Chapter 14: With the US CIA
"The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become double agents and available for our service. It is through the information brought by the double agent that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy."
Sun Tzu - The Art of War
I completed all courses at the Daekwang High branch of Koje Island. The graduating class of 1952 took a ferry from Jisepo to Pusan and attended the solemn graduation ceremony. The Daekwang High was based in Seoul but because of the war time situation, it ran from a temporary campus in Pusan and all graduates were required to attend the ceremony. Most of the kids in my Kojedo class came South with their family and their parents, siblings and relatives were there on the happy occasion. I was the only one who came South with the Student Volunteers Army and without the parents, and there was no one but my brother to congratulate me. He treated me to a meal of tang-su-yuk, commonly called "sweet and sour pork" in America, at a Chinese restaurant.
The celebration did not last long, however. Soon after the graduation, we, every member of my class, took entrance examinations for colleges. Seoul National University was also in Pusan, another refugee from Seoul. Luckily, there were not many applicants due to the war and the exams were fairly easy. But the university officials told us that one only in ten applicants will be accepted and that they would maintain their traditional high standards, even if it meant no new student.
Thus properly scared and primed, I went to Pusan’s Seoul National University campus in exile that April 1, to see if I passed the entrance exam. What would I do if I failed it? An anxious crowd waited in the rain. Finally, the list, written out in long hands on white paper, was posted on a wall, and I saw my name on it! A dream came true. I was now a proud member of the most prestigious university in Korea! My new school mates celebrated their fortune with family and friends, but I had to forego any celebration for I had more important things to worry about, like where my next meal would come from. My brother scraped together enough money for my tuition, but he could not feed or house me. I was on my own.
Figure
21. The Koje-do Dae-Kwang High class of 1952. I am 1st left, 2nd
row.
My best friend, Kim Hyo Gun’s cousin from Seoul, got me a job with an American BOQ (Bachelor Officers Quarters) at Young-do Island in Pusan harbor, an old Japanese resort. The job involved waiting on tables for American officers. It did not pay much, but it did include meals, all I could eat, and free lodging on a clean Western bed. For the first time since the 1940s, I got to eat real white rice and meet, and even a daily hot bath! Most importantly, I got to practice my English on the Americans. I was free to attend classes during the day.
The BOQ was for the US CIA training camp. Most officers wore civilian clothes or officers’ uniforms with no insignia. There was Captain Tanaka, a thin tall Japanese American; Mr. Smith, a fat old man in civilian clothes - supposedly a spymaster, but actually US Marine LTC “Butch” Kramer. And there was Col. Johnson, actually Hans Tofte, the commanding officer, was a very cold guy. He loved to party with Red Cross ladies. It was my job to bring food and drinks to the office parties with the ladies that lasted into the early hours. We had to stand around watching the dancing and smooching until the officers scored or gave up on their sexual hunt.
I got along fine with Mr. Smith and I made sure that he got extra servings. He was always hungry for second and third servings. He would clean up his plate and then stare at me with a sly smile, our secret code for more food. The BOQ ran like a normal eatery and charged its patrons. The old man appreciated my assistance. In return, he corrected my English whenever he could.
That April, the South Korean general in charge of the South Korean Army’s Higher Intelligence Department appeared to inspect the CIA camp at Yong-do. The general was tall and lean, in his fifties. The American officers lined up and saluted the Korean general. All of us watching this scene had tears in our eyes.
These white guys treated us like niggers, yet they saluted a Korean! They said that the old man fought the Japanese army in China. The general asked the Americans to train his officers. Soon a group of young Korean officers moved into the BOQ. The Americans were not crazy about the arrangement to share their quarters with a bunch of garlic smelling Koreans.
Syngman Rhee was remaining obstinate. On April 24, 1952, Rhee stated: “I am still opposed to any cease-fire which leaves our country divided. No matter what arguments others may make, we are determined to unify our fatherland with our own hands.” Rhee demanded: a complete withdrawal of Chinese forces and disbanding of North Korean Army. He also wanted UN promise to prevent any support of North Korea, South Korean participation in any UN discussion of Korean affairs, and South Korean sovereignty over North Korea.
Seething tensions on Koje Island continued to escalate after I had left the island. North Korean POWs took Brig. Gen. Dodd, the POW camp commander, hostage on May 7, 1952. The POW leaders demanded a meeting to air grievances with the general. The general agreed and met the POW delegation just outside a camp entrance. While the meeting was in process, a column of POW's returning from a work detail surrounded the general and dragged him inside the camp.
The prison guards watched this carefully planned kidnapping of their commander in disbelief and stood helplessly. The POWs threatened to kill Dodd unless their demands were met. On May 11, 1952, the POWs demanded: “Immediate cessation of brain washing, use of poison gas, germ warfare, and atom bomb experiments by the US prison guards”. The communists were propaganda masters, and headlines in world newspapers were humiliating the US forces. Gen. Colson, standing in for Gen. Dodd, agreed to their demands and Dodd was freed. Gen. Clark was angry at both Dodd and Colsen and sent a combat general, Chinese-speaking Brig. Gen. “Bull” Boatner, to clean up the POW mess once and for all. British and Canadian troops were called in to help the Americans in the campaign to pacify the POWs.
Another crisis emerged to steal headlines from the Koje Island POW riots. The Korean Assembly in Pusan did not have the votes to reelect Rhee that May 15, 1952. Rhee ordered the Assembly to amend the constitution whereby presidents were elected by popular votes, but the Assembly refused to go along with Rhee. In events you would expect only in a Hollywood thriller, on May 25, 1952, Rhee declared martial law and liquidated his political opponents. Truman was shocked and ordered Rhee to lift the martial law immediately. Rhee threatened to detach his army from the US control for the first time since its formation in 1945. Gen. Clark formulated “Operation Everready” to arrest or assassinate Rhee, and secretly readied a Special Forces unit for the operation. He warned the Korean general staff of the consequences of siding with Rhee. The 8th Army would eliminate any ROKA units defending Rhee.
On June 2, 1952, Gen. Clark met with Rhee face to face. Rhee claimed that the Korean people wanted to go on fighting and that his army was capable of going alone. Rhee accused the US of building up a Japanese army which would take over Korea after US troop withdrawal, and claimed that communists controlled the National Assembly. Rhee stirred up anti-American demonstrations in the streets of Pusan and Seoul.
Ever the master at timing, on June 10, 1952, the North Korean POWs staged an uprising at Kojedo. Gen. Clark issued a shoot-to-kill order to the POW guards. US paratroops moved in with tanks and killed 150 prisoners. On June 14, Ambassador Muccio informed Acheson that the time had come to get rid of Rhee once for all. He recommended that Gen. Clark order the ROK Army Chief of Staff to take over Rhee's government. Truman agreed and ordered the State and the JCS to formulate an action plan.
On June 25, 1952, Truman ordered Muccio and Gen. Clark to proceed with Operation Everready at the earliest opportunity. More specifically, if Rhee threatened the safety of US personnel or messed with the Korean National Assembly, Clark and Muccio would demand Rhee to desist, and if Rhee refused, Gen. Clark would order Gen. Jung Il Kwon to take over the Korean government. Rhee was also forced to proclaim the end of martial law. If Rhee refused, he would be eliminated. Gen. Jung secretly agreed to Clark's plan. After the war, Gen. Jung claimed that he kept Rhee informed of the US plans. In a sudden about-face, the Korean National Assembly revised the constitution for a popular election of presidents on July 3, 1952. Rhee freed assemblymen jailed earlier and lifted the martial law. On August 5, Rhee was reelected through a rigged election. Gen. Clark set aside Operation Everready for now. Truce talks faltered again and ground actions came to a virtual stop. But the air war over North Korea intensified.
Working as a waiter at the CIA BOQ dining hall at Yong-do had a major benefit – food, all kinds of food and all you could eat for FREE. I ate like a hog and gained some 20 pounds, courtesy of the US CIA. All food items were flown in from the US or Japan. No local products were allowed in the officer’s mess. We had two giant freezers filled with frozen carcasses of pigs, chickens, turkeys, sheep and cows. We had several hundred cases of pies, ice cream, vegetables, cooking oil, utensils, beer, wine, liquor and soda, piled sky high. In our warehouse, we had mountains of rice, flour, corn and potatoes.
The Americans paid a nominal fee for their meal; the CIA subsidized the eatery, which also doubled as the party house for the officers. As I noted, the CIA brought in American Red Cross nurses and patriotic women – for weekly all-night parties. There was plenty of food and booze for the Korean staff as well.
Since the Korean staff members were to eat only leftovers, the Korean cooks prepared more food than the Americans could consume so that the poor Koreans could eat well, too. We had our fill of steamed rice, lily white, good old American steaks, chicken, pork-chops, apple pies and so on, and washed them down with the best American booze CIA money could buy.
Figure
22. My childhood friend Kim Hyogun and I (right) in 1951 at Pusan.
There had been times when I had to go without food for several days. In those days, I survived by drinking water with some sugar in it. Once I had to beg for food from a poor farmer on Koje Island. I was on my way to the POW camps for a job interview. I had to walk over a mountain to reach the camps from Jisepo. It was a good one-day journey on empty stomach. Climbing the steep mountain sapped my energy in no time at all and my body went on a strike – it said some food now or else. Cold sweat oozed out my face and my brain went limp. I saw the end coming.
Like a miracle, I saw a straw-thatched house hidden in the forest and I mustered the last ounce of energy and walked to the house. The door was open and I saw an old man lying on the floor. He had an ugly open wound on his body and moaned with pain. He saw me coming and pointed his finger at a table. There were some half-eaten food and he motioned me to finish them up. I did not have to ask for food. He figured from my appearance that I could use some food and he offered me his own food. I thanked him profusely and promised him that I would pay him back – a promise I have never fulfilled. Some day I will go back to Koje and pay back my IOU’s, just in case that compassionate old man still lives.
That October in Pusan, one Korean HID, Higher Intelligence Department, officer grew extra harsh on the Korean civilian staff. The man treated us much worse than the Americans did, screaming insults at us and ordered us around as if we were his personal slaves, and he was especially rude to me. One day, I got into a fistfight with him and this incident became a major event. The man in charge of the Korean staff decided to let me go. My friend, Mr. Smith, came to my assistance and pulled strings to make me a Critical Military Specialist (CMS), the official title of the Korean interpreters assigned to the US intelligence operation. Thus, thanks to that arrogant Korean HID officer, my career in the intelligence business began.
I was attached to a front-line intelligence unit with 10 or so Japanese Americans the first day of February. My unit was a “Low Level Interception” teams of the US Army Security Agency. ASA ran about 10 teams at the time. Our mission was to interrogate North Korean prisoners before they were killed or sent to the POW camps. We also interrogated North Korean civilians when our combat guys captured a North Korean village. Refugees were also screened.
Figure 10a. My US 2nd Infantry Division patch. My ASA MIS102 unit was attached to the Indian Head.
The US Communications Intelligence (COMINT) in World War II and Communications Security (COMSEC) in the early years of Cold War had made a number of critical contributions for national security. Breaking the German Enigma machine code, Japanese and Soviet cryptographic systems is well known After World War II and prior to the Korean War, the Army Security Agency (ASA) shared COMINT mission with the US Navy Communications Supplementary Activity (COMMSUPACT), which became the Naval Security Group in June 1950 and the US Army Air Corps COMINT assets became the Air Force Security Service (AFSS).
The US Department of Defense created the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949 as a central clearing house for COMINT and also to eliminate duplication of COMINT among the Service Agencies. The US COMINT was dealt a near fatal blow due to a Soviet intelligence agent inside AFSA. The Soviet agent, William Weisband, was recruited by the KGB in 1934. Weisband worked in the Russian section in ASA and AFSA. This sorry incident left the the U.S. COIMINT unprepared for the Korean War. The US COMINT did intercept some North Korean signals between May 1949 and Marchl 1950 in Soviet radio sweeps, but they were not analyzed once it was determined that they were of non-Soviet sources.
Figure ccrak1.jpg: A list of Koreans attached to CCRAK 8242 AU. My name is highlighted. This list was given to the station master, Pusan Railway Station, for free rides from Pusan to Seoul. This document was signed by LTC. Washington Ives commanding the 8242 and LTC. George Kramer commanding the 724tg Transport Railway Operation, US 8th Army, dated February 7, 1953.
However, in April 1950, ASA made a limited scan of North Korean radios with two monitors and recorded about 200 messages, but none was analyzed until the war broke out. COMINT did had two hints of war, none of which was clear enough to sound an alarm: in the spring of 1950, a Soviet monitor in Vladivostok suddenly increased interception of radios in South Korea; the other hint was large shipments of bandages and other medical supplies from the USSR to North Korea, starting in February 1950. When the war broke out, AFSA had two half-time cryptanalysts and one linguist, a total of two men equivalents, but this situation changed rapidly after June 1950 and the Korean section expanded to include several hundreds employees. All available monitors in Japan, including some Navy monitors and the 50th Signal Service tasked to monitor US radios, were mobilized to the Korean War effort.
A small ASA unit arrived in Korea in mid-September 1950 and the 60th Signal Service Company arrived in October to augment ASA presence in Korea. ASA in Korea was hampered by World War II era equipment unsuited for the mountainous terrains of Korea and more critically, by lack of Korean language specialists. In 1950, only two Korean linguists were available to ASA, Lt. Youn P. Kim and Sgt. Richard Chun, neither had any prior experience in intelligence work or US security clearance.
Fortunately for ASS, many Korean spoke Japanese and ASA had a large supply of Japanese-speaking GIs, and ASA Low Level Interception teams were made of Japanese nisei and one or two native Koreans with some English ability. If a prisoner spoke Japanese, a Nisei did the interrogation. If not, I did the honors with the help of a Nisei. Chinese prisoners were sent to another unit manned by Chiang Kai Sek's boys from Taiwan. North Korean propaganda said that Japs were fighting for the US in Korea. I guess they were right; Nisei are Japanese technically speaking.
I was attached to an American infantry division, whose soldiers wore the distinctive Indian head patch, the US 2nd Infantry Division. I lived in a US army tent and ate chow with the American GIs. Some GIs wondered what a group of gooks were doing in their midst. American GIs called Koreans 'gooks', not necessarily in a bad way. The term basically means the people of a country. For instance, Americans are “mi-gooks”. 'Gook' comes from South Korea's 'Dae Han Min Gook' and North Korea's 'Gong Wha Gook'. Our tent had an army field phone hotline. You cranked it to charge up the capacitor, and we took turns manning it.
The war was winding down and about the only calls I got were about some stupid war exercises. I idled my time away drinking beer, telling dirty jokes and inventing new games to play, such as who could drink the most (a Japanese, and who was most sexually gifted and other stupid things. The losers got to buy the winner a case of beer at the PX.
Once a day, we went out on patrol in a jeep. We made sure to include at least one white or black guy, because a lot of GI's were trigger-happy and eager to open fire on Koreans. I was the only Korean in our unit, most other Asians were Japanese, but all Asians seemed to look alike to white guys. No new POW's or enemy towns were being captured these days. Watching GIs fornicating with Korean females in open fields became the main highlight of our patrols.
We patrolled north of the Imjin River and all civilians had been evacuated to the south of the river earlier. This meant that the poor girls had to swim across the river to get hooked up the horny GIs. The girls wore skimpy bikinis and after completing a transaction, they jumped in the water and squatted down to wash their private parts, after which they came back to service their next clients.
My Nisei friends wore GI uniforms and the standard US army insignia. They were actually regular GIs and had no prior training for spying. They carried the standard US GI gear, a carbine or a pistol, a canteen and a GI belt. Technically, I was a civilian employee and so I was not allowed to carry any weapon, not officially. I wore GI uniforms without insignia with a name tag that did not have my real name. My Japanese buddies let me carry a carbine now and then.
I had an ID printed both in Korean and English that stated that I was a critical military specialist, an employee of the UN Command. It said further that I should not be meddled with as I did my duties. The latter was intended for the South Korean military police who were on the lookout for communist spies, draft dodgers and deserters. Any Korean youth caught without a proper ID was arrested.
Our commander was a white lieutenant. He asked me to keep an eye on the Nisei because he thought some of the Japs might be North Korean spies. We also watched South Korean units on our flanks. Americans worried that South Koreans might go on the offensive on their own to crank up the war, or they might change sides and attack the Americans. I guess nobody can trust anybody in a war. I am sure I was being watched over by the GIs. After all, I was a North Korean.
My brother, Kim Ung Sik, an ROK army doctor, moved to Uijungbu north of Seoul that January. I paid him a visit. Since there was no hotel accommodation available, he put me up with his patients , very much against the regulations. The field hospital was made of some 50 tents and had about 3,000 South Korean soldiers. Each tent had 100 beds. My brother was in charge of the eye injury ward. Shell explosions create shock waves that tend to make the eyeballs to pop out. My brother had some 250 patients who lost one or both eyes.
Most of the patients were farmers and accepted their misfortune with gallant humor. They would take out their glass eye balls and put them into their mouth to moisten, and then push them back into their empty eye socket. They played games, for money or cigarettes, with their glass eyeballs. They rolled the balls on the floor, the one rolled the farthest won the game. When the game was over, the eyeballs went into the mouth for cleaning. It was a grisly pastime, but the soldiers enjoyed the game.
On February 11, 1953, Gen. Van Fleet was replaced by Gen. Max Taylor as the 8th Army Commander. Taylor was more concerned with GI's lives than Van Fleet, who attempted to ape his hero MacArthur. Ike wanted to end the war by threatening China with the A-bomb. Then on March 5, 1953, Joe Stalin passed away and Malenkov took over the USSR. Malenkov wanted the war to end – “There is no disputed or unresolved question that cannot be settled peacefully.." Kim Il Sung and Chou En-lai also wanted to settle the POW issue "in order to insure the cessation of hostilities in Korea and to conclude the armistice agreement.”
The Joint Chiefs of Staff drew
up a plan to hit the communists, if the talks failed, and
an all-out effort including extensive strategical and tactical use of
atomic bombs against China and Manchuria, coordinated with a massive 8th Army
ground offensive to achieve a position along the waist would be a bargaining
power. On March 27, 1953, the JCS recommended the use of tactical nuclear
weapons in Korea and China: “The efficacy of atomic weapons in achieving greater results at less
cost of effort in furtherance of U.S. objectives in connection with Korea points
to the desirability of re-evaluating the policy which now restricts the use of
atomic weapons in the Far East. In view of the extensive implications of
developing an effective conventional capability in the Far East, the timely use
of atomic weapons should be considered against military targets affecting
operations in Korea, and operationally planned as an adjunct to any possible
military course of action involving direct action against Communist China and
Manchuria.”
Of course, no one officially
briefed me when “Operation Everready”
was reactivated on May 27, 1953, but I pretty well know what was happening. I
was 17 and I look back now and realize that my lack of indignation came from the
brutality, instability and treachery that the Korean people had known. It was no
surprise that Gen. Clark was fed up with Rhee's refusal to give up his “march
north and kill Kim Il Sung no matter what” attitude. Clark was about to
execute option #3 of the Plan: “President Rhee would be invited to visit Seoul or elsewhere -
anywhere to get him out of Pusan. At an appropriate time, the UN commander would
move into the Pusan area and seize between five and ten key ROK officials who
have been leaders in Rhee's dictatorial actions...and take over control of
martial law through the Chief of Staff, ROK army, until it is lifted.”
That June 18, 1953, Rhee ordered his army to free as many POWs as possible, by force if necessary. Some 27,000 POWs were freed at several camps. ROK soldiers exchanged fire with the American guards. The American guards fired on the fleeing POWs, killing several hundreds. This was the first documented case of US soldiers fighting ROK soldiers. By June 20, 1953, Winston Churchill declared that Rhee was a traitor, called for his ouster and announced that he was ready to pull out the British troops from Korea. Ike was mad at Rhee and had resurrected Operation Everready for the fifth time. Ike said in a cabinet meeting: “I wish the South Koreans would overthrow Rhee.” MacArthur, the man who put Rhee in power, in a rare lucid moment, seemed to realize that while you could kill countless Koreans, you could not fool them, and he told Ike that Rhee would be “killed within a few weeks by the Korean people.”
Ike told Rhee: “Your violation creates an impossible situation for the UN command. If continued, such a course of action can only result in the needless sacrifice of all that has been won for Korea by the blood and bravery of its magnificent fighting forces. The UN is ready to effect another arrangement to end the war; i.e., that any further such behavior could leave the ROK standing alone in the post-armistice period, with no U.S. assistance.” Ike was ready to end the war with or without Rhee.
During June 24-25, three bloody years to the day after the war’s breakout, the communist forces launched a major offensive aimed at the South Korean troops. 7,400 South Koreans were killed. On July 13, another offensive was mounted against the South Korean Army. Rhee was about to lose his army as well as the support of the American hawks. Rhee finally gave up and accepted the truce terms.
On July 19, 1953, at last the
shooting ended. There was no celebration or rejoicing. Gen. Namil initialized
the document, and Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung affixed their signatures. Peng
stated: “This is a happy day for our people. Through three years of fighting
together, the Volunteers had forged a comradeship in blood with the North Korean
people and their army - a friendship which further deepened and strengthened our
international feelings.”
On the American side, Gen.
Harrison initialized and Gen. Mark Clark signed the documents at a camp set up
in Munsan, just a few miles south of the military demarcation line, in South
Korea. Gen. Clark stated: “I cannot find it in me to exult in this hour. Rather, it is time for
prayer, that we may succeed in out difficult endeavor to turn this armistice to
the advantage of mankind. If we extract hope from this occasion, it must be
diluted with recognition that our salvation requires unceasing vigilance and
effort.”
All of us were tired of the war and Uncle Sam wasted no time in reducing the forces in Korea. Our rations were cut short and we got no more bonuses. The first to go was the intel guys. My Nisei friends were sent back to America and I was reassigned to the MIS headquarters in Seoul.
The war cost Korea over 6 million civilian casualties; 520,000 North Korean soldiers dead or wounded with 120,000 captured; South Korea lost 415,000 killed, 429,000 wounded, and 460,000 missing; the US lost 157,530 dead, wounded, captured or missing. The biggest loser of the war was the Korean people. A US commentator stated: “A potentially swift and relatively bloodless reunification is turned into a carnage”.
The only winner was Syngman Rhee. He saved his job at the cost of six million dead and devastation of Korea. As MacArthur had predicted, the Korean people threw out Rhee in April 1960. Rhee tried to rig an election for the second time. The people were more humane to him than Rhee had been to the people - his life was spared. Rhee was expelled to the US where he should have stayed in 1945. Rhee was perhaps the worst thing to hit post-liberation Korea.
China lost 360,000 killed or wounded and 20,000 captured. It had rotated 25 field armies, 70 artillery divisions, 10 railroad engineer divisions, three tank divisions, two security divisions, 12 air force divisions, and 15 engineer regiments, totaling 2,300,000 men. The Soviets equipped 60 infantry divisions, 10 air force divisions, and supplied 80 percent, 250,000 tons, of the ammunition for the communist forces. Some 100 Soviets officers, including Kim Il Sung's personal advisor, Col. Itziatzev, died in Korea.
While the front lines had quieted, activities in rear areas did not. On July 30, 1953 in Pyongyang, a coup attempt by South Korean Communists failed. In September 1951, Yi Sung Yup, Minister of Justice, had formulated a military coup against Kim Il Sung. Yi had the support of his followers at the Kumgang guerrilla school. Unaware of Yi's plot, Kim Il Sung created another guerrilla school in Namyongback under Yi's supervision in April 1952 By November 1952, Yi assembled over 4,000 guerrillas positioned to strike Pyongyang. Yi planned to form a new cabinet with Park Hyong Yong, premier, Chu Yong Ha and Chang Si U, vice premiers, Kim Ung Bin, Defense Minister and himself as the chief of a new Korean Communist Party. Kim Il Sung accused Yi of being an American spy.
Until recently, American historians thought the spy charge was trumped up and had no basis. However, recently, South Korean researchers have uncovered documents that support the spy story. Yi was, in fact, an American spy and had wrecked Kim Il Sung's operations in South Korea beyond repair. Yi was born in 1905 into a boat rower's family in South Korea. He participated in the March 1st Movement and later in various left-wing youth movements. He joined the Korean Communist Party in 1925. He was arrested in 1931 for subversive activities and served an eight-year term in the Hamhung Prison. He was arrested again in 1940 and released after he renounced communism and swore loyalty to the Emperor of Japan, and he became an ardent Japanese collaborator. He joined various communist organizations and snitched on them for the Japanese police.
On the day Japan surrendered, Yi turned himself into an ardent anti-Japanese and became a communist again. Surprisingly, the Communist Party of South Korea accepted Yi into the top leadership, in spite of his past misdeeds. The man who sponsored Yi was Park Hyon Yon, the Party chief. Since virtually all communists in Korea had given in and collaborated with the Japanese in one way or another, there was a code of silence, don't ask, don't volunteer, prevailing among the communists in South Korea. In fact, Yi was appointed Minister of Justice (an alternate), of the Korean People's Republic, formed by Yo Un Yong on September 14, 1945. By the early 1946, he was second only to Park Hyon Yong in the Party hierarchy.
The US Military Government arrested Yi Sung Up in February 1946 on suspicion of an attempted assassination of Rhee Syngman. There was no basis for this charge. The US military was keen on suppressing communism in South Korea and began a nation-wide campaign to root out communism. He was tortured by South Korean police in Seoul for a few days and then turned over to the US intelligence, which was eager to plant moles in the communist movement in Korea. Yi was turned and began his career as an American spy in May 1946. Lt. Leonard Bertsch was his handler and Cho Il Myong, another communist turncoat, was his contact.
Yi was arrested by South Korean police in May 1947, while taking a document from North Korea to Park Hyon Yong for a signature. While in police custody, he was visited by Harold J. Noble, political advisor to Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge and Chang Taek Sang, Seoul police chief. Yi was told that the US was keen on forming a coalition government of left, right and center factions, that communists were opposed to this, and that they need Yi to form a communist group in support of the plan. Yi readily agreed to work for this plan on the premise that he would play a key role in the coalition government. Park Hyon Yung fled to North Korean in October 1946 and Yi became the de factor boss of the South Korean Communist Party.
In July 1948, Park Hyon Yung ordered Yi Sung Yup to come to North Korea. Yi was taken in by communist partisans in preparation of his trip to North Korea, which led to the extermination of the partisans thanks to Yi's secret reports to the US military. Unaware of Yi's duplicity, Kim Il Sung appointed him minister of justice. Yi's cover was almost blown in April 1950, when two American spies, Alice Hyun and Lee Sah Min, aka William Yi, were caught red-handed in Moscow. Alice Hyun began working for the US intelligence during World War II and worked for CIGK, Communication Intercept Group Korea, a secret organization that read Korean mails and wiretapped phones in South Korea.
Alice's father was Rev. Soon Hyun, aka Song Won Sang, one of the 33 signatories of the 1919 March 1st Declaration. He was born in Whang-dong, Kyonggi Province, in 1878, into an yanban family. His grandfather, like my father, had three wives at the same time. He went to Japan in1898 for education, but he was unable to come up with the tuition and returned home in 1902. He was hired as an interpreter for Korean farmhands at the Kahuku Plantation in Hawaii and arrived at Honolulu on March 1903, with the second shipload of Korean immigrants to America. Most of the Korean immigrants were Christian converts due to the fact that American missionaries in Korea were primarily responsible for recruiting laborers for Hawaii's sugar crops. He helped establish several Korean churches in Hawaii and became pastor of the Korean Methodist Church in Kapaia, Hawaii, in 1905.
Figure hyonsoon.jpg: Hyon Soon in October 1919 (far right, front row) in Shanghai. Shin Ik Hee is far left and Ahn Chang Ho is at center, front row. Courtesy of Korean Independence Museum.
He returned to Korea in 1907 to preach at the Chung Dong Church, Seoul, noted for its central role in the March First Movement of 1919. Upon collapse of the movement, he fled to Shanghai and participated in the Korean Provisional Government as deputy foreign minister. He returned to Hawaii in 1921 as official representative of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, and later worked for US intelligence during World War II. He sired Peter, David, Alice and two other children in Shanghai. Peter Hyun, Alice's brother, joined the US Army during World War II and landed in Korea, a major, with the occupation force.
The very first Korean American to serve with US intelligence was Park Yong Man. He was one of the few Koreans who came to America as a student, not a laborer as in the case of the great majority of the Koreans in America in the early 1900s. He studied politics and military science in Nebraska. After graduation, he moved to Hawaii and established a military school for young Koreans and formed a Korean American paramilitary group. He translated the March First declaration of 1919 into English, publishing it on a Hawaii newspaper. In May 1919, he joined the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia as an intelligence agent. The Americans were allies of the Japanese troops in Siberia and thus, ironically, Park became a Japanese spy. Park helped establish a Korean nationalist army at Nikolsk, Siberia and negotiated a secret mutual defense pact with the Soviets on behalf of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai in 1920.
After 1920, Park Young Man devoted his time to financial affairs and provided funds to Kim Wong Bom's Yiyuldan. He worked with pro-Japanese elements in China and Korea. He went to Korea in 1924 with a group of Chinese military and business leaders. He was assassinated on Gen. Ji Chung Chun's order on October 17, 1928 at his home in Beijing. Gen. Ji, military commander of the Korean Provisional Government Army, claimed that Park was spying for the Japanese.
Alice's companion, Lee Sah Min, and another Korean American, Harold Sonoo, wrote a letter to Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon Yong dated Nov 15, 1948, reporting on Korean communists in America, stating that Lee Sah Min, Harold Sonoo, the Kwaks and Alice Hyun were members of the Communist Party USA.. This letter was recovered in Pyongyang by US troops in 1950 and was used in the hearings against the leftist Korean Americans in June, 1955 by House Un-American Activities Committee. The Kwaks left for North Korea in 1955, never to be heard from again, and presumed to be executed.
Alice Hyon and Lee Sah Min "defected" to North Korea in April 1949. Kim Il Sung's security organ was well informed of the situation and opposed to their entry to North Korea, but Park Hyong Yong vouched for them and prevailed, making Alice his personal secretary. In April 1950, Alice and Lee Sah Min were arrested at Moscow airport by Kim Il Sung's secret police. In their possession were Kim Il Sung's secret war plans. They confessed, implicating Yi Sung Yup and Yi Gang Gook. Yi denied any guilt and once again, Park Hyon Yung vouched for their party loyalty. The man who saw the light and exposed these American spies in 1952 was Lee Song Un of Kapsan, my birth place. Lee was involved in Kim Il Sung's Pochongbo raid and spent years in a Japanese jail.
Kim Il Sung's secret police placed agents disguised as cooks and drivers with the suspects and collected evidence. In the early hours of March 5, 1953, Yi Sung Yup and 40 of his co-conspirators were arrested. Those arrested included: Yi Sung Yup: secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, minister of justice, chairman of the People's Inspection Committee, chairman of the Seoul Provisional People's Committee; Cho II Myong: vice-minister of culture and propaganda; Yim Hwa: vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Soviet-Korean Cultural Association; .Pak Sung Won: chairman of the Kyanggido People's Committee, vice-chairman of the Liaison Bureau of the Workers' Party of Korea; Yi Kang Guk: president of the General Commodities Importing Company of the Ministry of Trade; Pae Chol: chairman of the Liaison Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; Yun Sun Da: vice-chairman of the Liaison Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; Yi Won Jo: chairman of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea; Maung Chong Ho: commander, Tenth Company of the Guerrilla Unit of the Korean People's Republic; Sol Chong Sik: member of the Seventh Section, General Political Bureau, Supreme Command KPA. All ten are sentenced to death.
Figure kim-park.jpg: Happy days - from left to right - Soviet ambassador Gen. T. F. Shtykov, Kim's 3rd wife, Kim, Park's new bride (a Korean woman who used a Russian name, Yun Lena), Park, and Kim Tu Bong at Park's wedding in 1948.
Sol Chong Sik graduated from Mount Union College and Columbia University in the US. He had worked for the Information Bureau of the US Military Government in Korea from 1945 to 1948. He fled to North in 1948 and was the chief North Korean interpreter at the armistice talks in July 1951. Sol was born on September 18, 1912, and attended Yonsei University in Seoul prior to his education in America. Sol was about the only US educated communist leader in North Korea.
That same day, Park Hyong Yong - Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of North Korea was arrested. On December 3, 1955, Park was indicted of treason, espionage and massacre of South Korean patriots. On December 15, 1955, Park was tried and sentenced to death. Park was born in 1900 in Chunchung Namdo, South Korea. He graduated from the First High School in Seoul. He studied in Shanghai and went to Russia in 1920 where he attended the Communist University of Toilers of the East. He was arrested upon his return to Korea in November 1925 and spent 18 months in a Japanese jail. After his release, he worked as a Dong A Newspaper reporter in Seoul. He was arrested again in 1939. Park got himself released by feigning insanity. He went underground upon his release and worked as a laborer until liberation day.
Kim Il Sung indicted Park on charges that he was an American lackey dating back to 1919 when he studied English at the Seoul YMCA, claiming that Park had informed on his fellow communists to get released from jail in 1927 and 1939. The Great Leader charged that Park had been sent by Gen. Hodge, commander of the American occupation force, to North Korea, and that Park had brought the coup leaders with him. Kim Il Sung claimed that Park intentionally incited demonstrations and uprisings in South Korea in order to eradicate nationalist movements to aid the American imperialists, that Park had planted many American agents in key North Korean agencies including foreign embassies, and that Park embezzled 870,000 won and 1,600 grams of gold.
The allegation that these old-time communists were American spies is hard to believe. The American intelligence community was not that sophisticated in those days. It is true that they had some contacts with the American intelligence agents cited in the trial. For example, Park Hyon Yon did study English under the famed missionary Underwood in Seoul and had some contacts with Americans in Shanghai. Yi Sung Yup did work for the US Military Government from 1945 to 1947 and met with Harold Noble. Yi Kang Guk, did share a woman, Kim Su In, a famed North Korean spy, with an American intelligence agent. Col. John Robinson and Col. Donald Nichols were indeed with the US intelligence.
Thus, although the battle lines were quiet, upheavals continued in the North. On August 4, 1953, Kim Il Sung convened the 6th joint plenum of the Central Committee and replaced his senior comrades killed in the war, Kim Chaek, Vice Premier, and Kang Kong, Commander-in-Chief, as he purged most of the surviving South Korean communists. He reinstated many of those party member he had expelled in 1950, including his old partisan comrade Kim Il. By August 15, 1953, the Korean People's Army had been completely re-equipped with modern Soviet arms. It was more than triple its pre-war strength.
For information on Kojedo POWs, see:
1) http://korea50.army.mil/history/factsheets/pow.html US Army Fact Sheets on POWs.
2) http://control.gsnu.ac.kr/~neoman/koje/poro.htm Koje POW Camp Museum
3) http://www.kimsoft.com/2000/dprk04.htm Memorandum Of The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs Of The Democratic People's Republic Of Korea
4) http://centurychina.com/history/krwarfaq.html Chinese POWs
For information on the US Army Security Agency, ASA, during the Korean War, see http://www.nsa.gov/korea/index.html A brief history of NSA in the Korean War.
For information on Yi Sung Yup and other conspirators, see:
1) http://banmin.or.kr/n_chungsan60/ji/lsy.htm banmin web on Yi Sung Yup
2) http://banmin.or.kr/n_chungsan60/ji/jim7.htm banmin web on Cho Il Myon
3) http://www.hidb.co.kr/cgi-bin/man/manSearchForm.cgi Chosun Ilbo Name Database
4) http://www.dapis.go.kr/mndweb/daily/1999/04/0414-10.htm Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai
5) http://www.independence.or.kr/media_data/thesis/1999/199909.htm Korean Independence and Communists
For information on Alice Hyun and her family, see:
1) Mansei! The Making of a Korean American (Kolowalu Book), Peter Hyun, University of Hawaii Press, 1986
2) In the New World: The Making of a Korean American, Peter Hyun, University of Hawaii Press, 1995.
3) http://chungdong.org/english/menu1-4.htm History of Chung Dong Church
4) http://www.iic.edu/korean-studies/archive/0012/msg00017.html Rev. Hyun's communist party connection
5) Michael Munk, private communications.
6) http://www.nadir.pe.kr/KimKoo/Sub/sub92.htm Rev. Hyun Soon biography
7) http://user.chollian.net/~ikch0102/n-35.htm Korean Christians in the March 1st Movement
8) http://user.chollian.net/~ikch0102/y-2-13.htm Koreans in Hawaii
9) http://www.christnews.com/church100/2000/ch100_65.htm History of Korean Christians in America
10) http://www.kmib.co.kr/missiontoday/c_history/root/roottxt33.html Korean Christians in Hawaii
11) http://www.mofat.go.kr/korean/gallery/museum/letter.htm Archives of Korean Diplomacy - includes a photo copy of Hyon Soon's letter to President Harding on May 11, 1921, there was no reply or acknowledgement.
12) http://cnntv.org/us/theology/c_history/ Korean Christianity
13) http://www.independence.or.kr/media_data/thesis/1999/199906.htm Koreans in Hawaii
14) http://www.independence.or.kr/exhibition/tempgov/imsi.htm Korean Independence Museum
15) http://www.cantina.net/family/hyun/tree.html Hyun Soon Family Tree
16) http://www.joonganghi.com/News/2000/01/dhm-3.htm 100 Year Anniversary of Korean Immigrants to America
17) http://members.tripod.lycos.co.kr/icanzeus/m5.htm Ro Baik Lin, a Korean American air force pioneer.
18) http://my.netian.com/~achim21/no.htm More on Gen. Ro Baik Lin (1875-1926).
20) http://my.netian.com/~achim21/air.htm
History of Korean Aviation