies we brought from Hamhung. The police took our heavy weapons and ammos, leaving us with two or three burp guns sans shells. Our commander insisted that he needed those weapons for training his troops. The navy captain agreed to take our commander, Yang Byong Hoo, to Pusan, the wartime seat of Syngman Rhee's government. The commander said he knew some important people there and would be back with funds and the official papers in a few days.

We were led to a small abandoned warehouse, our new quarters. Our bedding was a sleeping bag on a hardwood floor. We were divided into groups of four and assigned to a 'patriotic' family. The poor locals were 'volunteered' to feed our group until our commander came back with funds. We were not exactly welcome guests to the locals. The locals were dirt poor themselves, eking out a living doing who knew what. Our meals consisted of potato plants (no potatoes!), seaweed, boiled barley and some other foul smelling dishes.

Figure 10c. My former Student Volunteers Army comrades serving in the ROKA.

The student volunteers army detachment from Hamhung had an odd mix of people from North Korea. Every one of us had a different reason for coming to south. There were deserters from the North Korean Army who had escaped from the Nakdong front and went into hiding in North Korea; when the US forces invaded North Korea, they came out of hiding. There were guys who went into hiding to avoid being pressed into North Korean Army. But most of us were sub-teens nearing the military age.

Comrade Kim Yun Ho was a student at China’s Peking University when Mao's peasants army defeated Chiang Kai Sek in 1949. He came home from China in 1949 and went into hiding to avoid being drafted into the People's Army. A brilliant student he was but he was wasting away when the UN forces occupied Hamhung. He was a close friend of my brother and joined the SVA in December 1950. He would work for the US CIC for a number of years before immigrating to the US where he earned a Ph.D. in history. In 1985, a car struck and killed him riding a bicycle.  Kim left a wife and three young children. 

Comrade Park Hong Chul was a student at Kim Il Sung University when the war broke out. He was drafted as a captain in the North Korean Army and fought at Inchon. He managed to straggle back to Hamhung and went into hiding. He joined the SVA in November 1950. He worked for the US CIC for three years and graduated from Seoul National University. He taught at a South Korean university until his retirement in 1990. Comrade Chang Suk was a student at Hamhung Medical College when the war broke out. He was a medical captain and served at the Nakdong Front. He straggled back to Hamhung after the Inchon landing and went into hiding. He joined the SVA and worked for the US CIC for 4 years. 

Comrade Park Ho Sul joined Rhee's Army in 1953 and saw action in Vietnam. After being discharged from the army, he came to America and ran a successful real estate business. He has chaired the Korean Veterans Association  in the Baltimore area and visited North Korea twice. Comrade Chang Song Nak, the English guru of our group, worked for the US State Department as a linguist. He was stationed in Okinawa for several decades and retired in Cleveland, Ohio, where his son, a college professor, and daughter, a medical doctor, live.  Comrade Lee Gyu Ryul worked for a business firm in South Korea.  

Comrade Kim Ung Sik, my brother, was also a student at Hamhung Medical College. Ung Sik went into hiding when the war broke out to avoid being pressed into the North Korean Army. He was one of the first to join the SVA and one of the staff officers. He joined the South Korean Army Medical Corps at Pusan.  He later received an MD and earned a Ph.D. in Seoul. He held several administrative positions in the ROK Ministry of Health. Upon his retirement, he immigrated to America.

Ridgway’s War

There was no assurance that our arrival at Koje Island would be a safe haven. That December 31, the communists attacked in force and closed in on Seoul. The ROK Army once again folded and ran. Gen. Mathew Ridgway, the new 8th Army commander after Gen. Walker's death, ordered a general retreat, south of the Han River. By January 4, 1951, Seoul fell to the communists for the second time. To the east, the US 2nd Infantry Division got clobbered by the North Korean Army once again and abandoned Wonju in a rout. The commanding general was fired. But the communists ran out of war supplies and paused for replacements. The front lines ran along the Kum River. Gen. Ridgway brought up the X corps, evacuated from Hungnam with me, from Pusan to join the battle.

Ridgway, a decorated World War II veteran, found the 8th Army in shambles: “There is a definite air of nervousness, of gloomy foreboding, of uncertainty, a spirit of apprehension as to what the future hold... It is clear to me that our troops had lost confidence; I can read it in their eyes, in their walk. I can read it in the faces of their leaders, from sergeants right on up to the top.”

Ridgway immediately fired five generals, commanders of the 2nd, 7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry divisions, all veterans of MacArthur's war in North Korea. Younger generals replaced the old tired men ready for retirement. Ridgway observed: “the other fellow manages and he seems never to lack ammunition, the heaviest load in his logistics stream, though, of course, he uses impressed human carriers and every local form of transportation - oxen, camels, ponies and two-wheel carts....The Chinese and Koreans are in appearance but a shade above the human beast. It is by the use of such human canaille that the Soviets are destroying our men while conserving their own.”

There was no mistaking the fact that a new wind, and a new will had arrived in Korea. On January 8, Ridgway ordered his troops to shoot any civilian suspected of being a communist before they become prisoners. He asked MacArthur's permission to use poison gas. MacArthur denied Ridgway’s request. MacArthur left Ridgway alone for a while. Ridgway tried to educate MacArthur the basics of a limited war: “To support the army in Korea, our mobilization base has been destroyed and our supply warehouses are bare. The United States is not capable of any major effort anywhere in the world except Korea.”

Ridgway was the first commander who knew how to handle MacArthur. On January 9, 1951, The US Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a chilling order to MacArthur: “Defend in successive positions as required by JCS 99935 (December 29, 1950), inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea, subject to primary consideration of the safety of your troops and your basic mission of defending Japan. Should it become evident in your judgment that evacuation is essential to avoid severe losses of men and material, you will at that time withdraw from Korea to Japan.”

With the front lines stabilized by Ridgway, MacArthur's cockiness returned. The part about bugging out of Korea angered MacArthur, and he responded back to the JCS: “Is it the present objective of United States political policy to maintain a military position in Korea - indefinitely, for a limited time - or to minimize losses by evacuation as soon as it can be accomplished?. Its military position is untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction if overriding political considerations so dictate.”.

On January 11, 1951, the UN Cease-fire Commission was working full steam to end the war diplomatically. The Commission proposed: an immediate cease-fire, a political conference of all parties concerned and a withdrawal of all foreign troops. A Chinese diplomat contacted a Chinese student in Washington, DC, who contacted a State Department employee; the Chinese diplomat wanted to exchange unofficial information. The State Department asked for the authentication of the diplomat;  they wanted an American spy in Chinese prison released. The Americans were not aware their man had been dead for some time and that the Chinese could not return the man. Thus ended the first peace overture.

By January 12, Truman sent Gen. Collins and Gen. Vandenberg to meet with MacArthur to assess his mental status. At the same time, Truman sent a personal letter to MacArthur begging for his understanding of the American foreign policy. Concurrently, the JCS sent a long explicit instruction to MacArthur. MacArthur replied to Truman's long letter with a curt, “We shall do our best.” Collins and Vandenberg went over the JCS directives with MacArthur in detail, sentence by sentence.

The UN forces went on the offensive by January 25, 1951. Ridgway combined the 8th Army and the X corps and then split it into two new corps, X and IX. The communist forces were pushed back to the Han River around Seoul. MacArthur was quick to take the credit.

Peng learned that he could not depend on Korean natives for logistics, that he was unable to maneuver freely to avoid combat on unfavorable terms and that he had little room for the tactics of avoidance as enunciated by Sun Tzu. Peng was forced to shed the people's war tactics and adopt the Soviet military doctrine of large formations backed by heavy firepower.

The Demise of the Student Volunteers Army of Hamhung

By January 30 on Kojedo, week had passed by without a word from our commander. We began to wonder if the man had deserted us. Those who could afford the boat ride to Pusan deserted us. Ostensibly, they wanted to look for our vanished leader in Pusan. In order to pay for our food, we collected firewood in the mountains and peddled them in the town market. Those who had rudimentary English got a job with the American CIC as interpreters at the POW camps.

I was dejected. My idea of an anti-communism crusade did not include physical labor for food. I envied the easy money my seniors were making working for the Americans. Unfortunately my English was not good enough for a job with the American forces. I devoted all of my free time to learning English. It was a matter of life or death for me.

My brother decided to go to Pusan and try his luck there. On the first day in Pusan, he ran into an old school friend from Hamhung, Kim Sun Wuk, whose uncle, a professor of medicine at Seoul Medical College, knew the commander of an army hospital and wrote a letter of recommendation on behalf of my brother.  This letter got my brother jobs at several South Korean army hospitals and made life much easier for both my brother and I.  Dr. Kim Sun Wuk lived a few blocks from us in Hamhung and fled to Seoul before the war.  He became a famous neurosurgeon in South Korea before emigrating to the US, where he pursued his other life as a famed calligrapher. His writings have been shown in China, Taiwan and America.   He and his wife, a famed painter of Oriental art herself, live in Los Angeles, California. 

The South Korean Army was acutely short of medical people and anyone with any knowledge of medicine was hired on the spot and pressed into doing surgery and other advanced medical chores. Ung Sik had only two years of medical education, but he did a surgeon's work at the hospital. He got free meals and lodging at the hospital, in addition to a small stipend. All doctors supplemented their stipend with a side business, they would steal medical supplies and sell them on the black market. Army hospitals were supplied by the Americans and no one felt bad about stealing them. There was plenty more where they came from. My brother was allowed to transfer from Hamhung Medical College to Seoul Medical College’s refugee campus in Pusan and no transcripts were necessary.

After a month of waiting, we decided to disband our unit ourselves. Those who were 18 years or older joined the South Korean Army. The police chief was more than willing to make the arrangement. The under-aged students like myself were sent to the refugee camp at Jisepo. Thus the Hamhung Student Volunteers Army Unit met its end, and so did our youthful dream of following our ancient Wharang heritage.

I learned three years later that our commander did obtain some funds from the Government’s Education Ministry, but had decided to keep it for himself. He was discovered hiding among the refugees in Pusan, but there was no criminal charge brought against him. By then, no one really cared much about the past. All of us were doing what we could to survive.

Word came that Truman decided to accept a cease-fire with Korea divided more or less along the 38th Parallel. The American public wanted the boys brought back home and an end to Truman's war.

The 18th Guard Aviation Regiment of the Soviet Army moved to Dadung across the Yalu River from Sinuiju, and joined the air war against the US. Some 160 MIG's with North Korean markings were deployed. Stalin moved five infantry divisions to the Rajin border area ready to move in Korea’s high rugged northeast corner near the Tumen River.

My comrades who joined the South Korean Army landed at Mukho on February 15, 1951, a seaport on the east coast of South Korea, and walked right into an enemy ambush. Few of them survived. Most of my friends from North Korea perished in a single battle. The poor souls arrived in a single landing craft at Mukho with no covering fire and no scouting. The commanding officer thought the town was free of the North Korean Army and ordered his men offshore. As soon as the troops were assembled on the beach, the enemy opened fire and cut them to pieces. The commanding officer abandoned his men and escaped. He was later court marshaled and executed for cowardice. That sure did not bring back my comrades.

I officially became a civilian refugee on February 17, 1951. About 91,000 refugees from Hungnam, Hamhung and Wonsan were in the refugee camps at Kojedo. Refugees were housed in US Army tents along the beach. We were organized into groups of 10 to 15 families.

Figure 20. At the Jisepo Pier – My teacher and classmates

Each group designated a group leader who reported to the camp leader. The UN Command fed refugees, and each refugee was entitled to daily ration of rice, canned GI rations, and other consumer goods. Each group prepared its own meals on the beach.

US army cans were used for cooking rice and soup. Children gathered firewood and edibles from the ocean. The ocean provided a host of food - seaweed, clams, oysters and fish. The beach was ideal for cooking food and dried up driftwood made excellent firewood. I ran into my neighbors from Hamhung.

Jisepo had been a hotbed of the Korean People's Committee in 1945. The local peasants and fisherman took over the island from the Japanese on August 15, 1945. The two or three rich landowners who owned all arable land were eliminated along with all Japanese collaborators on the island. The Committee refused to obey the US Military Government's order to disband and fought with arms the invading troops, mostly former Japanese police and army soldiers. Several hundreds of the island's youth were killed and their bodies were thrown into the ocean. Even in 1951, human bones washed up on the beach now and then. Many of the islanders were still bitter and hostile towards the Americans.

Refugee camps were run by corrupt people, refugees themselves, who padded the camp roster with ghosts. Ghost padding was also practiced by the Korean 'Bang-Wie-Gung' Militia, which included many refugees of the military age, and some South Korean army commanders. The UN Command supplied daily rations and military pay based on head counts. The Commander of the militia, reportedly a former body guard of Rhee Syngman, was executed for corruption.

Refugees were encouraged to leave the camp and become self-supporting as soon as possible. Many refugees started up a business or moved to Pusan where opportunities abounded with quick-buck schemes. One way in which a corrupt refugee official made money was not to report those refugees who left the camp. Rations for non-existent refugees were sold to local residents or to the sole business of Jisepo, a rice wine brewery.

The South Korean Dae Kwang School trustees helped out the refugee kids by donating funds and teachers for a branch campus in Jisepo. Rich American and Korean Christians funded Dae Kwang. Tent class rooms were set up on a mountain side. Students and faculty cleared a patch of trees and brushes. The US Army donated tents. The principal was a South Korean Christian woman genuinely motivated to educate the refugee kids. Some of the teachers were recruited from refugees. I enrolled in the senior class along with 20 others.

I find that research allows me to chronologically reconstruct and remember what was happening in my personal life. For instance, on February 20, 1951, Gen. Ridgway mounted “Operation Killer”, his second major offensive. MacArthur decided to grab the headlines and showed up at the 8th Army headquarters and called a press briefing. He told the press, “I have just ordered a resumption of the offensive.” The offensive was supposed to be a surprise attack, but here MacArthur was broadcasting the secret UN plan to the whole world.

What made Ridgway angry was that MacArthur implied that he came to Korea to assess the situation himself and had decided to start the Operation Killer. Ridgway was outraged by MacArthur's apparent willingness to sacrifice American lives in order to keep his “public image always glowing.”.

Ridgway maneuvered to keep the old man out of Korea; he told MacArthur that his visits to Korea were sure signals to the communists of an impending UN offensive and therefore it was unwise for MacArthur to come to Korea. MacArthur concurred and agreed to stay away until an operation was well under way. Yet on March 7, 1951, MacArthur was back in Korea at Suwon, 30 miles south of Seoul, and stepped on Ridgway's toes again. MacArthur made a public statement that ridiculed the American aim of a stalemate - why die for a non-win war – “Why die for tie?”  MacArthur called for war with China. Ridgway saw in MacArthur an exhausted and depressed man, a general who had already lost his reputation, a defeated general looking for a miracle. To some, MacArthur reminded them of Hitler during the last days of the Third Reich.

Indeed, MacArthur was busy rewriting the war history. He called his home by Xmas campaign a brilliant success: “Our field strategy, initiated upon Communist China's entry into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to lengthen the enemy's supply lines with resultant pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an almost astronomical increase in the destructiveness of our air power, had worked well... The concept advanced by some that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is wholly unrealistic and illusory.”

On March 20, 1951, the US Counter Intelligence Corps, 308th Battalion, the Kangnung Unit commanded by a Mr. Adams, set up a shop in an office at the rice wine brewery. The man in charge was Mr. Big MingChung, a former Japanese policeman from Hungnam. Mr. Chung reported to an American based in Pusan. Chung's job was to find communist agents hidden among the refugees.

He recruited informants among the refugees for this. Chung was paid by the Americans by the number of intelligence reports he submitted. I was known as the English expert in Jisepo, the boy who had 20,000 English words in his memory, and I offered my service to the American CIC. I translated CIC agents’ reports into English for Mr. Chung. I also translated instructions coming to Mr. Chung into Korean. My pay was the privilege of sleeping in the CIC branch office during the night, if Mr. Chung did not need the room for his frequent affairs with refugee women.

Another form of pay I received working for Mr. Chung was the dried rice from the brewery. Rice was cooked, dried and then mixed with yeast for fermentation. I got to eat as much of the dried rice as my stomach could hold. In addition, I got to watch Mr. Chung fornicate. He said, the “sex show” was part of my pay.

I got to be a friend of the brewery owner's son who was a few years older than I was, and who loved to watch the show with me. There was not much to do on this island. I walked around the island several times and there was not much new sightseeing left. I spent about half of my time studying English and the other half talking politics with my fellow refugees.

The first CIC presence in Korea was the 607th, K Sub-Detachment, a small three-men outfit, stationed at Kimpo Airfield west of Seoul. Its primary mission was detection and prevention of subversives against the US Air Force units in South Korea. It was also involved in screening South Korean civilians working for the US units. The K detachment was embraced by Syngman Rhee as means of suppressing his political opponents. By 1947, the 607th had evolved into a large-scale spy and counter-spy organization manned mainly by South Koreans. It had placed informers in the ruling circle of the Korean Workers Party and reliable agents elsewhere n North Korea. It had accurate intelligence on North Korean agents' infiltration routes, methods of operations, and destinations. Donald Nichols, a US Air Force master sergeant, was in command of the operation. Nichols had direct access to Rhee and other ruling elite of South Korea. Nichols had many of the leading politicians in his hip pocket through friendly persuasion and coercion. Nichols wrote in his autobiography:

“I soon learned one of the most effective ways to control high level politicians is through a state of fear. Everyone has a skeleton to hide; find out what, where, or who it is, and you have your man more-or-less under control. I used this tactic with any official I couldn't win over by sheer friendship and magnetism. There was a lot of guerrilla warfare activity in South Korea prior to 1950. Often, leaders of these groups were apprehended, their heads were cut off, placed in containers of gasoline and brought to headquarters for identification and proof.”

In October of 1949, Rhee established the South Korean Air Force, which had a handful of US Army observation L-5 planes. Its primary function was intelligence over-flights over North Korea. Nichols was made an honorary citizen and colonel of South Korea by Rhee. Nichols' outfit was designated as the US AF 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) based in Pupyon between Seoul and Inchon. Thus, this CIC world I had just entered had years of operational depth and momentum.

Figure 20a. My classmates of Koje Daekwang High visiting Seoul 

The first graduating class of Koje Daekwang High School in 1951 had three girls and five boys. I was in the second graduating class, which had all boys.  My class started out with two girls but they got connected with their relatives in Seoul and left us. The classrooms were actually US army field tents and it got really hot and stuffy even when the sides were rolled up. The campus was built inside a forest and the tall trees surrounding the tents prevented any breeze from blowing fresh air into our classrooms. For the starving refugee kids, the free daily lunch of rice and fish was the highlight and the main attraction of the school. In fact, many of the kids came to school for the meal.  It is true that Uncle Sam gave the refugees plenty of food, but the rice we received was yellowish long grain variety and our stomachs had trouble digesting the foreign rice.  Luckily, our school used Korean rice, short, round and white.

We received lessons in English, calculus, Korean language, world history, geography and advance algebra. An old man from Hamhung taught history and Korean language classes. One day, the school principal gave him money to buy our textbooks in Pusan, we received textbooks and other school supplies free, courtesy of a rich American Christian.  The old man took a ferry to Pusan and managed to buy the books, that weighed nearly one hundred pounds.  He hired a coolie with an A-frame to carry the books to the ferry boat.  Unfortunately, the coolie ran off with the books and the poor man came home empty and greatly dejected, in tears. He vowed that he would sell everything he owned, which did not amount to much, and get us the books. But the generous American sent more money for our books.

 Our math teacher also came from Hamhung.  He was one of the most gifted math teachers I have had. He was patient and spotted our mental blocks right away. He knew how to clear up our befuddled brains. A few years later, he became a math professor at a University in Seoul.  Our English teacher doubled as our Bible teacher.  We were expected to attend the Bible class every school day.  Although attendance was not mandatory, we felt some moral obligation to read the Bible and sing hymns in English. We read the Bible in English and the teacher preached in English as well, thus we learned Jesus Christ and English at the same time.

Working At POW Camps

Five of my former comrades of the Student Volunteers Army worked at the camp site, where the US CIC had an office. I was happy to be reunited with them. They shared a tiny room rented from a farmer with two Chinese agents from Taiwan. The agents handled the Chinese POWs. They were fluent in English and Japanese. They said that the Japanese treated Formosans fairly and that they missed the Japanese colonials. It was obvious that these Chinese were Jap lovers, and we had contempt for them.

On June 10, 1951, I got employed at Koje Island’s POW camps as an English translator. My hours of English learning finally paid off. A POW compound consisted of 30 to 40 tents, each tent housing 30-60 POWs. Each compound was enclosed by high wire fence with watchtowers here and there. 5 to 6 US soldiers guarded the entrance. Communist officers were isolated from soldiers and housed in a special compound. Chinese POW's were separated from North Korean POWs.

My work consisted of translating POW profiles, name, address, unit designation, educational background, into English. There were about 15 of us and our office was an army tent, which we shared with American GI's who edited our English. POWs were brought in 15 at a time before each translator, and filled out a standard form in Korean. We were popular with the refugees looking to see if any of their relatives were POW's. We were not allowed to look through the files, but we managed to locate POW relatives now and then. The relatives brought food and family news to us and we smuggled them to the POWs.

Figure pow-ci.jpg.  Women and Civilian POWs in 1952.

There were also camps for civilian internees, those South Koreans who joined the Korean militia. Female POWs were segregated from male POWs. The POWs themselves ran each camp, but communist cadres managed to set up 'under-tent' tunnels to control the whole camp.  Female POWs were allowed to keep their babies with them. It was surprising to see so many kids and pregnant women in the camp. The guards claimed that male and female POWs copulated through the barbed wire fences. A more likely story was that since most female POWs worked as nurses in male POW 'sick' tents, they had plenty of opportunity to be alone with a male POW or a guard.

The Chinese POWs behaved quite differently. Whereas the North Koreans did military marches singing the People's Army anthem or Kim Il Sung songs, the Chinese played more artistic songs using musical instruments. They didn't do any military march or exercise. The Chinese were more keen on fine tuning their singing or dancing skills than martial arts. Another difference was that many Chinese POW camps flew Chiang's nationalist flag!

POWs wore GI uniforms with a large 'POW' in white paint on the back. The POWs altered GI caps into North Korean army caps complete with KPA insignia made from cans. The POWs marched and exercised as of they were in their regular barracks. They were fed three square meals a day, white rice, meat and vegetables; much better than what the South Korean troops ate. The POWs themselves prepared all meals. The POWs were pressed into work details digging canals, emptying latrines (contents were carried in 'honey' buckets and buried on the beach) and other 'busy' work.

American GI's cussed, kicked and mistreated the POWs as if they were dogs. It was painful to watch our fellow Koreans treated like animals by foreigners, but there was not much we could do. We were treated no better than the POWs. GI's loved to play dirty tricks on the Asians. They would throw down a cigarette butt on the floor when a POW was close by. Some POWs stooped down, picked up the butt and puffed on it. The GI's took photos and laughed. Another popular trick was to leave candy bars or other tempting items around. When a poor soul grabbed it, the GI's pounced on him – “We caught this gook stealing this or that.” It was a fun game for the Yanks.

Whenever I could, I roamed the POW camp grounds hoping to finds friends and relatives. I was amazed at the ingenuity of the the POWs.  They somehow made People's Army uniforms out of the second-hand GI fatigues issued by the Americans. They called themselves "reborn" people's army and drilled long hours every day. They marched in smart formations singing, "We are the invincible army of the Korean people,,,".  They paraded past a reviewing stand. These troops did not look like POWs at all and they seemed to be ready to go on to war.

One day I spotted a POW who looked so much like my father. He was about middle-age, stoutly built and stood out among the POWs because of his aristocratic bearing. He was among POWs trucked out to bury human wastes and bring back sands from Jisepo beaches. American MPs guarded the POWs and no contacts with civilians were allowed.  Believing that he was my father, I waved and shouted at him, but he did not even look at me and kept on shoveling sands. I found out where he was kept and spent many hours watching him from a distance, hoping to get his attention. 

The Strange Case of Senior Colonel Lee Hak Gu

The officers were housed in their own camp.  There was extra fence around it and extra guards were posted there. There I saw the most famous POW, Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku, the official spokesman of the POWs.  I have seen him several times and I never saw him smile or laugh. Of course, I never met him in person and I watched him from a distance with awe because he was so famous.  He was fairly tall, pale-skinned and handsome. He went about visiting tents of his fellow officers.   

Officially, Senior Col. Lee Hak Ku was the ranking North Korean POW. Kim Il Sung's army was modeled after the Soviet Army and had more grades in ranks than the US army. Thus, Lee's rank was the highest grade of the staff officer rank - major, Lt. colonel, colonel and senior colonel. Lee was chief of staff of the People's Army 13th Division. On September 21, 1950, he walked over to a group of American GI's in sleep and said in fluent English - 'Hello, I surrender, do not shoot!' to the startled Americans. It turned out this was the only English phrase he knew and he memorized it from a safe-conduct pass dropped by US psychological war planes.   

Lee was graduated from Seoul Agricultural College and went to China to join an anti-Japanese army. After returning to Korea with the Soviet Army, he joined the People's Army in 1946. By the time the war broke out, he was a senior colonel, equivalent to an American brigadier general, and chief of staff of the 13th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Hong Yong Jin. Hong's incompetence decimated the 13th Division. At the time of his surrender, the 13th was down to less than 3,000 men, mostly conscripts from South Korea. On the day he surrendered, Hong ordered an all-out suicide attack on the American line defended by the 7th Cavalry. Lee could no longer stomach the senseless slaughter and shot his commanding general, ordered his men to retreat as best they could and defected along with 128 of his troops. Lee Hak Ku was tried in absentia and sentenced to death by Kim Il Sung.

Lee was flown to Tokyo and met MacArthur in person and, flying in a L-19 over the front area, urged with a loud speaker his former comrades to surrender.  Lee was sent to the Koje to manage the POWs on behalf of the United Nations. Here was a place of bloody intrigue. Unofficially, the ranking POW was Gen. Park Sang Hyon, who let himself captured disguised as a private, called Jeon Moon Il. Park was an anti-Japanese partisan in Kapsan (my birthplace). He was sent by Kim Il Sung to organize POWs. Col. Lee acted as chief spokesman for the POWs, but Gen. Park issued orders. North Korean agents landed at Koje and smuggled weapons and secret instructions from Pyongyang. The North Korean POWs called themselves the reborn People's Army. 

Figure leehak. Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku, at the time of his defection in 1950. Courtesy of the US military archives.

To the dismay of the American generals, Lee Hak Ku double-crossed them and worked to stir up troubles. Instead of a docile pied piper leading his flock to the American side, Lee became a thorn on the side for the Americans, so much so that some Americans suspected that he was sent by Kim Il Sung to organize the POWs and that his defection was a clever ruse.  But the fact is that Lee Hak Ku was executed soon after his repatriation.  It is unlikely that his ruse would have involved shooting a general and leading his troops to surrender.

I believe Lee Hak Ku defected on his own, but he was turned off by the treatment he received. When he defected, he was treated no better than those who were captured. In fact, he was hog-tied and paraded like an animal and he was tortured by South Korean counter intelligence. The Americans tried to get the most mileage out of what they believed to be the highest ranking North Korean in their hands. They made him to broadcast US propaganda and then threw him into the snake pit at the officers POW compound.  The Americans naively believed that the POWs would take orders from their senior officer and that Lee Hak Ku would obey the Americans. Records show that South Korean commanders opposed the American move, fearing for Lee's life, but the US command ignored them.  By now Lee Hak Ku must have realized his mistake and attempted to redeem himself, believing that Kim Il Sung would forgive his crime. Kim Il Sung did not, and another Korean was rubbed out. 

On June 23, 1951 at the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Malik announced: “the Soviet people believe that, as a first step, discussions should be started among the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for mutual withdrawal from the 38th Parallel.” Two days later, Radio Peking announced that China supported Malik's proposal. From Tokyo, on June 29, 1951, Gen. Ridgway sent a radio message to Kim Il Sung: “As Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following: I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Upon the receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.”

On July 2, 1951, Radio Peking broadcasted Kim Il Sung's response: “We are authorized to tell you that we agree to suspend military activities and to hold peace negotiations, and that our delegates will meet with yours. We suggest, in regard to the place for holding talks, that such talks be held at Kaesong, on the 38th Parallel. If you agree to this, our delegates will be prepared to meet your delegates between July 10 and 15, 1951.”

Thus it was that on July 8, 1951, a North Korean female officer, Capt. Kim Sung Ja met US AF Col. Andrew Kinney in an open field, the very first peaceful encounter between the two enemies. The two officers worked out detailed protocols for the first full meeting of the two warring armies with who, how and when spelled out and agreed to in advance. The first truce talk was held at Kaesong on July 10. The communist side was represented by North Korean generals, Nam Il, Li Sang Cho, Chang Pyong San and Chinese generals, Xie Fang (Peng's chief-of-staff) and Deng Hua. Gen. Nam Il headed the delegation.

Nam Il was born on June 5, 1913, in Russia to a poor Korean farmer. He attended the Smolensk Military School and a Russian college in Tashkent. He was chief of staff of a Soviet Army division at end of WWII. Nam would become North Korea’s foreign minister after the war, and died in bed on March 7, 1976. Li Sang Cho became ambassador to the USSR after the war, but took asylum when his Yenan group was purged for pushing collective leadership. Chang Pyong San, a Yenan general, would also later be purged.

The UN side was represented by Adm. Joy and other military brass, including a Korean associate, Gen. Paek Sun Yup, the commander of ROKA 1st Division.

Kojedo was no longer the only spot where intrigue was unfolding. Rhee Syngman and some diehard MacArthur supporters tried to sabotage the talks. US planes mistakenly strafed Kaesong, convoys carrying the communist negotiating team, and armed raids across the cease-fire lines. American planes bombed Antung in Manchuria. The CIA stepped up covert operations in China and US aid to Chiang Kai Sek started flowing again. These activities almost succeeded in derailing the talks.

In August 1951, the truce talks proceeded at an agonizingly slow pace. No longer were Chinsese “human waves” hurling themselves at UN forces, and battle lines began to stabilize. Ground actions and US bombing raids intensified. For the first time, Russian and East European communist allies openly sent military personnel to aid North Korea. Russians manned anti-aircraft guns, coastal defense batteries, communications and counter-espionage. Russian pilots flew MIGs. East Europeans manned hospitals, security and other rear area duties. The communist strength reached over 700,000.

That October of 1951, US B29 bombers carried out simulated A-bomb attacks, code-named “Operation Hudson River”, on major cities in North Korea. The bombers dropped dummy atomic bombs, real except for the explosives. This was intended more for a psychological than tactical effect. It was hoped to keep North Korean leaders guessing when the real thing would come. To counter this challenge, the communists expanded their air capabilities to 4,000 planes manned by Chinese, Korean and Soviet pilots. On the ground, they dug 776 miles of tunnels, 3,427 miles of trenches, formidable fortifications that would withstand atomic bombs.

On October 25, 1951, the truce talks resumed at Panmunjom. The North Korean POWs split into pro- and anti-communist factions and started killing each other. South Korean agents were inserted into POW camps to identify communist leaders who were then eliminated by the guards on various pretexts. Some 6,000 POWs were killed inside POW camps. Many died in the most cruel ways imaginable, with sharp stakes pushed into the anus, beaten to death, suffocated to death, hanged, and so forth. Bodies were buried under the tents or cut into small pieces and carried out in honey buckets.

It was on January 21, 1952 that my career at the POW camp came to an abrupt end. All translators had to wear US GI fatigues and the army cap. As we entered our office tent, we would leave our cap on a table. The American GI's did the same. All caps looked alike and I made the mistake of picking up a wrong cap. The GI's had set up a trap for me, and I was caught in their trap. They accused me of stealing the cap, and I was fired on the spot.

The Snakes of Koje Island

Koje is a small island several miles from the Korean peninsula, yet it had its share of snakes of all kinds. There were 6-foot snakes that lived in the stone walls many of the islanders built around their homes.  The large snakes were not poisonous and frowned on harming the creatures because the snakes ate rats and other pests.  I heard rumors of the islanders worshipping the snakes and the native women allowing the snakes to invade their private parts.  On a sunny day, the snakes sunbathed in the open and the natives were unperturbed by their proximity.

We the refugees from North Korea had not love for the snakes. Snakes scared them and incited in us the primordial instinct to kill all snakes. We were also hungry for fresh meat and some of us developed tastes for the snakes of Koejdo. A 6-foot snake had enough meat to feed a family of six.  One would cut off the head and then peel off the skin, after which the poor snakes, dead by now, were gutted and chopped into small pieces for a soup pot.  Our soup "pots" were actually discarded large American ration cans of aluminum. Seaweeds and other edible, and semi-editable, substances were added to the snake soup. 

My school was several miles from the refugee camp. We climbed a small hill on dirt paths, which were inhabited by another kind of snakes, much smaller and deadly poisonous.  The islanders claimed that the Japanese brought the little rascals to the island for a research project during World War II.  When the war ended, the Japanese let loose the snakes and they multiplied like weeds on the island.

The poisonous snakes were two to three inches long with large triangular heads.  When you came upon them, they would raise their dark heads and dared you to step on them.  Most of my classmates were afraid of the snakes and went around them, but some of us considered it iur sacred duty to smash the snakes with rocks. 

Figure kimsnake.jpg: Kim Chol Ryong was referred to as 'Kim The Snake' by American officers. He worked for the Japanese military police during WWII and, after Liberation, for the US army in South Korea. He was involved in Kim Gu's murder and killed several thousands Korean nationalists and opponents of Rhee Syngman on faked charges.

Speaking of the snakes of Korea, I must mention the worst kind of snakes Korea had ever had.  It was not a crawling kind, it was a two-legged kind, affectionately called "Kim the Snake" by his American handlers.  Kim was born in North Korea in 1916, to a poor farming family. During World War II, he was recruited by the Japanese military police in Manchuria as an agent. His undercover activities resulted in deaths of several hundred Korean and Chinese patriots fighting against the Japanese occupiers. By the end of WWII, Kim had earned three stripes in the Japanese army.

In 1945, he managed to escape Soviet troops in Manchuria and returned home, only to be arrested for war crimes in his home town.  He was to be executed but he again escaped and made his way to Seoul, where he was met by his former associates in the Japanese army.  He joined Rhee's army and his pathological hatred toward 'communists', aka Rhee's political opponents, made him the darling of Rhee Syngman and Rhee's American handlers.  The former corporal in the Japanese army rose to the rank of major general by the time he was gunned down by his own men in January 1956.

Kim's special skills were agent provocateur and torturing, which he had learned from his Japanese masters. He would torture his victims until they 'confessed', they confessed to whatever Kim the Snake wanted. He would organize and lead 'communist', read anti-Rhee, plots and then pounce on them with 'evidence'.  His 'achievements' included: unmasking of the 1949 "People's Liberation Army" for the purpose of purging Kim Gu's followers in Rhee's army;  in the 1950 "communist guerrilla invasion" of Pusan, Kim had promised a group of prisoners from Taegu a general pardon if they did a job for him, they disguised themselves as communist partisans in a village near Pusan. Kim's heroic forces attacked the "red" rebels, killing them all.  Rhee placed Pusan under a martial law using this incident, and the political dissidents in Pusan were silenced.

For more information on Koje Island, see:

1) http://www.kojehotel.co.kr/htmls/tourists/kojeis.html Jangsung-po Beach Hotel Home Page

2) http://philip.koje.com/mainpage.html Phillip's Koje Home

3) http://city.koje.kyongnam.kr/english/default.asp Koje City Home Page

4) http://control.gsnu.ac.kr/~neoman/koje/poro.htm Koje POW Camps

5) http://www.kojenet.or.kr/e/e-1/inforporo_3.asp Koje Information Center

6) http://museum.ulsan.ac.kr/puankyung/haean/spot.htm History of Kojedo

For information on Koje POWs, see:

1) http://www.kcaf.or.kr/htdocs/Hyperdrama/D00765/abs.html Red and White - The Tragic Life of Lee Hak Gu

2) http://my.netian.com/~hksk/suyoung.html  Kim Soo Young's POW camp experience poems

For information on Kim Chang Ryong, see

1) http://www.ihs21.org/sub4-html/7pjs.htm Kim Chang Ryong and His Plots - by Park Jun Sung, Sung-Gyun Kwan

2) http://minjok.or.kr/n_chungsan60/gun/kcr.htm  일제 관동군 헌병에서 대한민국 특무부장까지  김창룡(金昌龍 1916~1956)