Despite the number of press articles claiming numerous instances of nuclear trafficking worldwide, we have no evidence that any fissile materials have actually been acquired by any terrorist organization. We also have no indication of state-sponsored atte mpts to arm terrorist organizations with the capability to use any type of nuclear materials, fissile or non-fissile, in a terrorist act. Unfortunately, this does not preclude the possibility that a terrorist or other group could acquire, potentially thro ugh illicit trading, enough radioactive material to conduct an operation, especially one designed to traumatize a population.
A non-state actor would not necessarily need fissile material for its purposes. Depending upon the group's objectives, any nuclear or radioactive material could suffice. The consequences of a nuclear explosion are well appreciated and feared. But non-fiss ile radioactive materials dispersed by a conventional explosive or even released accidentally could cause damage to property and the environment, and cause societal and political disruption.
Examples of non-fissionable radioactive materials seen in press reports are cesium-137, strontium-90, and cobalt-60. These cannot be used in nuclear weapons but could be used to contaminate water supplies, business centers, government facilities, or trans portation networks. Although it is unlikely they would cause significant numbers of casualties, they could cause physical disruption, interruption of economic activity, post-incident clean-up, and psychological trauma to a workforce and to a populace.
Non-state actors already have attempted to use radioactive materials in recent operations. For example:
Traditional terrorist groups with established sponsors probably will remain hesitant to use a nuclear weapon, for fear of provoking a worldwide crackdown and alienating their supporters. In contrast, a new breed of multinational terrorists, exemplified by the Islamic extremists involved in the bombing of the World Trade Center, might be more likely to consider such a weapon if it were available. These groups are part of a loose association of politically committed, mixed nationality Islamic militants, app arently motivated by revenge, religious fervor, and a general hatred for the West.
The Aum Shinrikyo attacks in June 1994, in Matsumoto, Japan, which killed seven and injured 500, and on the subway in Tokyo in March 1995, which killed 12 and injured 5,500, were the first instances of large-scale terrorist use of chemical agents, but a v ariety of incidents and reports over the last two years indicate a growing terrorist interest in these weapons.
These incidents include, but are not limited to:
Such examples reflect an increased interest in and a capability to produce chemical and biological agents. Open source literature--including access to the Internet--provides instructions on how to make some chemical agents.
Terrorist interest in chemical and biological weapons is not surprising, given the relative ease with which some of these weapons can be produced in simple laboratories, the large number of casualties they can cause, and the residual disruption of infrast ructure. Although popular fiction and national attention have focused on terrorist use of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are more likely choices for such groups.
In contrast to the fabrication of nuclear weapons, the production of biological weapons requires only a small quantity of equipment. Even very small amounts of biological and chemical weapons can cause massive casualties. The fact that only 12 Japanese d ied in the Tokyo subway attack de-emphasizes the significance of the 5,500 people who required treatment in hospital emergency rooms. Such a massive influx of injured--many critically--has the potential to overwhelm emergency medical facilities, even in a large metropolitan area.
Terrorist use of these weapons also makes them weapons of mass disruption because of the necessity to decontaminate affected areas before the public will be able to begin feeling safe. Although the Aum Shinrikyo case demonstrates that terrorists can prod uce CW, they also may be able to directly acquire these weapons via other means:
The continued willingness of such states as Iran, Libya and Syria to support terrorism highlights the danger of state sponsorship of a terrorist's chemical or biological weapons program. Although we have no evidence of state sponsors providing chemical or biological weapons or the technologies to produce them to terrorist groups, recent revelations about Iraq's well hidden chemical and biological programs highlight the difficulty in detecting national programs to develop such weapons and disperse them to terrorist entities.
SOURCE terrorism-list
Posted by <100662.3357@CompuServe.COM> Richard Cummings on 16 May 96 05:30:59 EDT
Excerpts from the full texts CIA Home Page.