Appendix I:

Headquarters

Far East Command Liaison Detachment (Korea)
8240th Army Unit
Guerrilla Section
11 April, 1952

To: Commander, Leopard
Commander, WolfPack
Commander, Kirkland
Commander, Baker Section

Subject: Guerrilla Operations Outline

1. General:

The increased activities of the guerrilla units with the advent of spring weather has been noted favorably by this and higher headquarters. The severe Korean winter understandably curtailed many of our operations during January, Februaryruary and early March. We are now entering the most favorable time of the year for launching guerrilla and partisan projects. We are able to strike the enemy an even more telling blow this year than we did in 1951. The experience and training gained in our operations during 1951 will enable guerrilla commanders to take seasoned men into combat this rear. Communications have improved and our supply levels are higher by far than they were at the beginning of the 1951 operational season.

2. Supply:

As is normal in partisan operations, plans will be made for obtaining the bulk of supplies from the enemy. This reduces the UN logistic burden and at the same time creates a shortage of supplies to the enemy. This is especially true of commodities that are produced in USSR and China. Ordnance and foodstuffs are in short supply in North Korea today. Any supplies that can be denied the enemy will further the war effort. Stress to your guerrilla leaders that if they can not evacuate enemy supplies and if they can not be given to loyal civilian supporters, that the supplies are to be destroyed. Medical supplies and signal and ordnance equipment will probably become scarce during the summer but sufficient supplies will be available to enable you to perform your basic mission. It is a principle of guerrilla warfare to live off the land and to re-supply from captured arms and equipment to the maximum. Complete logistic support is unnecessary.

3. Shipping:

Shipping will continue to be insufficient to carry out all the missions you would like to execute. Local facilities must be exploited to the fullest. Shipping is being outfitted in Japan and at Inch'on for our use but the critical shortage of certain items required for refitting will prevent our receiving a substantial number of seaworthy craft prior to mid-May. Commanders will utilize vessels that they now have plus those that can be liberated from the enemy for their early operations. Use of Native sail craft should be encouraged for initial reconnaissance and projects in infiltration. Heavier supply shipping will continue to be adequate. APD's may be requested for major raids through this headquarters. Make certain that you place your request early, with detailed plan that will be required to secure approval at higher headquarters.

4. Air Support:

Air support will continue to be adequate. This will include airdrops of agents and supplies as well as tactical airborne operations. Air strikes will continue to be requested through your local naval support unit. Additional air support can be obtained from JOC through this headquarters. JOC will divert a substantial portion of their air attacks to support our operations if we clear the project with them in ample time to do the necessary coordinating. Emergency supply drops are available.

5. Medical Support:

Medical support will continue as at present unless the UN forces become heavily engaged in a major offensive with its resultant casualties. Wounded can be evacuated by air to the 121st Hospital at Yongdongp'o where they will receive the same medical treatment as US wounded. Advanced treatment will normally be given at the Italian Red Cross Hospital or the Korean hospital. Local medical support is believed to be adequate for our current needs. You will continue to exploit the services of Korean doctors. Emergency copter lift is available upon radio request.

6. Training:

All commands will qualify paratroopers. A desirable number is one company each for Leopard and Wolfpack and one platoon for Kirkland. Baker Section will continue jump training along with demolition and infantry minor tactics. CW radio operators be trained at Seoul. Commanders will be advised of quotas. Voice procedure operators will be trained by commanders. Radio communications will be stressed and will be the normal communication. CW will be used in longer ranges and radio phone for lower units.

7. Liaison:

Liaison will be maintained with naval and/or marine elements based on same or adjacent islands. Liaison will be maintained with supporting naval vessels. Let us strive to improve coordination with these elements; their friendship and trust is desirable for a united effort.

8. Privateering:

Individual privateers will be encouraged to engage the enemy for the purpose of either seizing enemy small craft or destroying them. The cargo should bb given to the privateer to encourage further attacks on shipping. Captured vessels can be repaired with our facilities in order to enable the privateer to better attack additional targets.

9. Civilians:

Non-guerrilla civilians will be well treated. The guerrillas will assume the role of friend of the people and attempt to assist them in their resistance to the Communist movement. When guerrillas capture more supplies than they can use for their own purposes they will turn the excess over to sympathetic civilians.

10. Chinese Guerrillas:

Efforts will be made to develop Chinese guerrillas from deserters from the CCF. Reports reaching this headquarters indicate that limited number of former Nationalists are deserting the CCF and forming guerrilla bands. These will be supported and encouraged to enlarge their guerrilla tactics. The locations, strengths and activities of Chinese guerrillas will be reported as obtained in order that action can be taken to establish liaison with them.

11. North Korean Currency:

Due to the large requirements for North Korean currency and the limited sources available, commanders will encourage bank robberies and other suitable means of procuring this currency.

12 Enemy Radar:

All commands will be alert for opportunities to seize enemy radar equipment. Such projects will be coordinated with 5th Air Force through this headquarters. This is a high priority project.

13. MiG 15.:

A complete MiG-15 is still one of the highest priorities established by the Air Force. Air Force and Navy will offer complete support for any feasible project that will secure a MiG-15. The MiG-15 technical orders are highly desirable. These are sometimes carried in the cockpit.

14. Escape and Evasion:

E&E efforts will be assisted by all elements of the command. Possibilities of liberating PW camps will be reported immediately. Attempts to liberate non-Korean PW from PW camps will be carefully coordinated with all agencies concerned. This does not apply to normal evacuation of air crewmen and others who are forced down in enemy held territory. If desired by commanders, $50.00 worth of trade goods can be given to the partisan unit that safely evacuates a member of the US Armed Forces from behind enemy lines.

15. Safe Houses:

The maximum number of safe houses will be established in enemy territory. These will serve couriers and can be utilized as stop-over points for UN personnel being evacuated via E&E channels.

16. Oxen and Carts:

Continuing efforts will be made to capture enemy oxen and other cattle. These cattle offer a source of fresh meat for partisans and deny oxcart transport to the enemy. Also, with the anticipated food shortage in North Korea during 1952, shortage of oxen will hamper farm production as the enemy has insufficient tractors. Oxen still remain a good trade item and can be used in trading for side dishes Commandeers will authorize the guerrillas to trade excess liberated cattle for items required.

17. Demolition Targets:

Locomotives, trucks and personnel are considered the most lucrative targets for demolition. Demo teams will be trained in techniques of placing demolition to derail locomotives and selecting sites for using AT mines for the destruction of motor vehicles. When sufficient explosives can be transported to the target area, tunnels and bridges will be attacked . Destruction of bridges and railroad tunnels should be coordinated with Air Force. Our effort will be directed at targets least readily destroyed by aerial attack. Enemy shipping that can not be liberated will be destroyed. Demolition training will include instruction in placing charges to inflict the maximum damage to surface craft (This is normally along the keel line where the back can be broken).

18. Assassination:

Primary assassination targets are Korean Communist leaders. Communist or North Korean Labor Party leaders who will not render partisan assistance to our forces will be assassinated. If succeeding Communist leaders are assassinated, the ambitions of minor leaders will be dampened. This has already been demonstrated by our efforts in some sectors. Terrorist tactics of focusing attention on the high mortality rates of enemy leaders are to be encouraged. Only selected Soviets should be assassinated. They should be of sufficient rank or possess sufficient technical knowledge that the gain will compensate for the resultant counter-measures that will be taken by the enemy. Soviets shelled be assassinated in areas that abound with pro-Communists. This creates doubt between the Soviets and their satellite Korean followers. Korean communist leaders should be assassinated wherever found.

19. Burning Supplies:

POL dumps are always good targets for incendiary attacks. Motor vehicles, once fired, burn well. Ammunition dumps are difficult to ignite but should be attacked when sufficient explosion and/or heat can be developed to ignite the ammunition. Supply dumps containing combustible items along with foodstuffs offer good targets as food continues to be a critical target.

20. Intelligence Collection and Reporting:

Intelligence collection and reporting remains the secondary mission of unconventional warfare. Adequate intelligence is required to mount sound operations. The intelligence required, if promptly relayed through this headquarters, will enable supporting services to attack tactical targets. Speed is essential in transitory targets such as moving troops. Teach your guerrilla leaders to forward all information that they have back to your headquarters so that this by-product of guerrilla warfare may be fully utilized by this headquarters.

21. Adjustment of Naval Gunfire:

Each major command will train guerrillas in the technique of adjusting naval gunfire. This will be a continuing requirement and will be coordinated with local support vessels. Leopard and Kirkland offer the best opportunities for placing naval gunfire spotting teams on the mainland. Damage assessment after naval gunfire is valuable in that it permits naval commanders to determine the amounts of ammunition to expend on given targets. This information will be given directly to Navy and also will be forwarded to this headquarters.

22. Prisoners of War:

Continuing efforts will be made to the maximum number of prisoners of war. CCF forces are especially desired. Commanders will be particularly alert for opportunities of capturing Soviet or other Europeans. MiG-15 pilots are especially desired.

The above is intended as a guide, rather than a restriction on subordinate commanders. Initiative and aggressiveness tempered with calm judgment will be encouraged. Avoid trying to win the war by yourself; pace the attack in accordance with your advantage; when the advantage has passed, get away to fight another day. Hit and run: those are guerrilla tactics. The- planning of such operations should include an escape route and rallying point. Substitute speed and surprise for mass. Our missions are outlined. Other missions will be assigned in fragmentary instructions as occasion arises.

J. Y. D. Vanderpool, Lt. Col. Artillery