The Iran-led Islamic bloc is a major component of the Axis and is the main vehicle for the further spread of the alliance's influence into Africa. This new Trans-Asian Axis derives its might from the rapid collapse and ensuing radicalisation of much of the Third World. It is significant that the Axis has a growing dependence in international terrorism and subversion as instruments of statecraft.
The Trans-Asian Axis stretches from North Korea (DPRK) and the PRC in the east and north-east, down into South-East Asia, including Myanmar and-potentially-the oil rich Spratly Islands. Its main westward arm -- the Islamic bloc along the Silk Road-aims at integrating the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, and then continues into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (including Syrian occupied Lebanon).
There is a growing Islamist influence in Turkey which could come under the Axis sway in the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Islamic bloc which Iran intends to onsolidate under its influence expands westwards into Africa: from the post-civil war Yemen, to Sudan (already a major hub of militant Islamism) and Somalia, as well as toward the Atlantic Ocean across North Africa.
This has been demonstrated in the rapidly escalating Islamist subversion of Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, all of which face severe destabilisation from the covert violence being conducted against them. This geostrategic surge is the outcome of several years of careful studies and deliberations in Beijing, Tehran, and, to some extent, Islamabad.
Since mid-1991, the PRC High Command has anticipated an overall worsening situation in the post-Cold War world. A strategic study published in December 1991 concluded that events and emerging trends in many world regions already point to "the marked escalation of regional turmoil and conflicts".
The PRC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) anticipates "the basic military situation of 'frequent small engagements but no major wars' will continue. However, the absence of major wars does not at all mean peace under heaven. Contrarily, the world will be even more turbulent and less peaceful."
In January 1992, the High Command elaborated that Beijing was convinced that "wars and armed conflicts ˘would| continue to 'run amok' in some countries and regions, with strong discord remaining in the 'post-cold war' world." Beijing concluded that the optimal way to cope with the challenge was an all-out surge to evict the US and Western influence from the region coveted by the PRC and its allies.
By now, Tehran and its allies were convinced that a major confrontation with the US was inevitable and imminent. In March 1991, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, although apprehensive about growing challenges, the Islamists were determined to capitalise on the upheaval and rage to further their cause.
Tehran and its allies were convinced that the time was uniquely ripe for the implementation of Iran's grand strategy. Sheikh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah explained that the Near East was providing incomparable circumstances and conditions for the resurrection of the Islamic Revolution on a global scale:
"The Middle East is the base of the Islamic fundamentalist movement, which has expanded to reach various regional and world locations at interlinked levels of security, politics, and culture. The Middle East is a strategic region . . . Only the Middle East could unsettle the world's political centres and affect them adversely."
Tehran's Institute of Strategic Studies under Hojjat-ol-Islam Mussavi-Khoi-niha was ordered to study Iran's future strategic posture and needs, as well as formulate Iran's long-term grand strategy. The results, as presented in a major conference in May 1991, still constitute the foundations of the Iranian grand strategy.
In the conclusion of the conference, Mussavi-Khoiniha emphasised that the US threat would increase since Iran was emerging as "the only centre of national liberation movements in the world" committed to the cause of anti-US struggle.
Iran, he said, should adopt a twin track strategy based on the interrelationship between regional hegemony made possible by undisputed Iranian military superiority and the leadership of the Third World's revolutionary (terrorist) struggle. In October 1991, in a subsequent international conference devoted to formulating a longterm strategy to confront the rise of Pax Americana,
Iran's Ahmad Khomeini emphasised the fatefulness and uncompromising character of the inevitable struggle with the US: "We should realise that the world is hostile toward us only for ˘our commitment to| Islam. After the fall of Marxism, Islam replaced it, and as long as Islam exists, US hostility exists, and as long as US hostility exists, the struggle exists." These principles determine the current strategy of Iran.
It was in the context of this world view, that Tehran and its allies moved to significantly intensify their cooperation with the PRC. The Chinese strategic cooperation with both Iran and Pakistan intensified in the wake of the visit by PRC President Yang Shangkun in the Fall of 1991. In this visit, Beijing introduced this new grand strategy to its most important allies and won its commitment to close cooperation.
In Islamabad, Yang discussed the expansion of defence cooperation with both Pakistan and Iran. Yang finalised the details of an "essential agreement on the signing of a joint pact" with both Pakistan and Iran aimed at countering the nuclear threats from the US and India.
Pakistani and Iranian officials stressed at the time that the tripartite agreement would remain clandestine: "These three nations will not sign a treaty officially, but in the event of foreign aggression against the one of these nations, the other two will treat the aggression as aggression against itself and will rise to its defence."
In Tehran, Yang dwelled on the expansion of Sino-Iranian relations in the context of the new strategic realities. Tehran explained that the legacy of the Gulf War "would certainly take the two countries' relations to a new height". A key to the new strategy is an alliance between the PRC, Pakistan and Iran:
"The expansion of the three countries' cooperation and relations, while enabling those countries to reduce impressively the existing political and economic obstacles on the way of their political, economic, progress, would undoubtedly also establish a new system for the maintenance of regional security without the presence of the world powers, particularly the United States, in the form of defence and military cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, and China."
Soon afterwards, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Command (IRGC:Pasdaran) Maj.-Gen. Mohsin Reza'i elaborated on the "strategic relationship" and objectives of the PRC-led alliance as a core for a wider Islamic bloc. He explained that "if there is unity among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, this will strengthen Muslim soliarity and enable the peoples of Soviet Central Asia and Kashmir to join in.
China would also welcome such a development, but I am not sure about the Indian view, although there are a lot of people in India (ie: 150-million Muslims) who share a similar heritage with us." He urged a major mobilization of all the bloc's members in order to acquire the required military capabilities to face the US's "dangerous designs in the region, as America sees Islamic fundamentalism as a threat now after the collapse of communism."
Reza'i was optimistic about the long term prospects of the Islamic bloc because, even though "unlike communism, Islamic fundamentalism has no such military might, America is still scared of it".
By mid-1992, there was a clear globalisation of the strategic thinking of the leaders of the Islamic bloc. Tehran and its allies are genuinely convinced that they are already in the midst of a global confrontation with the US in which no compromise is possible. Reflecting Iran's perceptions, Syria argued in June 1992 that "World War III began with the Malta summit and has not yet ended. Civil, ethnic, and border wars are the bullets" of the war for US global hegemony.
Therefore, "it is not in the US interest for the wars raging in several parts of the world ˘to| come to end because US control requires continuing tension". Thus, there is no escape from participation in the world war against the US.
"In order not to lose the right and the future we have to give priority to our pan-Arab issues, prove to the world that we are a nation whose stage of division is over, and that we will not be the victim of the new world and the division caused by the Third World War which began with the Malta summit, and whose chapters have not ended yet," Damascus concluded.
The spread and consolidation of the Beijing-led Trans-Asian Axis and, within it, the Tehran-led Islamic bloc is the Third World's main response to the World War III challenge.
By early 1993, Tehran concluded that "an Iran-US clash" was likely because "Islam ˘is| at its most sensitive and that heightens our responsibilities more than ever". The West was bent on containing the spread of the Islamism, knowing that Iran was the bastion of the worldwide spread of the Islamic Revolution.
Therefore, Tehran realised, Washington had no alternative but to confront Iran and Islam in order to solve its own regional problems. "No matter how we look at it, the solution would be linked with the defeat of Iran as an important and potential regional and world power. . . . Iran is a repository of a very deep form of Islamism, which makes it an indicator of the future world order." Therefore, Tehran concluded, it was imperative that "the wave of Islamism is boosted abroad as one of the main pillars of our national security".
Indeed, in an address to the IRGC, Ayatollah Khamene'i stressed that "Islam has proposed jihad against infidels and hypocrites as a solution and a defence against internal and external calamity."
Meanwhile, the PRC High Command was studying the military aspects of the implementation of the strategic surge. The conclusions were presented in a June 1993 textbook of the PLA High Command called "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?".
The PLA considers the US as the PRC's principal strategic adversary. Beijing concluded that "the conflict of strategic interests between China and the United States .. . is now surfacing steadily" to the point that Washington "absolutely cannot tolerate the rise of powerful adversary in East Asia". With the PRC determined to become the region's power, "the military antagonism between China and the United States" could reach the point of armed confrontation.
Seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with the US, the PRC High Command identifies in "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", eight scenarios in which Beijing goes to war against the US in the near future to defend its vital interests. The optimal points of military clash with the US are at the extreme fringes of the Trans Asian Axis -- Korea in the east and the Middle East in the west --where Beijing's close allies (North Korea and Iran-Syria respectively) are willing to take on the US and its regional close allies on their own.
Moreover, according to "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?", the PLA considers India "the greatest potential threat" to the PRC, because the implementation of the PRC's Trans-Asian Axis strategy endangers India's vital interests and thus might very well lead to a military clash. The PLA stresses that they "see India as a potential adversary mainly because India's strategic focus remains on the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia".
Therefore, it is imperative for Beijing to divert India's stretegic attention away from the Chinese strategic surge from the east, both on land and in the ocean. This strategic diversion is the role of Islamabad. Pakistan is thus instigating a major defence challenge to India from the west, ranging from subversion to a major military build-up. The aggregate effect of the Pakistani strategy should be a growing tension along the Indo-Pak border that would compel New Delhi to neglect blocking the PRC's surge until it is too late to reverse the new geo-strategic realities in Asia.
Iran shares Beijing's apprehension of an impending confrontation with the US, primarily a localized military clash. In late September 1993, Reza'i defined a new strategic posture in which Iran found itself. He pointed out that the most credible threat to Iran is a US limited strike against key installations to reverse Iran's strategic posture in the region, as well as the Muslim world, without engaging Iran in a full war.
"It is possible that the West may contemplate a partial military action against us in the long term." Reza'i warned Washington that "if it enters this military vortex, it will sustain irredeemable losses". Thus, as far as Tehran is concerned, even a retaliatory strike will inevitably escalate into a major war. Moreover, Reza'i warned, the routine US forces in the Near East "can be used for military purposese against Iran within moments".
Meanwhile, Islamabad has become a critical linchpin of the Axis: the physical link between the PRC and Iran. Pakistan's role has become more active since the return to power of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Prime Minister Bhutto's Islamabad considers the opening of the road to Central Asia by using Pakistan as the region's gateway to the Indian Ocean to be the key to the growth of Pakistan's commercial activities.
Pakistani officials stressed in the late December 1993 that "the role of China in the construction of the Silk Route has made the bilateral relations as strong as the Karakoram Highway".
By early 1994, Pakistan had in part already assumed a discreetly anti-US position. Islamabad's decision to intensify its involvement in the expansion and strengthening of both the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider Trans-Asian Axis alliance with the PRC and the DPRK took place immediately after Prime Minister Bhutto took office. It was during Prime Minister Bhutto's visits to Tehran, Beijing and Pyongyang in late 1993, that the emerging strategic posture of Pakistan was formulated.
Starting in early January 1994, Islamabad intensified its participation in the joint anti-US radical front, both as an active member of the Iran-led Islamic bloc, and as a leading member of the PRC-led wider Trans-Asian Axis. This surge of activism was the consequence of a major study of US policy conducted by the ISI -- Inter-Services Intelligence, the principal Pakistani intelligence organisation -- and Pakistan's leading think tanks. Completed in late December 1993, the ISI's assessment, reportedly, was that a confrontation with Washington was inevitable.
An ISI report stated that the US had already begun the close monitoring and targeting of nuclear-related facilities in Pakistan, Iran, and other Muslim countries as a central part of "Washington's new anti-Islamic policy and strategy". That US policy replaced communism with Islam, and not without good reason, the ISI concluded.
Consequently, by early January 1994, Islamabad had already defined a coherent world view in which Pakistan was an intended victim of a US-led effort aimed at restraining and constraining its ability to develop indigenous strategic capabilities --primarily nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles -- so that they always remain at the mercy of the Western superpowers. The only way to reverse this trend was through a joint effort of all potential victims.
"In this context the meetings of the leaders of Pakistan, China, and the DPRK have been particularly significant in that they have been resisting attempted subjugation from armed plutocratic powers. At this critical juncture Kim Il-Song's advice aimed at South-South cooperation is significant," explained senior Pakistani officials.
Indeed, already in early January 1994, Islamabad began capitalising on the newly reaffirmed alliances in order to further its own policies. Islamabad started urging an activist policy against India by the Islamic bloc as an integral part of the radicals' steadfast resolve against the West.
Meanwhile, Tehran was closely studying its future role and posture in the rapidly consolidated Trans-Asian Axis. As of the February 1994, Tehran began presenting itself as the centre of a global strategic axis with China. Tehran explained: "China considers Iran as a very important country in West Asia, especially in the Persian Gulf, which as a strategic role in maintaining peace and stability in the region."
The growing cooperation between Iran and Pakistan, especially in the aftermath of Prime Minister Bhutto's visit to Tehran, was stressed in the context of the Trans-Asian Axis.
Tehran and its closest allies were now so apprehensive about an impending major war with the US, that Beijing had to address their concerns.
In late January 1994, official Beijing suddenly reported that Tehran "ruled out" the possibility of a US attack on Iran "before 1996". According to Iranian senior officials, "this action will not take place because the United States knows us better than other countries". Tehran believes it is aware of a US and Israeli design to strike Iran before 1996. "Our Government, our Army, and our people are ready for any kind of actions," the Iranian official stated.
This Chinese report was essentially Beijing's endorsement of an Iranian warning of an impending crisis, to be blamed on the US and Israel, rather than Tehran's apprehension of an attack on Iran. Such a clash would serve Beijing's strategic interests for it would remove the US presence from a key flank of the Trans-Asian Axis.
Iran began to actively urge for a Beijing-Tehran axis aimed at confronting the US and reducing its influence in the region. Toward this end, Tehran began floating in early March 1994 the idea of an all-Asian anti-US alliance centred on Iran, Pakistan, India and the PRC. The declared objective of this alliance was to counter "US hegemony over the world". The offer was a trap for India: an instrument of providing the proof that the essence of New Delhi's approach to relations with the West, mainly the US, was taking side against the Third World.
Ultimately, the Iranian strategic plan is a further development and refinement of a strategic vision first raised by Iranian Surpeme Religious Leader Ayatollah Khamene'i and President Hashemi-Rafsanjani during Prime Minister Bhutto's recent visit to Tehran.
The Pakistani reaction to the Iranian offer was enthusiastic. Islamabad pointed out that the objective of the alliance proposed by Iran was "to eradicate the external influence from the region. This countries have resources which, if they were pooled, would enable them to check the interference of the great powers."
However, predictably, Pakistan was apprehensive about the proposed inclusion of India the alliance. Islamabad went into great length to point out the long standing conflicts between India and China, India and Pakistan, and the oppression of Muslims in Kashmir, reminding Tehran that the origin of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's family was in Kashmir.
Therefore, Islamabad concluded, India could not constitute a component of such an alliance, while Pakistan had already proven itself as a devoted and dedicated member. This is exactly what Tehran had in mind originally. By waving the Indian flag, Tehran got Islamabad to fully and wholly commit itself to participation in the Iran-led Islamic bloc and the wider anti-US Trans-Asian Axis.
Indeed, Pakistan suggested a new Trans-Asian alliance comprised of an Islamic bloc and an East Asian bloc. Islamabad stressed that "if here can be a new alliance or bloc, then it should include Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, the Islamic countries of Central Asia, and Turkey. That will be a natural alliance... The Muslim countries, having common religious, historical, cultural and economic values and interests, should join a single platform and form a regional bloc.
If China can be included in the present alliance, then there is no reason why US hegemony in the world could not be resisted." In this context, Pakistan should be he linking party between the PRC and the Muslim World in view of the unique and special relationship between Islamabad and Beijing.
"The history of cooperation and friendship between Pakistan and China is enviable. The PRC has now offered to cooperate liberally with Pakistan to meet its weaponry needs. Pakistani tanks and missiles are also being manufactured in China. China did not even care for the US pressure in this regard. No-one will object to China's inclusion in the alliance of Muslim countries as China has not been seen to carry out aggression against any neighbouring country, nor has it claimed the territory of its neighbours."
Tehran differs only in that its sees the development of this alliance with Iran assuming the leading coordinating role vis-a-vis the PRC, although with Pakistan playing an important role as well. Tehran explains that "the PRC sees it in the perspective if Iran and Pakistan, but Iran is more important".
The key to the unique position of Iran in this alliance is the strategic maturity of Tehran. "Tehran's vantage point is totally different from that of Beijing and is extremely strategic. In view of the international military structure, the perception that the PRC is a durable regional and international politico-economic force is gaining ground among Iranian leaders."
The Iranian leadership is committed to the long-range strategic alliance and special relations with the PRC because "Beijing is a relatively independent force on the international political and economic scene and its model of national expansion has drawn the attention of many Third World countries".
Moreover, Tehran also sees the PRC as the key to future weapons technologies. "The Chinese have made immense advances in manufacturing of defensive weapons; and the not so complex technology of Chinese weapons (of course as compared to Western weapons) is capable of being absorbed into Iran's defence system." However, Iran also recognises that much of the transfer of the Chinese military production technologies, primarily in such sensitive areas as nuclear weapons, would be conducted via Pakistan, the long-term special ally of the PRC.
Thus, Tehran concluded in the early Spring of 1994, the consolidation of an even stronger Trans-Asian Axis is the key to any strategic development capable of restraining the West, especially the US, and stabilising Iran's own place as the leader of the Muslim World. The key to the profound reinforcement of the Axis must be the inclusion of the newly independent Muslim states of Central Asia: the natural corridor between China and Persia along the historical Silk Road.
Beijing shares Tehran's vision fully. Just how crucial the new Silk Road is to the PRC and its allies, primarily Iran and Pakistan, was recently clarified. In mid-April 1994, Premier Li Peng led the largest and most important Chinese delegation to have visited Central Asia on a 12 day tour in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirgistan, and Kazakhstan.
The primary objective of this trip was to revive China's traditional political economic hegemony in the region: the historical posture of China before the Russians started the slide into Muslim Central Asia in the 18th Century. "Now we want to build a new Silk Road to make our relations even more glorious," Li Peng said following a meeting with Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov.
A major development in the formulation of the Trans-Asian Axis took place on August 29-31, 1994. Iranian First Vice-President Hassan Habibi led a delegation of 26 senior officials, including the entire elite of Iran's economic and industrial establishment, on a major visit to Beijing. Both Tehran and Beijing stressed that the visit was "at the official invitation of the Chinese Premier".
Li Peng is perhaps the leading force behind the expansion of the Trans-Asian Axis as a cornerstone of the PRC's global strategy. Beijing quoted Habibi's expectations that his "visit to China will produce great impact upon further development of the ties between the two countries". In their statements at the beginning of the Sino-Iranian negotiations, both Li Peng and Habibi stressed historical themes. Li Peng stated that "Iran is a country with an ancient history and civilization which enjoys a special role in the region and across Asia." In his response, Habibi took the theme a step further: "For us, friendship with the people of China and cooperation with its Government is a fundamental strategic issue. We believe that, under present international conditions, Asia's civilised countries which enjoy a long history should increasingly cooperate with one another."
While Habibi was still in Beijing, Tehran presented Habibi's vision of the future of Asia, specifically stating that these subjects were being clarified with Beijing at the moment: "The distinctive nature of the contemporary world, which is in a transitional period, demands that the power in the Asian region should forge closer constructive ties -- in short, strategic cooperation to guarantee their survival in the world of the 21st Century in all political, economic, and cultural fields. The experience of the Persian Gulf War clearly proved that, in view of US military power, giving all kinds of green lights to Washington or ignoring international developments results not only in attacks on one country or another, but can also prove catastrophic for the very existence of the Third World."
"With the forging of new political alliances on the international level and the changes in international balances, strategic unions are vital and mandatory for all Asian countries that do not want to be in the orbits of US, European, or even Japanese pole, or be relegated to being marginal 'appendages'."
"In fact, the era the United States envisions, where it will be the only power centre in the world, has not yet taken shape. Close and consistent cooperation among the bigger independent countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the PRC, Kazakhstan, and even Pakistan can be viewed in this context. High technology, unique manpower, limitless energy resources, and the enviable economic growth of these countries can all be molded into a firm and reliable 'fourth pole' in Asia with the advent of the 21st Century. Time is passing by swiftly; this opportunity should not be lost."
Ultimately, the PRC remains the key to the long-term viability and success of the Trans-Asian Axis. The significance in the surge for, and the establishment of, the Trans-Asian Axis lies in that it is the main strategic policy of the younger generation of Chinese leaders. These leaders -- both civilians and military -- come from the next generation of leaders who will soon climb to supreme power in the post-Deng Xiaoping era.
The leaders of the post-Deng generation are a sharp deviation from their elders. The very smooth and direct handover of power from one generation of leaders to the other should not mislead as to the extent of the profound difference between these two generations. Whereas the elder leaders were preoccuppied with the survival of the Chinese Revolution in a hostile world surrounding it, the younger leaders grew up in a communist China, and now come to power assertive and self- confident about a very strong China. They are preoccuppied with finding for their China the appropriate place at the top of world affairs.
These younger Chinese leaders have a vision of a strong China reasserting itself as a world leader and a first-rank superpower. Their vision of the PRC is a combination of the 5,000-year legacy of China and a perceived role for Beijing as the natural leader for the up-and-coming Developing World. Beijing's rising leaders are fully cognisant that the pursuit of such national policy will place Beijing on a collision course with the West, particularly the US.
The escalation of such a confrontation might even result in the removal of Western technology and economic investments from the PRC, as well as the closing down of China's export markets. They are convinced that the rise of China into global prominence is worthy of such a price.
Moreover, the long-term forecasting in Beijing anticipates the marked decline of the importance of economic relations with the West to the PRC's economic and technological development. Beijing is convinced that the flow of technology and investments from Japan, the ROC (Taiwan), South Korea, and the rest of the East Asian states now recognising China's hegemony, will more than suffice to replace whatever the West will have taken away. With the entire scope of economic activities of the Far East "dragons" conducted under the clear regional hegemony of the PRC, Beijing will be in a position to dictate comfortable and preferable conditions for the regional economic cooperation.
These younger leaders are far more open to economic "liberalism" (permission to get rich), including limited free market economy, than their predecessors. The conducive conditions for economic development and cooperation they intend to establish are bound to attract foreign investments regardless of the PRC's strategic posture and hegemonic designs.
Beijing is also encouraged by the gradual revival of Tokyo's quest for sphere of influence -- this time based almost solely on economic might and dominance --because it is inherently anti-American simply because the US is Tokyo's main competition. In building this economic sphere of influence, Tokyo builds much of its strength on stressing common East Asian identity. Beijing is convinced that it will be able to convince, perhaps coerce, Tokyo into placing its economic sphere of influence within the framework of the Chinese strategic hegemonic umbrella.
Tokyo's muted criticism of the PRC's military, primarily naval, build-up, as well as Beijing's heavy-handed handling of its claim for the Spratly Islands, reflect, as far as Beijing is concerned, initial signs of Japan's acceptance of the new role of the PRC. Tokyo's pleading with Beijing to restrain Pyongyang's nuclear reach, which is specifically aimed at Tokyo, provides Beijing with additional leverage over Tokyo.
A critical question yet to be resolved is the role of Russia. Moscow has always considered "the Orient" as its primary zone of hegemony, and the drive South as its manifest destiny. Russia is working hard on the reintegration of the former Soviet Union, including Central Asia, while anticipating friction (at the very least) with the West. Moscow has no problems with the rise of China, as the myriad of recent and currently military deals demonstrate, as long as it does not interfere with the revival of Russia as a global superpower. The major question is the Islamists' reaction to the revival of Russian (neo-Soviet) hegemony in Central and South Asia. Moscow is convinced it can establish a strategic condominium with Beijing. Beijing is not hostile to such an eventually, especially once the Russophiles assume power in Moscow. In that case, Tehran and the Islamic bloc will have to cope with the new reality along the Trans-Asian Axis.
Thus, a major geo-strategic development has been taking place in Asia since late 1993: a Chinese drive to consolidate an anti-US Trans-Asian Axis along the route of the historic Silk Road which connects the heartland of Islam with China and East Asia. This Trans-Asian Axis is already of major political, strategic and economic importance. Considering the Islamic character of the states of Central and South Asia, the PRC pursues this geo-strategic surge in close collaboration with the Iran-led Islamic bloc of which these states are members.
The new alliance built around the Trans-Asian Axis is already a centre for military development and production (including nuclear weapons technologies), as well as financial centre for hard currency obtained through drug trade, counterfeiting US dollars, the acquisition of sophisticated Western technologies and industrial systems (both legally and illegally), as well as nuclear materials and sophisticated weapon systems from the former Soviet Union.
It is noteworthy that most of the economic activities related to the Trans-Asian Axis are illegal -- when judged by international norms -- and so huge that they already have had a dramatic impact on the structure and functioning of organised crime all over the world.
The Trans-Asian Axis already constitutes a clear military and strategic challenge to the US, a threat which will only increase in the immediate future. In 1992, key members of this alliance - North Korea, Iran, and Syria -- actively prepared to launch a coordinated war against the US and its close allies in order to reverse the growing Western influence in the world.
Beijing apparently gave its blessing and provided extensive military assistance. The plan was averted at the last minute because of internal problems in Pyongyang. Presently, the availability of operational nuclear weapons and regional delivery systems in the hands of the most radical elements of the Axis -- Iran and North Korea -- significantly increases their readiness to embark on a major confrontation with the US.
The Trans-Asian Axis may soon, if the present pace of preparations and coordination continues, transform into the primary strategic challenge facing the West. The near-future evolution of the Trans-Asian Axis will have a direct impact on the global posture of such countries as Russia and Japan, as well as on the present form of existence of such countries as Israel, India, and South Korea.