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Many historians and participants on both sides have tried to forget the untruths and atrocities of the Forgotten War. It is true that our libraries have several shelves of books on the war written by the "experts". Unfortunately, most of these bo oks contain more or less the same old half-truths gleaned from war-time press releases (censured and controlled by the military). The sources depict a different picture of the war.
The least known aspect of the war is the covert and espionage activities conducted by both sides - much of which is still classified especially on the N Korean side which ran a highly successful espionage and counter-espionage operations.
In sharp contrast to the conventional warfare, the partisan and spy warfare was conducted almost exclusively by North Korean nationalists, most of whom were young high school students - Student Volunteers Army. The US 8th Army and the CIA relied o n these youngsters - some as young as 13 - in their spy war against the Communists. The partisan and spy groups had such bizarre designations as Blue Boy, Big Boy, and Donkeys
The spy war, which involved as many as 23,000 Koreans at its peak, cost US over $100 million. The spy war was a dismal failure. Most of the student volunteers were nationalists - both anti-Rhee Syngman and anti-Kim Il Sung. Their main reason for riski ng their lives was an independent nationalistic N Korea. When the truce talks began in 1951, they realized that their dream of returning to a free N Korea was just a pipe dream and that they were misled by US (Gen. MacArthur said in December 1950 that h e would return to N Korea in one month!) The American GI's asked - why die for tie?, but the Korean nationalists asked - why die for no home?.
DARKMOON by Ed Evanhoe chronicles many of the activities of the N Korean nationalists.
Ed Evanhoe, a combat infantryman at the start of the Korean War, was transferred to Far East Command in mid-1951. Over the next fifteen years he conducted intelligence operations in various parts of the Far East, retiring from the U.S. Army in 1965.
Fluent in both Korean and Japanese, he has studied at the Presidio of Monterey, the U.S. Army's intelligence and language schools, and the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Currently, Evanhoe is the Far East editor for BEHIND THE LINES and lives in Antlers, Oklahoma.
July 2 Col. John McGee heads the FEC G-3 Miscellaneous Division. He is ordered to form guerrilla operations in Korea ASAP. McGee forms the 8th Army Ranger Company (8213th Company)
Sept. 1 Operation Trudy Jackson: Lt. Clark, Royal Marines and South Korean National Police land on Yonghung-do and Taemu-do. Two weeks earlier, a ROKA unit cleared the islands for Clark's arrival. Sept. 8 Clark, Royal Marines and local irregulars ( mostly high school kids) retake Taemu-do on the north side of Flying Fish (Inchon Approach) Channel.
Sept. 15 Miryang Guerrilla Battalion (comprised of North Korean nationalists) lands at Changsa-dong on South Korea's east coast. The mission is to: (a) Interdict supplies to North Korean troops in fighting in P'ohang area and (b) Diversion for Inch'on landing by US X Corps. The landing is a failure and the guerrilla battalion is withdrawn on Sept. 17 under fire by ships from Task Force 77.
Sept. 24 Clark (Promoted to Lt. Comdr.) returns to Korea with orders to liberate major islands south of Thirty-eighth parallel. His guerrillas augmented ROKM battalion and ROKN LST. Oct. 2 Clark's mission expanded to include `liberating' Yellow Sea islands north of 38th parallel.
Dec. 8 Two Korean agents air-dropped near Hwanju, 25 miles south of Pyongyang.
Jan. 15 Col. McGee forms the Attrition (Partisan) Section under Miscellaneous Division, Eighth Army G-3. Its main mission is to direct N Korean partisans.
Feb. 15 Maj. William Burke is assigned to command Task Force William Able (later renamed Leopard Base) based Paengnyong-do with a mission to direct partisan operations in North Korea's western provinces.
Feb. 15 Col. McGee creates Baker Section at Kijang near Pusan to airborne-train partisans for behind-the-lines operations in North Korea. Recruiting for the first behind-the-lines operation begins at the US 4th Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne.)
Feb. 22 One agent air-dropped near Yonan and another near Chinnampo.
March 1 Task Force William Able is instructed to initiate partisan operations as soon as possible to support 8th Army's Operation Killer. The Able Base partisans are organized into Donkey xx units. Donkey-1 is led by Chang Ja e Hwa, a merchant from Choryon; Donkey-4 led by Chang Sok Lin, a S Korean intelligence agent, later assassinated and replaced by Pak Chull; Donkey-11 led by Lee Jung Hok, a teacher from Onjin area; Donkey-13, led by Kim Chang Song, a fruit farmer from S inchon; Donkey-15, led by Kim Ung Soo, a banker from Sinuiju.
March 15 Virginia One, three Americans, one Briton, and 20 Korean agents, is launched near Hyong-ni near Wonsan on an interdiction mission. Only five members survive.
March 31 Three Virginia One Rangers ex-filtrate by Naval helicopter from a hot Landing Zone. All others are killed or captured.
April 25 The 8th Army G-3 (Miscellaneous) assumes control of the east coast partisans formerly under ROKA control. Task Force Kirkland is formed at Pohang-dong and prepares for a move to Samchok on April 30.
May 5 The 8th Army G-3 Miscellaneous Division (Attrition Section) becomes an authorized TD unit, G-3 Miscellaneous Group, 8086th Army Unit. It takes over the partisan operation on Han River Estuary islands from US First Corps.
May 15 Task Force Kirkland Rear is established as support headquarters at Chumunjin, a small port city seven miles south of the 38th Parallel. Advance elements of Task Force Kirkland Forward depart for Nam-do, an island on the 39th Parallel, 10 m iles off North Korea's coast.
May 19 Kirkland Forward main body arrives on Nam-do, an island near N Korean port of Wonsan.
May 23 Major Burke, Leopard CO, sends Captain Robert Channon to Han River islands to settle a "civil" war between ROK Army led irregulars and N Korean nationalists.
June 3 Kirkland launches its first raid on Kojo on the North Korean mainland. This is to "bloody" Kirkland partisans, gather intelligence material and make the enemy use troops needed at the front to guard its coast. The mission completed next day.
June 18 A 5-men (1 Briton, 2 Americans and 2 Koreans) advance party for Operation Spitfire parachutes into North Korea. The main mission is to set up a partisan base in the Kumgang Mountain area.
June 26 Spitfire augmentation team of 9 Koreans, 1 American and 1 Briton is dropped.
July 5 Aircraft making re-supply drop to Spitfire cannot find Drop Zone and loiters until dawn and then makes drop directly over the hideout, thus exposing the Spitfire location to the enemy.
July 6 Spitfire Advance scouts run into enemy ambush at dawn. Sgt. Miles and Lt. Ho fight delaying actions to allow others to escape. Only 8 of the 16 members escape. The mission fails. No Baker mission for seven months after Spitfire disaster .
July 10 Truce talks start - "Die for tie" campaigns demoralize partisans. Col. McGee is replaced by Col. Jay Vanderpool of the CIA.
July 17 Donkey (tang-na-gui) 8 partisans launch a raid on the N Korean mainland. Boats stranded by outgoing tide. Naval gunfire and air support save partisans but casualties heavy.
Aug. 1 Aviary Section, Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK), 8240th AU, established at K-16 (Seoul City Airport.). Its official designation: Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, 8240th Army Unit [FEC/LD(K)].
Sept. 1 Plans for Mustang II (POW rescue mission including General Dean) approved by Far East Command Headquarters. This is an updated version of Mustang I that was shelved in July.
Sept. 6 Yuk-do and Yongui-do attacked by North Korean troops. Yuk-do successfully defended but Yongui-do falls. Captain David Maus is killed on Yongui-do.
Sept. 17 A B-26 carrying Baker Section officers on recon of Mustang II mission site (Ha-ri, NK) shot down. Accompanying B-26 reports two parachutes opening at very low level. Mustang II on Sept. 21 canceled due to possible compromise.
Oct. 8 Donkey 15 captures sister islands of Tan-do and Tyan-do near the mouth of the Yalu River. Requests permission to capture Sunmi-do with UN naval support.
Oct. 10 Permission for Sunmi-do invasion approved. Planning begins. Dept of Army issues Field Manual 31-21, "Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare".
Oct. 14 Donkey 15, supported by HMS Cossack, lands on Sunmi-do but island has been recently reinforced. Landing fails with heavy Donkey 15 casualties.
Nov.. 6 Chinese troops attack Donkey 13 on Tan-do. Tan-do falls. Survivors retreat to Tyan-do. On Nov.. 8, Chinese troops take Tyan-do.
Nov.. 11 CCRAK deploys its first Tactical Liaison Office (TLO) team to US infantry divisions. Mission - dispatching and retrieving agents through front line positions. Later TLOs will conduct long range patrols behind enemy lines.
Nov.. 15 Chinese troops take Ae-do. On Nov.. 24, Chinese troops take Sohwa-do
Nov.. 30 Chinese troops land on Taehwa-do. Vicious fighting between Donkey 15, supported with naval gunfire from HMS Cossack, fails to stop landing.
Dec. 1 Taehwa-do, last partisan base along northwestern North Korean coast, falls. Three British (one SAS and 2 naval gunfire officers) and one US officer captured. One US officer flees in get-away boat leaving others.
Dec. 10 Eighth Army G3 Miscellaneous Group is re-assigned to Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea, 8240th Army Unit (Intelligence). New Designation, United Nations Partisan Forces, Korea, 8240th Army Unit Combined Command Reconnaissance Activit ies, Korea, 8240th AU, assumes responsibility for all behind-the-lines activities (intelligence and special operations) in Korea. Both UNPFK and CCRAK under FEC/LD(K), 8240th AU, forward HQ for Far East Command Liaison Group, 8240th AU, Tokyo.
Jan. 10 Donkey-4 commander Chang Sok Lin is assassinated by his own men for being corrupt and dictatorial. Pak Choll takes over the command.
Jan. 22 Baker Section launches Mustang III, a 19-member Korean partisan operation. Mustang III is intended to contact an existing Donkey 15 partisan group operating in far northwest North Korea. It is to provide Donkey 15 with radio contact with Le opard and to train the Donkeys in sabotage methods. The second phase includes contacting prisoners in non-Korean PW camps and establishing E&E routes from these camps. Jump successful but radio contact fails a few days after insertion.
Jan. 30 Big Boy informs Kirkland Forward on Nam-do that it has rescued a shot-down US Navy pilot and requests helicopter evacuation.
Feb. 5 Attempt made but Navy helicopter hit by groundfire and returns to its ship where it crashes on landing. Kirkland CO slightly injured in crash. On the second attempt on Feb. 7, aircraft reaches EZ but runs into ambush on landing. Crashes on takeoff. Chopper Pilot, downed pilot and Kirkland XO are captured.
Feb. 19 CCRAK-Aviary mission is downed 12 kilometers west of Wonsan when an agent flips a primed grenade back into C-46 as he jumps. Plane crashes but most crew able to jump. Pilot and one CCRAK EM KIA. One AF noncom DOW shortly after jump. One Av iary noncom captured and one noncom MIA. Information indicates possibility this MIA noncom taken to Russia.
March 1 Kirkland again marginally operational. Chief role infiltration of teams to establish inland partisan groups. Secondary role spotting targets for naval gunfire and small coast road interdiction raids. Leopard and Wolfpack increasing acti vity with improving weather.
March 16 Mustang IV, a 16-men Korean team, is dropped in the vicinity of Sinuiju. Contact is lost after six days.
April 22 Vanderpool issues Partisan Operations Outline.
May 1 Two US officers and 40 Donkey 15 partisans begin junk-borne reconnaissance of northwestern islands. Simultaneously US-led full scale raiding resumes along coastline in Leopard and Wolfpack areas of operation.
May 14 Mustang V and VI launched but in different locations. Mission sabotage and establishing escape and evasion (EE) routes from PW camps. No contact established with either party after drop.
May 21 Donkey 15 returns in force to Taehwa-do and Sohwa-do. Improved communications allow direct contact with both Navy and Air Force.
June 1 Wolfpack 8 noncom leads inland recon. Finds several previously unknown enemy concentrations. Calls in and directs airstrikes with good results. Make successful withdrawal night of June 4.
June 9 Kirkland mounts raid on railroad tunnels north of Kojo. (Same tunnels attacked by ROK Marines prior to Virginia One.)
June 19 Leopard launches American-led reconnaissance-in-force in area across channel from Ch'o-do. Finds few enemy in this area.
June 25 Kirkland lands Daniel Boone on east coast. Unit infiltrates to interior and establishes a partisan base in Diamond Mountain area south of Wonsan.
July 13 Donkey-4 mounts a raid on a NKPA coastal gun emplacement. A complete success at loss of 6 killed and 7 wounded - chronicled in White Tigers.
July 15 Tropical storm hits west coast. Several Leopard and Wolfpack boats swamped. Operations halted for cleanup.
Aug. 3 Second typhoon hits west coast. More boats damaged. Lack of transportation plus cleanup slows Leopard and Wolfpack operations.
Aug. 11 Kirkland makes raid against AA positions south of Wonsan.
Aug. 22 Leopard's Donkey 2 makes raid near Chinnampo.
Sept. 27 Orders received to expand UNPFK to 20,000 partisans by 15 March 1953. Task Force Scannon formed on east coast. Kirkland becomes Kirkland Regiment.
Sept. 28 Wolfpacks makes reconnaissance-in-force landing. Party consists of four Americans and 475 partisans. Some objectives obtained but sheer size precludes quick movement. On Sept. 30, reconnaissance party withdraws under fire. Heavy casualties.
Oct. 5 CCRAK redesignated 8242nd AU and assumes operational control of Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Korea. This includes the partisans.
Oct. 31 Mustang VII (5 men) and VIII (6 men) dropped in vicinity of POW camps in far northern North Korea. Initial success but again radio contact lost after a few days.
Nov.. 11 Partisan forces are redesignated as United Nations Partisan Infantry, Korea, 8240th AU [UNPIK]. Leopard, Wolfpack and Task Force Scannon are redesignated as Partisan Infantry Regiments (PIR). Baker Section is redesignated as 1st Partisan Air borne Infantry Regiment (1st PAIR).
Nov.. 31 Nov. is the best month ever for partisan operations. 408 separate actions conducted. 6,785 enemy casualties claimed.
Dec. 10 3rd PIR (formerly Task Force Scannon) is assigned to a larger operational area. Three battalions, Storm, Avonlee and Torchlight join the Kirkland Regiment (battalion) as part of the 3rd PIR.
Dec. 15 3rd PIR reports numerous desertions and other morale problems after a buildup from 275 men in Aug. to a strength of 1,589 as of Dec. 15th. Most new UNPIK men are South Koreans and have enlisted in UNPIK to escape Korean Army service.
Dec. 20 Jesse James I (10 men) is dropped near Kaesung. Team captured upon landing.
Dec. 28 Jesse James II and III, 10 men each, are dropped north of Kaesung. No radio contact.
Feb. 7 CIA launches Boxer I and II, 12 men each, on east coast (NE of Hungnam.) to run raids along the coast in conjunction with naval missions. No radio contact and no survivor.
Feb. 9 Boxer III (12 men) dropped. No contact. On Feb. 11, Boxer IV (12 men) dropped. No contact.
Feb. 21 Internecine war with ROK authorities are getting critical. All partisan commands are ordered to avoid friction with ROK military and civilian authorities. Friction is due to expansion plans and ROK fears of partisan forces turning on Rhee Syn gman.
April 1 5th PIR created from western area of 2nd PIR (Wolfpack) and becomes operational. Rabbit I (sleeper mission) dropped.
April 5 New commanders assigned to CCRAK, Liaison Detachment and UNPIK as chair-warmers move in to qualify for CIB and other combat awards.
April 6 6th PIR created from north area of 1st PIR (Leopard) becomes operational. Rabbit II dropped.
April 16 Orders issued to cease recruiting and to cut partisan strength to 20,000 men by 15 July 1953.
April 20 Two Americans and 20 partisans (Seadragon) make a junk survey of Yalu River Estuary Islands.
April 22 Green Dragon reports rescuing five US pilots. US officers establish voice contacts with the pilots and drops a 27-men augmentation team for Green Dragon to aid in the rescue. A special equipment to snatch the pilots from a low flying airc raft is dropped.
May 17 2nd PIR (Wolfpack East) lands 410-man partisan force. Three Americans lead. On May 19, additional 30 agents dropped for Green Dragon for the 5 pilots waiting to be rescued. The rescue plane is ambushed and Green Dragon is officially wri tten off as an enemy operation.
May 22 Partisan strength now stands at 22,000 men.
June 12 All partisans and Americans withdrawn from islands north of the cease-fire line with exception of stay-behinds and small reconnaissance patrols to keep tabs on enemy movements. Operations continue from islands south of the cease-fi re lines and north of Sokcho-ri.
July 27 Armistice signed. All partisan operations but stay-behind and espionage missions cease.
Sept. 1 Disbanding of N Korean partisan units starts in earnest.
Line crossing was relatively safe in 1951 when the front-lines were fluid and tens of thousands refugees moved in both directions. Both armies were tolerant of the refugees and line-crossers mingled easily with the refugees.
Once the front-lines stabilized, the refugee flow halted. Line-crossers had to stand on their own. Most line-crossers were young teens with a few old men and young women with babies. Both armies were reluctant to shoot children, old men or women with cr ying babies. However, line crossing became too dangerous and ineffective in 1953 when both armies were dug in along static front lines and civilians on both sides were evacuated to the rear.
The 8th Army reverted to the use of TLO (Tactical Liaison Officers) in charge of specially trained agents dressed in NKPA uniforms. A typical TL team had one officer, 2 GI's and 25 Koreans. Each US Infantry Division had a TL team attached.
Line crossers were mostly N Koreans and they were not liked by ROKA who viewed all o Koreans working for the Americans as draft dodgers. Line crossers were often shot by ROKA intentionally.
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