China's Decision to Enter the Korean War

Introduction

These questions have been asked and answered by many, who, with different convictions and the materials accessible to them at the time, provided widely different interpretations. Against the "red scare" of the 1950s, it was believed that the Chinese invasion of Korea was an integral step in the Communist worldwide expansion directed by the Kremlin, and Beijing's action was lunatic and irrational. Allen Whiting's classic work, China Crosses the Yalu, examines the CCP's ac tion under new light, and argues that Beijing's decision was not unprovoked and naked aggression, but "rationally motivated." [1]

In the 1960s, the U.S. experience in Vietnam made many view Washington's postwar foreign policy more critically. Some scholars tend to argue that because of the "strained alliance between Moscow and Beijing," the Chinese were tryin g hard to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. Only when China's security was under direct threat, was Beijing forced to take action. Even after their "preemptive limited attack" on the U.N. force in early November, "the Chinese Peop le's Volunteers" (CPV) disengaged themselves from further confrontation. This indicated, these scholars argue, that Beijing was cautious, and "its objective was apparently not a decisive effort to destroy the U.N. forces in Korea." In othe r words, had Washington decided to negotiate and maintain the 38th parallel divide, the bloodshed could have been stopped there and then. [2]

Promising to offer a unique "Chinese perspective," two Chinese authors, writing in English and in the United States, also conclude that Beijing's decision was of "primarily security concern," and Beijing's "lean-to-one-side" policy was made only after Washington's rejection of CCP friendly overtures. However, they themselves reveal much information which strongly suggests that Mao's outlook of "proletarian internationalism," rather than simple concern over China's bord er security, played a significant role in his taking a confrontational stance in dealing with the Korean crisis. Also there is evidence used in their article which proves that Beijing and Moscow closely collaborated from the very beginning to the end. [3]

Richard Whelan argues that the American sacrifice in Korea effectively drew a line to stop the Communist expansion directed by Moscow, as the title of his book suggests. Curiously, while complaining about the unfair treatment the "forgo tten Korean veterans" received, Whelan laments that "tragically, the Korean War failed to teach the United States the vital lessons - about Asian nationalism as distinct from international Communism... that might have spared the natio n the fiasco of Vietnam." In his opinion, the Chinese were unnecessarily pushed toward war [4] . However, having made his point, Whelan appears not interested in proving the "Chinese nationalism" as "distinct from international Communism."

In contrast to the conventional belief that North Korea was Soviet-sponsored and distant from Beijing, Bruce Comings effectively argues that Pyongyang was more closely connected with and influenced by the Chinese than the Russians. Since the North Koreans had made an enormous contribution to the CCP's liberation of the entire mainland, Beijing thought it only reasonable for the Chinese to give reciprocal assistance to their comrades in Korea whenever needed. Cumings believes that this reciprocity was the first motive for Beijing's intervention, while China's concern over its border security and a hostile Far East situation, with a revived Japan, was the second. The third of Beijing's motives, according to Cuming s, was to supplant decisively the Soviet influence in North Korea. To him, Beijing and Moscow were more rivals than comrades. [5]

Recently, among other documents, two telegrams from Mao to Stalin, dated October 2 and 13, 1950, have been made available [6] . Based on these newly released CCP materials, this paper will argue that from his bi-polarized postwar world vision Mao perceived direct Sino-American confrontation to be inevitable, and the Chinese participation in the conflict advantageous to what he called the "revolutionary front" of the world. Mao was also of the convic tion that the Americans could be defeated militarily, and only with a serious military setback could Washington be forced to negotiate or withdraw from Korea.

This rationale precipitated Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War, and the CCFs initial military objective was no less than a total victory over the U.S.-led international forces in Korea. In accordance with the spirit of the newly-signed Sino-So viet military alliance, Mao and Stalin closely collaborated in dealing with the Korean crisis from the beginning to the end. Beijing's aggressive revolutionary attitude was matched by the American mood for "rolling back," and Washington's concern for U.S. "credibility" in the postwar world. Therefore, a Sino-American collision appeared inevitable in 1950.

This "inevitability" stemmed from the mutual hostility of both sides involved. It goes without saying that Beijing's decision to invade Korea was a kind of "reaction" toward U.S. intervention in Korea and the Taiwan Straits. However, to attribu te Washington's action as a determining factor for Beijing's reaction is to repeat an old pattern in western sinology: "western impact and Chinese reaction," which has been challenged by some scholars. [7]

In any bilateral confrontation, the action of the A side constitutes the background for the action of the B side, which in turn becomes the background for the A side's "reaction." With such a historical train of "reactions," it is less product ive to determine who provoked who than to explore why and how they acted in the way they chose. Since the American perspective has been studied substantially, this paper will focus on the Chinese perspective. How did Beijing view the s ituation after Washington had decided to intervene ? Why did the CCP choose a course of action to confront the Americans militarily?

Mao's Perception of "Inevitability" and the CCP's Preparedness

On June 6, Mao was not in a mood to fight the Americans directly. He told the Party plenum that: "The world front of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union is stronger than it was last year... and the liberation movements against imperialist oppression are developing broadly... Although the danger of war from the imperialist camp is still there, so is the possibility of the third world war. The forces which can check the danger of war are increasing rapidl y... and a new world war can be checked." [8]

Based on such an optimistic estimation of the world situation, Mao emphasized China's economic reconstruction and the liberation of Taiwan and Tibet as the Party's urgent tasks. However, Mao's bi-polarized o utlook of the postwar world order lay the very foundation for Beijing's particular reaction, of its own choosing, toward the Korean crisis.

Only three days after Washington decided to intervene in Korea, Beijing shifted its military focus from the Taiwan Straits to Korea. On June 30, the CCP Military Committee informed Xiao Jinguang, commander-i n-chief of the CCP navy, that the timing for liberating Taiwan be postponed, and the preparation for encountering the U.S. in Korea took the first priority. [9]

On July 7, Zhou chaired a meeting of the CCP Military Committee, which decided to form the Northeast Defense Army (NDA) immediately. Su Yu, the CCP general previously responsible for the liberation of Tai wan, was then appointed as the commander of the NDA, which would initially include four infantry armies and three artillery divisions. All of these troops were ordered to complete their gathering in the Manchurian bo rder area by the end of that month. [10]

The task of the NDA was not to defend the Sino-Korean border, but to take part in the Korean War. From the very beginning, the military training program of the NDA was geared toward fighting the Americans in Korea. [11] As early as August 4, when the U.N. forces were still hard-pressed by Kim Il-sung's North Korean armies in the South [12] , Mao stated in a Politburo meeting that if U.S. imperialists gained the upp rehend in Korea, they would become cockier, and would further threaten Communist China. Therefore, Mao insisted that Beijing assist their North Korean comrades by sending Chinese volunteers. Although the timing of this could be decided l ater, Mao continued, the preparation for it should be initiated. [13]

In the same Politburo meeting, Zhou Enlai expressed the same opinion. He said that it would be disadvantageous to world peace if the North Koreans were defeated, because the Americans would become more rampant. To achieve victory in Korea, the Chinese factor must be added to the struggle, and that would encourage a change worldwide for the better of the revolutionary forces [14]

This theme was repeated in Mao's telegram to Stalin on October 2. Apparently, Beijing did not perceive the necessity of Chinese intervention in Korea only in terms of self-defense of China's border. For the CCP leadership, the result of the K orean crisis would be symbolic. An American victory would mean a major setback of the world revolutionary forces headed by the Soviet Union.

The rampant reactionary forces headed by the United States would step up their offensive against the world "revolutionary front," as Mao termed it; and Communist China might very well be the next target of the reactionary assault. If concern over U.S. "credibility" was a major factor in Washington's postwar policy making, to establish the "credibility" of new China on behalf of the "revolutionary front" of the world clearly played an important role in Beijing's d ecision to assist Kim Il-sung. From such a point of view, Mao vigorously pushed for Chinese preparedness.

On August 5, one day after the above-mentioned Politburo meeting, Mao telegraphed Gao Gang, the Commander and Commissar of the NDA, that "there will probably be no fighting (for the NDA) in August, but (it) should be prepared for combat in early September. Every unit should be ready within this month in order to move to the front to fight." [15]

To carry out Mao's instructions, Gao called all division commanders to a meeting on August ll, but those who attended believed that it was impossible to be ready and move into Korea during August. Gao telegraphed Mao on August 15, suggesting that the time for sending the NDA to Korea be postponed. On August 18, Mao replied. While being agreeable to Gao's suggestion, he pressed Gao to pick up speed and emphasized that the NDA "must complete all prepar ations before September 30." [16]

By the end of August, the situation in Korea appeared gloomy to the Communists. On August 27, Mao felt it necessary to increase the strength of the NDA, and he telegraphed Peng Dehuai proposing that 12 armies be called upon to r einforce the four armies already near the Sino-Korean border. [17]

In accordance with Mao's idea, Zhou Enlai chaired another military meeting on August 31. The meeting decided that the NDA would be strengthened to include ll armies with 700,000 troops, which would form three echelons with the 13th, 9th and 19th Army Corps in sequence [18] .

On September 9, the Military Committee ordered the 9th Army Corps in the Shanghai area and the 19th Army Corps in the northwestern area to congregate along the railways, in order to move into Manchurian quickly when they were called upon. [19]

Before September 1950, the North Koreans were advancing toward the south, and China's border security was not threatened by the Americans. Why was Mao so vigorously pushing for military preparedness to combat the Americans in Korea ? On the technical level, according to Nie Rongzhen, then the Chinese Chief of Staff, Mao felt in August that although the North Koreans were pushing toward the south, their northern rear was unprotected. The U.S. would not accept defeat and its further excise of naval and air force power might very well disadvantage Kim's forces. Consequently, Mao was pushing for the completion of t he Chinese preparations to invade Korea. [20]

More importantly, on the conceptual level, the CCP leadership was firmly convinced that a direct military confrontation with the U.S. was inevitable; the question was only when and where. Beijing perceived three possible locations in which the Sino-American confrontation might take place: the Taiwan Straits, Vietnam, and Korea. The men in Beijing calculated that since the PLA's navy and air force were weak, the Taiwan Straits was not an advantageous choice for them. Vietnam was so far a way that the logistics could be a problem if the PLA was to invade Vietnam to assist Ho Chi Minh's forces. Besides, the French, not the Americans, would be the direct enemy in Vietnam, and Beijing intended to give the United States, not France, a lesson. In comparison, Korea would be the most advantageous location for Beijing to fight U.S. imperialism, because it was close to the Soviet Union, the supplier of the weapons and air cover. [21]

As Zhou Enlai later stated "The confrontation between U.S. imperialists and us was inevitable; the question was the choice of location. This was (not only) up to the imperialists, we could also determine it. The American imperialists decided (to have this showdown) in the Korean battlefield, this was advantageous to us, and we decided to confront the Americans and assist the Koreans, too. Looking back, it is' understood that everything considered it would have been much more di fficult for us if (we had chosen) Vietnam to fight, let alone the off-shore islands (in the Taiwan Straits). [22]

This indicates again that the formation of the NDA and Mao's push for military preparedness were not for "border security" perse. Because Beijing thought a Sino-American confrontation inevitable, and chose Korea consciously as the ba ttlefield to set the score straight with the Americans, it was only a technical issue for the Chinese to decide the timing for invasion. The time came in October, 1950.

The Tortuous Road Toward the Final Decision

With the decision to invade Korea, Beijing not only prepared to confront the Americans in the peninsula in a limited war, but also prepared for Washington's declaration of war on China, and American invasion of the Chinese mainland, or at the very least, U.S. air and naval attacks on China's major cities and strategic locations. [24]

At the end of the meeting, Mao suggested that a telegram be sent to Stalin, and he personally drafted the cable. On October 6, the Chinese high command meeting worked out the details of military planning, and Mao issued an o rder the next day: "Change the Northeast Defense Army into the Chinese People's Volunteers, and move it into Korea immediately." On the same day, Peng Dehuai, now the Commander of the CPV, passed Mao's order to his subordinates and demanded that all preparations be completed within 10 days. Peng decided to go to Korea to meet Kim Il-sung on October 11 to make final arrangements for the Chinese invasion. [25]

However, Stalin appeared to have second thoughts. On October 8, when Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang left for Manchurian to carry out Mao's order, Zhou Enlai flew to the Soviet Union to discuss Soviet military aid and participation of Soviet air force. According to Hong Xuezhi, the vice-commander of the CPV, after MacArthur's Inchon landing in mid-September, both Beijing and Moscow realized that Kim could not hold on all by himself, and Stalin and M ao started to consider how to assist their North Korean comrades. After lengthy discussions, they reached an agreement: the Chinese would send volunteers to confront the American-led forces on the ground, while the Soviets would provid e air cover. [26]

Now, Zhou Enlai wanted to finalize the details for the participation of Soviet air force. Stalin was then in the Crimea and Zhou met him on October 9. Malenkov, Beria, Mikoyan, Molotov, and other top Soviet leaders also took part i n the meeting, which lasted from 7 in the evening to 5 the next morning. Stalin agreed to send arms for 20 divisions to Manchuria immediately, but he was reluctant to send the Soviet air force to participate directly. He told Zhou that t he Soviet air force was not ready yet. [27]

Zhou telegraphed Mao on October 10 to inform him of Stalin's decision, which took Mao by surprise. However, the Chinese continued to proceed as planned. On October ll, Mao telegraphed Peng to give his consent to send all troops then a t Peng's disposal to Korea. [28]

But, he had second thoughts the next day. At 8 p.m. on October 12, Mao telegraphed Peng again to order that the CPV stay where they were to wait for further instructions. [29] Peng and Gao Gang were to ld to return to Beijing immediately. On October 13, a Politburo meeting was held again to discuss the new situation. The central issue was whether or not the CPV should cross the Yalu without Soviet air cover. The result was revealed i n Mao's telegram to Stalin on that day, which conveyed the "unanimous opinion" of the Politburo: The CPV would go ahead. [30] The next day, Mao and Peng together drew up a military plan; they decided that the CPV would cross the Yalu on October 19. [31]

Mao's mood appeared to be influenced by Stalin's hesitation to send the Soviet air force. In his telegram to Stalin on October 2, Mao expected a quick victory by destroying large numbers of American troops in Korea; the least favorable scenario Ma o then perceived was a stalemate, which would ruin China's economic reconstruction. The Politburo meeting of October 13 reconfirmed the necessity to cross the Yalu, but Mao was not certain that it was feasible to achieve a quick victory . On October 14, Mao telegraphed Chen Yi to instruct the 9th Army Corps to leave the Shanghai area, but not to move into Manchuria immediately, as his first telegram on October 12 had indicated. Instead, it should be moved int o Shandong, and wait for further instructions there. [32]

In his telegrams to Zhou Enlai on October 14, Mao explained that if all four infantry armies and three artillery divisions were positioned north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, it might deter the enemy from pushing north, and the CPV might win some time to get better prepared. Should the enemy continue to push northward, the CPV would be able to destroy two to three South Korean divisions. But if the enemy would not push toward the north for s ix months, the CPV would not attack the Pyongyang Wonsan line either. After six months the CPV would be better armed and trained, and then, a major offensive against the Pyongyang-Wonsan line would be launched. Mao even suggest ed that if the enemy would not attack northward, a half of the CPV troops might withdraw to Manchuria for training, which would make logistics easier; and they could be sent back to the front whenever a major battle was expec ted. [33]

However, Mao's technical caution did not indicate any significant change in his determination to confront the Americans in Korea, because he was still convinced that the Americans would not quit unless they were defeated, and that onl y by positioning superior military forces in front of the enemy, could the U.S.-led troops be deterred from pushing toward the north. For that reason, Mao telegraphed Gao Gang at 1 a.m. on October 15 to order that the CPV c ross the Yalu on October 18, or not later than the 19th. Only four hours later, Mao cabled Gao again to propose that it would be better if the CPV could start to cross the Yalu on October 17, so all the troops could be in Korea within ten days. [34]

Because of Mao's instruction on October 15, a regiment of the 42nd Army crossed the Yalu at midnight on October 16. However, the next morning, Mao changed his orders again. He cabled Peng that the operation to cross the Yalu should be postponed until October 19, and Peng and Gao should fly back to Beijing immediately. This delay was due to a message from Zhou Enlai in the USSR. Zhou informed Mao that he would be back home on the 18th. "The ti ming of sending troops (to Korea) should be finalized after Zhou's return on the 18th," Mao told Peng and Gao. [35]

We do not know the exact words from Stalin which Zhou brought back. According to Chen Yi, when Stalin learned that Beijing had decided to send troops to Korea even without Soviet air cover, he was so moved by the CCP's selfless "internationalism" that he was tearful. [36] Eventually, Stalin sent two air divisions to participate by the end of 1950. All the Soviet pilots were dressed in CPV uniforms and were instructed to identify themse lves as Russians-Chinese if they were captured by the enemy. [37] Judging from these CCP materials, Stalin's message brought back by Zhou was encouraging.

In October 17 afternoon, Peng Dehuai received a telegram from Deng Hua and Hong Xuezhi, the commanders of the 13th Army Corps. They argued that without air cover and adequate anti-aircraft guns, it would be very difficul t to hold their position against U.S. air raids. They suggested that the CPV should wait until next spring to invade Korea. In the meeting of October 18, Peng reported this opinion from the rank and file to Mao. But Mao was dete rmined. He stated that the timing for the CPV to cross the Yalu should not be postponed any more, "even if there is 'heaven-sent' difficulty." After the meeting, at 9 p.m., Mao sent the final order to his lieutenants in the front, and the cr oss- Yalu operation started the next day with full-scale, and four armies and three artillery divisions poured into Korea.

The Motives and Objectives of Beijing's Decision

Mao also made it clear that Beijing's goal was not merely the security of the Chinese border and the survival of the Pyongyang regime. He stated that since the Party had decided to send Chinese troops into Korea to combat the Americans, they expected and were prepared for the United States to declare war on China, and for the U.S. air force to bomb China's major cities and industrial bases. But, Mao was very optimistic about the result of a full-scale war wi th the United States. He said, "if our army could destroy U.S. forces in Korea, especially wipe out its Eighth Army, the situation would become favorable to both the revolutionary front (of the world) and China. That is to say, if th e Korean problem ended with the defeat of the U.S.... then, if America declared war on China, this war would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last for long." Mao told Stalin that 12 divisions would be sent to Korea on October 15, and another 24 divisions would follow in the spring and summer of 1951, so that the CPV could destroy the enemy thoroughly and decisively. [39]

New information suggests that three factors in the CCP's perception of the Korean conflict precipitated Beijing's decision to enter the war. And, each factor had a counterpart in U.S. policy. Therefore, a collision seemed to be inevitable . First of all, on the global level, just as the Americans saw a worldwide Communist plot for expansion, Beijing was convinced that there was a U.S.-led worldwide reactionary camp which aimed at the destruction of the new regime in China as one step toward the destruction of the socialist world, i.e., what Mao called the "revolutionary front" of the world. Thus, the events taking place in Korea were not perceived as a localized phenomenon, but an integral part of the global struggle. That was why Mao linked the defeat of the "Korean revolutionary forces" with the whole situation in the Far East, and the destruction of U.S. military forces in Korea with a situation favorable to the "revolutionary f ront" of the world and China.

If on a subconscious level the Chinese felt obligated to reciprocate their Korean comrades, Mao apparently elevated this simple sentiment to a conscious level which might be called "proletarian internationalism." The CCP's internationalist o utlook was deep-seated. In late 1945, when the Second World War had just ended, the CCP came to the conclusion that "The central problem in the (postwar) world is the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The reflection of this (global) struggle in China is the struggle between Jiang Jieshi and the CCP." Although, for tactical reasons, the CCP should conceal the close relations between the Party and Moscow, the Communists' internationali st outlook made them certain that the USSR-CCP versus US-GMD were natural alignments [40] . They did not take their struggle against the GMD as a purely domestic matter, neither the Korean conflict as a localiz ed development.

With such an internationalist outlook, the CCP would certainly advocate the solidarity of the so-called "revolutionary front" headed by the Soviet Union. As we have seen, Beijing and Moscow had already discussed the matter of Chinese part icipation in the Korean conflict before the CCP Politburo meeting on October 2, and Stalin had agreed to send the Soviet air force to cooperate with the CPV ground force. Mao's telegram of October 2 indicates that Beijing's decision t o enter the war was made with the assumption that Moscow would provide air cover and weaponry. Although the Soviet air force went into the war a bit later than Beijing requested, Stalin honored his promise. These telegrams of Mao we are now discussing are apparently only two among many, and that fact itself indicates that Stalin and Mao were in close collaboration. [41]

At the Politburo meeting on October 4, Mao expressed this "revolutionary internationalist" outlook rather explicitly. After participants argued over various domestic disadvantages of entering the war, Mao said: "What you have said sounds r easonable. But it would be shameful for us to stand by seeing our neighbors in perilous danger without offering any help." If China could stand by when North Korea was in peril, Mao argued, then, the USSR could do the same when China wa s imperiled. "Internationalism would be mere empty talk." [42]

Since the CCP had been viewing postwar world politics in terms of the "two-camp struggle," solidarity and mutual assistance within the socialist camp was essential to both world revolutionary forces and China's survival in the face of a Washington-directed anti-Communist onslaught.

Conditioned by his radical vision of the postwar world order, when the CPV was pushing toward the 38th parallel in December 1950, Mao insisted that the Chinese must cross the divide not only for military reasons, but also for politica l reasons. He told Peng Dehuai: "If we stop north of the 38th parallel, it will be very disadvantageous for us politically." After the campaign in early December, he explained that "the so-called 38th parallel was an old concept in people's mi nds, and it has disappeared after this campaign (in early December)."

If the CPV had not crossed the parallel, many speculations would have arisen. "If we can score another campaign in the first half of January (1951)... it will greatly encourage the democratic front of the world, as well as the people in vario us capitalist countries. It will certainly be a new blow to the imperialist (camp)" [43] . Obviously, Mao did not take the military action of the CPV in Korea simply as a matter of Chinese national security, which, in Mao's mind, was closely linked with the global struggle of the "democratic front" and the "good people" in capitalist countries against the imperialist camp headed by Washington.

Secondly, the CCP's long-standing anti-Americanism continued to be a decisive factor in Beijing's policy thinking. After the Seventh Fleet anchored in the Taiwan Straits and the U.N. forces intervened in the Korean War, Mao and his coll eagues were convinced that a clash between the U.S. and China was inevitable. Based on this judgement, Beijing's suspicion of and hostility toward the U.S. became bellicosity. War planning and preparation started in the very early stage of the Ko rean conflict. [44]

Since Korea was the chosen battlefield for the inevitable war with the U.S., Mao not only decided to combat the U.S. in Korea, but also prepared to face U.S. attacks on mainland China. For the same reason, Beijing's initial goal was not to "scare" the enemy in order to achieve a negotiated settlement with a possible North Korean concession, as some scholars suggested. [45]

Instead, as Mao's telegram of October 2 explicitly stated, Beijing aimed at the total destruction of U.S. forces in Korea, especially the Eighth Army, in order to settle the score once and for all. With his typical reasoning, Mao believed tha t the more damage the Communists could inflict on the Americans in Korea, the less likely would be a long drawn-out war in mainland China.

According to Mao's first telegram, the so-called Chinese disengagement after the CPV's initial attack on the U.N. that the first 12 CPV divisions would cross the Yalu on October 15, but, in the first stage, they would attack only small ene my units while watching the situation and "waiting for the arrival of Soviet weapons." And then, the CPV would "launch a counter-offensive in cooperation with their Korean comrades to destroy the U.S. invading troops." [ 46]

A number of recently published telegrams of Mao in this period suggest that the CPV intended to lure the enemy deep into an unfavorable position where the CPV could destroy them thoroughly. Another reason for the CPV's temporary pause was that three additional armies of the 9th Army Corps began to cross the Yalu on November 1 to join the six armies already there to push southward in late November. This is what the CCP called the "Second Campaign."

In December, the CPV recovered Pyongyang and reached the 38th Parallel. Mao told Peng that the U.S. and Britain wanted the CPV to stop at the parallel where they would re-deploy themselves. Therefore, the CPV should cross the 38th parallel to destroy another 40,000 to 50,000 of U.S. and British troops. Only then, Mao believed, the "Korean problem" could be solved with the withdrawal of the U.N. forces. Mao did not think about giving Washington time to reconsider it s policy, because in his mind, the only way to make the U.S. change its policy was to defeat it in the battlefield. [47]

This CCP anti-American-imperialism was matched by the Americans' anti-Chinese-Communism. Even men such as O.E. Clubb, who had been an advocate of a more flexible policy toward the CCP and eventual recognition of the PRC, was frustrated in the spring of 1950, and angrily talked about a "shooting war" with China. He compared the Beijing regime with "Hitlerite Germany, but is less intelligent in even a Machiavellian sense " [48] . W ith such a hostile mood on both sides, some form of clash seemed quite natural.

Thirdly, like MacArthur with his cocky attitude and underestimation of Beijing's willingness and capacity to fight the Americans in Korea, Mao also underestimated the fighting capacity of the U.S. forces, and predicted a quick and thor ough victory over the United States. In his telegram of October 2, Mao told Stalin that if the Chinese had air cover and sufficient firing power, it was possible in one campaign to destroy one U.S. army (including two infantry and one mec hanized divisions) with four Chinese armies.

However, reality soon forced him to change his mind. In his telegram of March 1, 1951, Mao predicted that the enemy would not withdraw from Korea unless a large part of their troops were eliminated, and that took time. "Therefore, it is possible for the, Korean War to become protracted, and we should be prepared for (it to last) at least two years.... Our troops must be prepared for a long war, and in several years, destroy several hundreds of thousands of American s. Let them know how difficult it will be. Only then will they withdraw (zhinan ertui) and the Korean problem will be solved." [49]

In his telegram to Peng Dehuai on May 26, 1951, Mao further recognized that it was impossible for the CPV to encircle and eliminate a U.S. division or even a regiment, not to mention an army. He proposed that each CPV army should aim at destroying only one company at a time. [50] By then, Mao must have realized that he had grossly underestimated the U.S. fighting capacity. But that underestimation had already precipitated the deci sion to enter the Korean War.

In sum, if China's "security concern" was Beijing's motivation for entering the Korean War, Mao defined China's security needs not only in terms of border security or a friendly regime in the neighboring territory, but also the w ell-being of the Soviet-led world "revolutionary front" vis-a-vis the U.S.-led reactionary camp. This two-camp vision minimized the potential conflict among the parties of the "revolutionary front," and solidarity was apparent ly the dominant feature of the "fraternal relations" among Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang.

Beijing's initial objective was not simply to deter the U.N. forces in order to maintain the status quo along the 38th parallel, but to defeat the U.S.-led international forces in Korea thoroughly. If there was a discrepancy between Beij ing and Moscow, it was Mao's aggressiveness and evolutionism versus Stalin's caution and conservatism, another repetition of an old pattern in the CCP-Moscow relations since 1935.

Notes

1. A. whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (Stanford, 1960), p. ix. In 1992, Whiting finds that Mao's telegrams on October 2 and, 1950 prove his argument. See James Walsh, "New Light on the Dark War," Time, March 9, 1992, p. 20; Seth Faison Jr., "Mao's '50 Cable Gives Evidence of Korea Plan, Indicates Leader Sought to End a U.S. Threat," The New York Times, February 26, 1992. These two resent articles indicate that it is still a deeply-entrenched belief in the West that "China entered the Kore an War chiefly in self-defense."

2. See M. Gurtov R B. Hwang, China Under Threat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), pp. 25-62.

3. Hao Yufang and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korea War: History Revisited," China Quarterly, v. 121, March 1990. These authors have revealed some very interesting information in their anonymous interviews. However, people's recolle ction of events forty years before cannot be perfect. In fact, most of the information that their informants offered had already been made available in some articles published in China in 1988-1989. These well-documented articles, upon which this write r relies, prove some of the informants' accounts wrong.

4. R. Whelan, Drawing the Line, the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. xiv, 201-16.

5. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. II, (Princeton, 1990), Chapters 11, 21. The research for the two volumes is undoubtedly superb; however, some Chinese materials might have enhanced the China-related chapters. For instance, an artic le written by a special party history committee of the CCP Centre, "Recollections on the Branch of the Northeast Bureau in North Korea during the Liberation War in the Northeast" (Zhonggong danshi ziliao, vol. 17, 1986), provides many details of the in timate relations between the CCP and North Korea, and Pyongyang's assistance to the CCP in 1947-1949.

6. The excerpts from these telegrams are in Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao (Collection of Mao Zedong's Writings after the Establishment of the PRC) (Beijing, 1989), v. 1 (hereafter refer to as Wengao), pp. 539-41, 556. The second one was sent to Zhou Enlai who was then in the USSR. Therefore, the ultimate recipient of it was apparently also Stalin. An English translation of these texts is in The New York Times (Feb. 26, 1992), which fails to note that the cables translated are only excerpts. In fac t, these excerpts were made available in Mao Zedong junshi wenxuan (Selected Mao Zedong's Writings on Military Affairs) published in 1981. Zhang Xi's article, "Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishi kangmei yuanchao de qianqian houhou" (The events before Peng D ehuai's appointment to head the CPV, Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, v. 31, 1989, pp. 111-59.) quotes substantially from the CCP archival materials, and so far, it is the most authoritative and the best-documented account from China on the Chinese participat ion in the Korean War.

7. See Paul Cohen, Discovering History in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

8. Wengao, v. 1, pp. 390-96.

9. Xiao Jinguang huiyilu, Xiao Jinguang's memoir (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe), v. 2, p. 26. Also see Xu Yan, "Chubing ruchao canzhan juce zuihou queding de quzhe guocheng" (The Tortuous Process toward the Final Decision to Enter the Korean War), Da ngshi yanjiu ziliao, 1991, no. 4, pp. 7-13.

10. See Mao's letter to Nie Rongzhen, July 7, 1950, Wengao, p. 428. Also see Xu Yan, op. cit. On July 13, an order was issued by the Military Committee that the 13th Army Corps, including four regular armies, be moved from Central China to Manchuria, an d three other artillery divisions and four anti-aircraft artillery regiments would join them to form the NDA, which was then 260,000 strong. See Zhang Tinggui, "Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng gaishu" (A brief account of the war of resistance to the U.S. an d assistance to Korea), Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue, 1988, no. 6, pp. 1-11; Zhang Xi, pp. 111-59.

11. Xu Yan, op, cit. Xu is a member of the Strategic Research Office at the Defense University in China, and he refers to Su Yu's appointment as "the selection of a commander to lead the army to enter Korea (ruocao renxian)." Su was ill and the command apparatus of the NDA did not come into being until it was converted into the CPV in October. Before that, Gao Gang was in charge.

12. For a brief military history of the War, see ]ames Stokesbury, A Short History of the Korean War (New York: William Morrow, 1988).

13. See Bo Yibo, Buogan zhongda juece yu shi jian de huigu (Recollections on Several Important Policy Makings and Events) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), p. 43.

14. Ibid.

15. See Mao's telegram to Gao, Wengao, pp. 454-55; Zhang Xi. op. cit.

16. Mao's telegram to Gao, August 18, 1950, Wengao, p. 469.

17. Mao's telegram to Peng, Wengao, p. 485.

18. Xu Yan, op. cit.

19. Zhang Xi, op. cit.

20. See Nie Bongzhen huiyilu (Nie Rongzhen's Memoir) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1984), pp. 733-35. Xu Yan's article conveys the same idea.

21. See Xu Yan, op. cit. Also see Nie's memoir, p. 738. Nie was still of the opinion even in the 1980s that "if (the Chinese) had let the U.S. imperialist plot in Korea succeed, the U.S. would have forced us to combat it in another battlefield. That wou ld have made us much disadvantaged." According to Chinese sources, Beijing was involved in the North Vietnamese struggle against the French at the same time. For instance, on July 27, 1950, Chen Geng, the commander of Yunnan Military Zone, acting as th e representative of the CCP Centre, came to Vietnam to meet Ho Chi Minh. Together With Chen, there was a team, including the CCP's military, political, and logistical experts. Chen, with Ho's full trust and authorization, acted as the real commander in directing the military campaign in September-October. See Deng Lifeng, Xinzhongguo junshi huodong jishi (Historical Records of New China's Military Activities) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), pp. 115-16. It is believed among some Chinese historians that some Chinese "volunteers" were involved in the fighting in Vietnam in the early 1950s. Chen Geng was later appointed as the vice-commander of the CPV.

22. See Zhou's speech at the CPV cadre's gathering, February 17, 1958, Xu Yan, op. cit.

23. Zhang Xi, op. cit. For Mao's telegram to Gao, see Wengao, p. 538.

24. See Mao's telegram to Stalin, October 2, 1950, Wengao, pp. 539-41.

25. For Mao's order and his telegram to Kim, October 8, 1950, see Wengao, pp. 543-45; also see Xu Yan, op. cit.

26. Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuancao zhangzhen huiyi (Recollections on the War of 'Resisting the U.S. and Assisting Korea') (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991), pp. 24-25.

27. Zhang Xi, op. cit. Also Xu Yan, op. cit.

28. On October 10, Peng telegraphed Mao to propose that, instead of sending two infantry armies and two artillery divisions, all four armies and three artillery divisions should be sent to Korea at once. Mao agreed. For Mao's telegram, see Wengao, p. 548. Peng also asked when and how much air force could be sent to Korea, Mao replied that air force was not ready yet. For Peng's telegram, see Zhang Xi, op. cit.

29. For Mao's telegram, see Wengao, p. 552. On October 12, Mao telegraphed Chen Yi to instruct that the 9th Army Corps be sent to Manchuria immediately. But a bit later on the same day, Mao telegraphed again to order that the 9th Army Corps stay in its present location for further instruction. Apparently, Mao's policy thinking changed on October 12, not on October 11.

30. See Wengao, p. 556.

31. Zhang Xi. According to Hao R Zhai's informant, on October 10, Stalin decided to postpone sending the Soviet air force until after the CCP issued the order to send the CPV to Korea. But this order was issued on October 8. The informant also believe s that Zhou was sent to Moscow to meet Stalin on October 10, that was after Mao had learnt that Stalin changed his mind; and Zhou informed Stalin that the CPV's invasion of Korea would be postponed if the Soviet air force's participation was postponed. He also believes that Mao's telegram of October 13 was sent to Zhou in Moscow and Peng in Andong.

32. Wengao, p. 557.

33. For Mao's two telegrams to Zhou on October 14, see Wengao, pp. 558-61.

34. For Mao's telegrams to Gao on October 15, see Wengao, pp. 563-64.

35. 35 Wengao, p. 567; Zhang Xi, and Xu Yan, op. cit.

36. Xu Yan, op. cit. This is confirmed by many Chinese sources, for instance, see Hong Xuezhi, Kangmei yuancao zhangzhen huiyi (Recollections on the War of 'resisting the U.S. and assisting Korea') (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 1991), p. 27.

37. Hao and Zhai, op. cit. According to another Chinese source, from October to December 1950, the buildup of the Soviet air force in China reached 13 divisions, 12 fighters and one bomber. See Wang Dinglei, Dangdai zhongguo kongjun (Modern C hinese Air Force) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1989), pp. 78-79.

38. See Wengao, pp. 539-41, 556.

39. Ibid.; Zhang Xi, op. cit.

40. See the Party Centre's directive of November 28, 1945, "Directive of the Strategy of Struggle Against the U.S. and Jiang." It is available in Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzhengshigi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian (Selected documents of t he Party Centre on the united front during the war of liberation), ed. by the United Front Department and the Central Archives of the CCP (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1988), p. 32.

41. In Wengao (p. 658), there is another telegram from Mao to Stalin on November 13, which was drafted by Zhou Enlai, and Mao did some revisions on it. This telegram suggests that Beijing was sending Stalin reports regardi ng the situation in Korea regularly. They sometimes were written by Mao himself, and sometimes were drafted by Zhou, approved by Mao. In both cases, Mao would be the one to sign these telegrams. Stalin's telegrams to Mao have not been made available, but they certainly exist in the CCP's archives. In Mao's telegram to Peng on December 29, Mao told Peng that Stalin (code-named "Comrade Phelibov") "considers the CPV leadership correct... and he ralized the C PV's difficulties and voluntarily offered 2,000 more trucks to solve your transportation problem," pp. 741-42.

42. Hao and Zhai, op. cit.; also see Zhang Xi.

43. See Mao's telegrams on December 13, 29, Wengao, pp. 722-23, 741-42.

44. For more information about the CCP's long-standing anti-Americanism in the pre-1950 period, please refer to my Ph. D. dissertation, "Maoist Dualism and the Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1935-1949" (York University, 1991).

45. According to Gurtov R Hwang, the CPV's initial attack on the UN forces was a "warning shot," intended "to check the enemy toward the Yalu River... and to force the Americans to reconsider their goal of total victory in Korea." (pp. 52-53.)

46. See Wengao, pp. 539-41.

47. Mao Zedong Junshi wenxuan, neibuban (Selection of Mao Zedong's Military Writing, classified version) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1981). pp. 649-92. There are 57 telegrams of Mao regarding the first and second campaigns from October to December, none of which suggests that Mao had ever intended to wait and see Washington's reaction. In contrast, he ordered the CPV to destroy the enemy, the more, the better. On December 4, he sent Peng a teleg ram which stated that "they [the U.N. forces] will possibly ask for a truce, but we insist that [they] must withdraw from Korea, or first of all to the south of the 38th parallel, and only then negotiation for a truce will be possible. The best way for us is to take not only Pyongyang, but also Seoul; mainly to destroy the enemy, first of all, to eliminate all the puppet [South Korean] troops. That is also a more forceful way to push U.S. imperialism to withdraw." See Qi De xue, "Guanyu kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng zhanlue mubiao de tantao" (A discussion on the strategic goal of the war of resistance to the U.S. and assistance to Korea), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu, 1989, no. 6, pp. 64-67.

48. See M. Schaller, "Consul General O. Edmund Clubb, John P. Davies, and the 'Inevitability' of Conflict between the United States and China," Diplomatic History (Spring 1985), pp. 149-60.

49. Junshi wenxuan, pp. 349-51. The phrase "zhinan ertui" reflected a deep-seated CCP conviction: like any other reactionaries, determined by their class nature, the U.S. imperialists would not give up their attempt to destroy the Chinese r evolution unless they were defeated. Therefore, an offensive approach to defeat them was the only effective way of defence. In the Communists' mind, this conviction had been proven by previous experience in dealing with the U.S.-backed Jiang regime, and Mao tried to prove it again in dealing with the Americans in Korea.

50. Ibid, pp. 352-53.