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"A Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldiers' Attitude toward the Korean War", Operations Research Office, the Johns Hopkins University, 1953. - Knowledge of the ideological weaknesses of an enemy target audience, and of the more vulnerable segments of that audience will permit the tailoring for specific tailoring of propaganda themes most likely to exploit fully such vulnerabilities. (3.5MB)
Report on Communist Radio Propaganda on the Korean War, August 8 - 31, 1950. Ogloblin, Peter. September 12, 1950. - This is an attempted evaluation of the propaganda issued by Communist radio broadcasts on the Korean War between the dates August 8 and August 31. The source material was the monitoring service of FBIS. (0.96 MB)
Recommendations for Psychological Warfare in Korea, Kilchoon, Kim. October 08, 1950. - This study was made to develop as much quantitative information as possible about battle casualties during a narrowly defined phase of Korean hostilities. The document shows the possibilities deriving considerable information on certain types of operations by constructing them from available records, the large number of charts and graphs permit the reader to study the casualty situation from a great many angles, and the narrative which accompanies the charts and graphs is easy to read, considering the technical aspect of the subject. The study successfully accomplishes its mission and points to the fact that studies of casualty rates are needed periodically in order to confirm or modify previous findings, to detect trends, to evaluate weapons and defenses, and to furnish planners with current data. (3.2MB)
Beliefs of Enemy Soldiers About the Korean War. Kendall, Willmoore. May 24, 1952. - To determine the most effective approach to the enemy soldier through psychological warfare, the Army needs to know to what extent he has been influenced by his own propaganda and background. Accordingly, ORO has examined what North Korean and Chinese Communist troops in Korea know of political affairs, and to what extent they have been Communist indoctrinated. To get this information ORO, through International Public Opinion Research, Inc., interviewed 768 North Korean POWs and 238 Chinese Communist POWs in Korea from 26 January to 5 March 1951. Prisoners were asked what they thought and knew about the causes of the war; about their countries' allies, and about various world figures, as well as what their leaders had told them about the US, Russia, the UN, and South Korea. Here are a few of the conclusions: (1) Most POWs had heard about the US and Russia, while a larger proportion of North Korean than of Chinese prisoners had heard of the UN and South Korea. Of the two groups, the North Koreans showed more hostility to the UN's purposes. (2) A majority of North Koreans blamed South Korea for the start of the war. In contrast, most Chinese prisoners had no opinion on this question and believed that their government was fighting a defensive war to prevent US invasion of China. (3) Russia was named most frequently as ally to both North Korea and China. North Koreans named Red China as their ally as often as they did Russia, but a smaller proportion of Chinese named North Korea than named Russia. (4.7MB)
Psychological Warfare Operations at Lower Echelons in Eighth Army, July 1952-July 1953. Ponturo, John 25 Jan 1954 - This memorandum attempts an assessment of psychological warfare operations at lower echelons in the Eighth United States Army during the third year of the Korean conflict. The main premise of the study is found in current US Army psychological warfare doctrine that psychological warfare may be expected to pay significant military dividends when used as a close support weapon and is tactically oriented. Some of the conclusions and recommendations are: (1) Psychological warfare in Korea was large scale and well developed; however the main effort was at higher echelons. (2) Intensified psychological warfare effort at lower echelons should be considered in the future. (3) Lower echelon psychological warfare by leaflet and voice media was not usually conducted in close conjunction with conventional military operations. (4) The division TO&E should be amended to include a full time psychological warfare officer. (5.8MB)
Pretesting Procedures for Psychological Warfare Printed Media - Phase II: Ranking and Other Methods. Birch, Jack W. Konigsburg, David Flanagan, John C. Khan, Lessing A. Nierman, Florence K. December 16, 1952. - From the outset of the Korean campaign, psychological warfare operating units recognized the need for procedures by which the effectiveness of new psychological warfare leaflets could be predicted prior to dissemination. To develop such procedures, a standard list of leaflets of known degrees of effectiveness was developed and various methods applicable to pretesting were tried out. Two methods were found to be practical for field administration. One enabled the field operator to estimate the probable effectiveness of new leaflets; the second isolated elements of strength and weakness in the leaflets being evaluated. The methods developed should be (1) put into use in the field, (2) applied to psychological warfare printed media other than leaflets, and (3) tested with both enemy and friendly civilian populations so that psychological warfare aimed at such targets may be adequately pretested. (10.5MB)
FEC Psychological Warfare Operations: Intelligence. Ponturo, John Kendall, Willmoore. April 28, 1952. - How efficient are the intelligence operations of psychological warfare in FEC? How valuable, in relation to its time and personnel costs, is the contribution of intelligence output to the current psywar campaign in Korea? In this memorandum, ORO has described and analyzed the theater-level psywar intelligence operations - from the processing of many sources of information to the issuance of various types of reports to psywar operators. To meet the operator's working needs for information, psywar intelligence should progressively reach beyond the selection and surveying of items of information and provide more interpretation and evaluation. Such efforts would increase the psywar yield of each source and increase the practical usefulness of intelligence reports. In general, operational efficiency would benefit from increasingly intensive internal communications within the psywar organization, with increased access by operators to intelligence files for reference purposes and with increased contact between intelligence producers and intelligence users, the writers of leaflets and scripts. (3.2MB)
Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War. Kendall, W. O'Donnell, L. F. Ponturo, J.. December 15, 1951. - The problem is to describe and analyze the organization of Eighth Army psychological warfare in the Korean war. The purpose which is intended to be served by the psychological warfare activities in the Eighth Army has an inseparable connection with the organization of those activities, the adequacy of the organization being subject to judgment, in the first instance, only in terms of how well it fulfills the purpose it is intended to serve. Along with this, however, there is another consideration, namely whether or not the nature of the organization evolved has tended to shape and limit the purpose or task which is or can be assigned to it. In sum, operations research must move back and forth between the purpose and the organizational measures taken to forward it, and must raise questions as to the rationality of the relation between them. (9.2MB)
US Psywar Operations in the Korean War. Pettee, George S. January 23, 1951. - The report is to assess the actual past operations and effectiveness of US military psychological warfare in the Korean War, and the possible means of gaining increased effect. (6.2MB)
Leaflet Dropping in Korea by the Far Eastern Air Force. Daugherty, William 03 Jan 1951 - It is the mission of this Study to assess the performance of the leaflet bomb and fuze which have been used in the Korean campaign and the adequacy of the liaison which has been maintained between the Special Projects Branch, G-2, GHQ and the Air Force personnel who have disseminated the bulk of the propaganda leaflets produced. (1MB)
Civil Affairs in Korea 1950-51. Stolzenbach, C. D., Kissinger, Henry A. 12 May 1952 - Army experience in Korea demonstrates, as it has elsewhere, the need for preparedness in the handling of civil affairs. Unique in some respects, the experience does reflect aspects of the problems likely to be encountered elsewhere. The study of civil affairs operations in Korea, conducted by ORO in 1951, reveals: The need to negotiate civil affairs agreements during the early stages of conflict, providing those controls over the internal affairs of the combat areas that are necessary to attain the military and political The inseparability of military command and civil affairs responsibilities, and the importance of both a single focus of responsibility within the Army for all civil affairs functions, and a single point of contact within the Army for relationships with governments of the operational areas. The need for officers qualified in civil affairs functions, including officers skilled in the language of the area. The need to alert commanders and other military personnel to the importance of civil affairs in attaining military and political objectives. Further studies of the Korean experience are recommended in order to provide more information for the guidance of future civil affairs operations. (6MB)
Study of Battle Casualties among Equivalent Opposing Forces. Best, Robert J.. April 14, 1952. - This study was made to develop as much quantitative information as possible about battle casualties during a narrowly defined phase of Korean hostilities. The document shows the possibilities deriving considerable information on certain types of operations by constructing them from available records, the large number of charts and graphs permit the reader to study the casualty situation from a great many angles, and the narrative which accompanies the charts and graphs is easy to read, considering the technical aspect of the subject. The study successfully accomplishes its mission and points to the fact that studies of casualty rates are needed periodically in order to confirm or modify previous findings, to detect trends, to evaluate weapons and defenses, and to furnish planners with current data. (7.9MB)
Observations on Close Air Support in Korea - by W. L. Archer, June 1951 - (1.2MB)
Analysis of Battle Casualties for the Stable Period of the Korean War. Cleaver, Frederick W. 12 Apr 1957 - Concomitances of the "Cease-fire" negotiations in the Korean War were the establishment of a stable MLR and a condition of limited objective warfare. Although consideration of this type of warfare is of secondary importance in conjunction with major anticipated conflicts, the fact that continued instances of attritional wars with satellite countries are within the realm of possibility causes the casualty structures of the various phases of such wars to be of interest. In this paper, an analysis is made of the battle casualties sustained by the US Army in Korea for the period September 1952 through July 1953. It is believed that the results of this analysis will be of interest, even though generalization may not be appropriate with the possible exception of some of the KIA to WIA ratios obtained. (1.5MB)
Operation Punch and the Capture of Hill 440 Suwon, Korea, February, 1951. Marshall, S. L.. February 01, 1951. - Operation Punch is one of the brightest entries in the record of 8th Army operations in Korea. Of it came the first solid American victory during the fighting of the 1950-51 winter. Once the left flank of the Army became firmly based on the south bank on the Han River, presaging the aborting of the enemy force defending Seoul, the way was open to the series of maneuvers by which the Communist armies were driven from their main holdings in South Korea. Strategically, therefore, this relatively small action was of major significance. It decisively influenced action at the very highest level. But what commends the operation to particular attention is that the importance of the event is in perfect equipoise with the excellence of its tactical concepts and the high standard of performance by troops. Here is a study highlighting decision at all levels of command combined with a close-in view of the American fighter at his best. The stresses in Operation Punch were about average for the Korean fighting. The weather was neither mild nor rigorously immoderate. The supply situation was favorable. Morale was at a mean as the Army was just beginning to upgrade after a period of grave reverses. More than half of the troops here engaged were replacements without prior experience in battle. The prevailing conditions therefore strike a reasonably normal balance favorable to an evaluation of the American character under fire. (KAR) OCLC: 4803349, 91 pages. Repositories: Joint Staff College, Center for Military History (US Army), Military Historical Institute, University of Texas, El Paso.
Vulnerability of Army Supply to Air Interdiction. April 01, 1953. - By its estimates of numbers of additional personnel and equipment required to reduce appreciably the vulnerability of Korean supply lines, ORO-T-46 (FEC) implies the practical limitations of this approach to the problem. It is logical to consider the other basic factors determining supply vulnerability: volume of supply, and restrictions imposed by terrain. A characteristic of the Korean War was the high per capita rate of supply for UN troops, which is an outgrowth of national preoccupation with protection of human life as the ultimate economy. (18.4MB)
US Combat Soldier and the Korean War: A Profile. July 01, 1951.
Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro Manpower. Volume I. - The overall problem to which this report addresses itself is that of how best Negro troops can be utilized in the United States Army. The Korean experience furnishes the occasion for an examination of the following aspects of this overall problem: How have Negro troops been used in the Korean war? What problems have arisen in regard to their use? What are the prevailing attitudes of Negro and white officers and enlisted men on the subject? What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience? (8.25MB)
Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro Manpower. Volume II. - (12MB)
Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro Manpower. Volume III. - (10.6MB)
The Utilization of KATUSA. 01 Mar 1954 - The purpose of this report is to determine the advisability of the continued utilization of KATUSAs in Korea and by implication, the utilization of foreign augmentation troops in other parts of the world, if such utilization should appear to be called for in the future. Specifically, four areas were investigated: (1) The opinions of American combat personnel in Korea about the quality of the military performance of KATUSAs. (2) The major problems experienced by American personnel in the utilization of KATUSAs. (3) The overall attitudes of American personnel toward KATUSAs. (4) Attitudes of KATUSAs toward their treatment in the U. S. Army and toward their rotation from the U. S. Army to the ROK Army. (5MB)
The KMAG Advisor: Circulated for Critical Reading.February 06, 1962. - The purpose of this study is to examine: (1) the role of the KMAG advisor; (2) preparation for KMAG duty; (3) elements of the advisory process; (4) the relationship of the advisor to the advisory group; (5) advisors' evaluations of the ROK Army; in order to make recommendation for the optimal operation of KMAG or other advisory groups which may in the future be concerned with the training and guidance of the military forces of foreign nations. (7.6MB)
Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in the Attack - Part II by Marshall, S. L., January 27, 1951. - Detailed study of the operations of 1st Mar Div against CCF in the Koto-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ni area 20 Nov to 10 Dec 1950 substantiates in nearly all major particulars the conclusions drawn in the paper, 'CCF in the Attack,' published on 5 Jan 1951, ORO-S-26 (EUSAK), wherein CCF tactical methods and weapons employment were evaluated on the basis of the experience of 2nd Inf Div in the Battle of Kunu-ri, 24 Nov to 1 Dec 1950. (1.8MB)
Training the Combat Rifleman in the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Army, Harris, Frank J. 13 Jan 1954 - This is the second of two studies on the motivation and training of Chinese Communist and North Korean riflemen. After interviewing a cross-section of POWs and studying available reports and records to find out what makes the Communist soldier fight as he does. (2.2MB)
Study of North Korean and Chinese Soldier Attitudes Toward Communism, Democracy, and the United Nations. Segal, Julius. February 16, 1954. - The purpose of the report is to determine psychological vulnerabilities of specific target audiences through the use of scales measuring attitudes toward communism, democracy, and the United Nations.(2.5MB)
Proposed Program of Investigation of Signal Communications in Korea, Clarke, Eric T. February 26, 1952. - The ideal military signal communications system is one which affords communication between any persons or groups requiring contact; it is not only instantaneous and certain, no matter where the users are and how they move about, but also is undetectable by anyone other than those for whom it is intended. The system should require a minimum of equipment and operating personnel since, in the last analysis, each man used for signal work represents one less man available for direct combat. (0.67MB)
Essay_korean_war.pdf (2 MB)
kr-guerrilla.pdf (2 MB)
prc_intervention_korean_war.pdf (2 MB)
UN Partisan Infantry, Korea (19 MB)
North Korean Armament - US Marines Intelligence (5.5MB)
UN Propaganda Leaflet Collection of Lloyd Miller
Enemy Leaflets Of The Korean War
4th Fighter Wing simulated nuclear strike against North Korea, 1998.
Korean
War Historical Documents (Steve Carroll) -- Official documents in English