This report on the Yosu insurrection is based on Captain Hausman’s Korean book The American Captain Who Managed the Korean President (Han-guk Dae-tong-ryon-ul um-ji-ghin miguk dae-wi) published in Korean by Korean Mun-Won Publishing, Seoul, Korea in 1995.

In less than two months after Rhee Syngman's dictatorship began in South Korea, the 14th Regiment stationed at Yosu rose up against Rhee and his American backers. These Korean troops sided with the people of Cheju-do who took up arms against police corruption, brutality and American occupation on April 3, 1948.

The Cheju 4.3 uprising was on a much larger scale and lasted much longer than the Yosu mutiny. Capt. Hausman ran the anti-rebel scorched-earth campaigns on Cheju for several years, but he scarcely mentions the Cheju uprising in his book. It may be that the good captain did not wish to recall any bad memories.

Capt. Hausman's account of the Yosu mutiny is short on accuracy and long on omissions. He writes this incident off as a Communist rebellion instigated by North Korea. In fact, both Communists and anti-Communists joined this failed military coup, which followed the mutiny of the 9th Regiment on Cheju (See Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl's memoir cited below).

Captain Hausman

The Yosu Mutiny happened during our watch in Korea. On August 24, 1948, Rhee Syngman and Gen. Hodge signed an agreement whereby the US would retain operational controls of the Korean army until June 1949.

I received the news of the 14th Regiment's mutiny on October 19, 1948 in Seoul and hurried over to Gen. Robert's office. I recommended that an emergency combat command be established right away to out down the rebellion before it spread to other regiments.

On the following day, an emergency meeting was held at Gen. Robert's office. Defense Minister Shin Sung Mo, ROKA Commander Song Ho Sung, several staff officers and myself attended this meeting. We decided to set up an emergency command at Kwang-ju. Initially, Col. Jung Il Kwon was to head this command, but Gen. Song took the command himself. I represented the KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) and took charge of the operations. I was also the special advisor to the commander, Gen. Song.

Gen. Robert gave me four specific orders:

1.        In case the Korean army fails to cope with the situation, I shall take charge.

2.        Establish the emergency combat command and take appropriate controls

3.        Make prompt reports to the KMAG HQ

4.        Prepare concrete battle plans and execute them successfully.

I landed at the Kwangju airport with Col. Jung Il Kwon at 14:30 October 20th. The rebel 14th Regiment was part of the 5th Brigade commanded by Col. Kim Sang Gyum. Col. Kim was away on Cheju and his chief of staff was unavailable as well.

The immediate cause of the mutiny was the decision to send the 14th Regiment to Cheju to help out the 11th Regiment fighting the guerrillas at Hanra (Cheju-do). The 14th was selected because it was located the closest to the island. Some elements of the regiment refused to fight the Cheju rebels and started the mutiny.

The mutiny was led by Sgt. Ji Chang Soo, Lt. Kim Ji Hoe and other communists who had infiltrated the regiment. Lt. Kim was from Cheju and he and his comrades refused to fight their own kind.

Maj. Oh Jing Gi commanded the regiment. Maj. Oh was an active right-winger but he was arrested by Rhee Syngman's police in connection with the Choe Nung Jin incident. Choe was the chief investigator for the US Military Government. Choe ran for an assembly seat held by Rhee Syngman and Rhee had him arrested for insurrection. During a police torture, Choe gave out Maj. Oh's name and Oh was arrested as accomplice and sent to jail.

About ten days prior to the mutiny, Col. Park Sung Hun replaced Maj. Oh as the regimental commander. When the mutiny broke out, Park was directing ship loading at the Yosu harbor. Park was informed that the rebels shot most of his officers and he went into hiding at a hotel. A few days, he managed to escape to safety, but he was dismissed from the army.

All available forces were mobilized to put down this rebellion. Kim Baik Il's 5th Brigade, Won Yong Duk's 2nd Brigade, Kim Jung Yol's Air Unit and Kang Pil Won's Special Force battalion were the main units operating under Gen. Song Ho Sung. Maj. Park Jung Hee was on the staff.

The Korean officers wanted to delay counter offensives until all forces were in place, but I insisted on immediate actions. The 4th Regiment in Kwangju was established right after the Liberation and split into the 14th Regiment at Yosu and the 11th Regiment at Cheju, comprising the 5th Brigade.

The problem with the 4th Regiment was that it had several fatal encounters with the police and lost confidence of the Seoul government. For example, a unit of the Regiment attached a police station at Young-am and killed a number of policemen. (My notes: The Korean police were manned by those Koreans who had worked as policemen for the Japanese and they were hated by the nationalists. Hausman states that these acts were committed by North Korean agents).

The Korean commanders feared that the 4th Regiment might join the rebels and they preferred to use other regiments. I did not buy their arguments and ordered an immediate action using the 4th Regiment. I knew that Lt. Kim Ji Hoe and Sgt. Ji Chang Soo had less than 40 followers when the mutiny began. Many others followed them later most likely under duress. Local Communists joined in and soon the rebels took over Yosu and dispatched a unit by train to occupy Sunchon.

The rebels claimed that Rhee's government took away rice for the Japanese and fed maize and barley to the Korean people. This was true ten years ago under the Japanese rule. (My notes: The rebels actually demanded: (1) Immediate withdrawal of the American troops; (2) Restoration of the People's Commune; (3) Dismissal and punishment of Japanese collaborators and (4) Unification. Capt. Hausman mentions none of these demands.)

The rebellion gained momentum rapidly and Sunchun fell to the rebels. I ordered Maj. Lee Jung Il's 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment to attack the rebels at Sunchun immediately. Lt. Kelso was the American officer attached to this regiment. But Maj. Lee camped his troops by the city and refused to fight the rebels. I believe this was because Lee's forces were outnumbered and not because Lee was sympathetic to the rebels.

Intelligence was scarce and I flew over the Sunchon area in an L4 light recon plane piloted by Capt. Kim Shin (the Air Force Chief of Staff a few years later). Once we landed at the Sunchon airport but had to take off fast after drawing small-arms fire from rebel soldiers.

At the time, the Korean army had no airplanes and the Korean pilots had to borrow planes from the US 24th Army. As the air war intensified against the rebels, the Korean pilots asked my permission to paint Tae-guk-ki on the loaned planes. I allowed them to do so. The rebels did not shoot at planes with the US insignia, but they went after the planes with Tae-guk-gi. Upon completion of the mutiny, I had Tae-guk-ki removed and the US insignia restored.

The rebels occupied Yosu, Sunchon and a large section of the Chul-Ra-Nam-do. Red flags flew and Communist organs sprang up in the occupied areas. However, the rebel advances were stopped in less than 10 days and tide turned against them. Yosu and Sunchun were recovered and the rebels retreated to the mountains for a long protracted guerrilla war.

I received Lt. Kim Jee Hee's severed head. Originally, I ordered Kim taken alive but realizing that this might entail additional forces, I changed the order to allow dead or alive. After killing him, the troops chopped off his head and send it to me in a 5-gallon gasoline can.

Since it was so swollen, it was difficult to identify. I had a priest from Cheju who cared for Kim since his childhood examined the head, but he could not confirm its identity. Later on, Kim's lover was captured and she confirmed his death.